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This project examines the relationship between mid 18th/early 19th 
century feminism and didacticism through the work of one of the 
late 18th century’s most celebrated feminist writers, Mary 
Wollstonecraft. It is my contention that Wollstonecraft’s work is 
representative of the ways in which women writers of this period 
manipulated didactic conventions and strategies to further 
feminist goals.  Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman, often recognized as feminism’s “manifesto,” is generally 
regarded as the text that defines and delimits the scope of 
Wollstonecraft’s feminist project. Yet Wollstonecraft’s didactic 
texts, although generally dismissed in feminist critical 
contexts, further define and elaborate on her feminist project by 
promoting resistance to 18th century discourses concerning women’s 
‘proper sphere.’ Reading Wollstonecraft’s work in relation to 18th 
century didactic traditions, I argue that Wollstonecraft 
appropriates and revises the work of 18th century writers on the 
subject of women’s education such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Dr. John Gregory, epitomizing a feminist didactic approach later 
(re)deployed by Jane Austen and Charlotte Brontë.  
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In the first chapter, I (re)read Wollstonecraft’s 
Vindication through the lens of Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of 
authoritative discourse, generating a theoretical framework for 
understanding Wollstonecraft’s feminist discourse as 
appropriation.  I suggest that Vindication enacts the same 
discursive strategies as Wollstonecraft’s didactic texts in its 
appropriation of established 18th century masculine discourses. In 
Chapters II and III, I situate Wollstonecraft’s didactic texts, 
The Female Reader, Original Stories, and Thoughts on the 
Education of Daughters, in relation to didactic texts and 
traditions that shaped them, arguing that Wollstonecraft 
appropriates these texts and traditions in order to establish a 
feminist pedagogical approach.  Chapters IV and V examine the 
continuities between Wollstonecraft’s didactic approach and the 
work of Austen and Brontë.  They, like Wollstonecraft, borrow 
from and appropriate earlier didactic texts and traditions in 
order to construct their feminist projects.  The very different 
ways in which Austen and Brontë (re)work these traditions, I 
suggest, reveals a shift in feminist thought from the late 18th 
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PREFACE: (RE)READING DIDACTICISM 
In the following pages I have endeavored to point out some 
important things with respect to female education. It is true, 
many treatises have been already written; yet it occurred to me, 
that much still remained to be said. 
  
—Mary Wollstonecraft, Thoughts on the Education of 
Daughters 
 
I had been toiling for nearly an hour with Miss Lister, Miss 
Marriott and Ellen Cook, striving to teach them the distinction 
between an article and a substantive…In the afternoon; Miss Ellen 
Lister was trigonometrically oecumenical about her French 
lessons…If those girls knew how I loathe their company, they 
would not seek mine as they do.   
   
  —Charlotte Brontë, Roe Head Journal 
 
—Oh! Dear Fanny, Your mistake has been one that thousands of 
women fall into…There are such beings in the World perhaps, one 
in a Thousand, as the Creature You & I should think 
perfection…but such a person may not come in your way, or if he 
does, he may not be the eldest son of a Man of Fortune, the 
Brother of your particular friend, & belonging to your own 
Country.—Think of all this Fanny.  
 
  —Jane Austen, Letters  
 
In 1983, Jan Fergus remarked on what she saw as the modernist 
turn from didacticism as a way of understanding and interpreting 
literary structure and conventions, as she suggests “the 
classical dictum, still operative in eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth- century fiction, that literature should delight and 
instruct, has since been largely abandoned or qualified beyond 
recognition, and few words used in criticism carry more negative 
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connotations than ‘didactic’” (10). Feminist critical approaches 
to the work of Mary Wollstonecraft provide a powerful example of 
this larger turn away from didacticism.  Critics of the seventies 
inscribed Wollstonecraft into a scholarly context and ultimately 
into the literary canon, and critical discussions of 
Wollstonecraft often focus on the polemic treatise A Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman (1792) as feminism’s “manifesto” (Brody 
25). However, prior to the publication of this controversial text 
in 1792, Wollstonecraft made a rather meager living as a 
schoolmistress and as a writer of didactic texts.  Most critics 
have dismissed these texts in an attempt to resolve what they see 
as an ideological contradiction between the seemingly 
conservative pedagogy these texts promote and the powerful 
reforms proposed in Vindication.  
Prominent Wollstonecraft critics Janet Todd and Moira 
Ferguson offer a few plausible, yet dismissive explanations as to 
why Wollstonecraft’s earlier didactic and later polemic works 
appear to have contradictory interests regarding the improvement 
of women.  In the Introduction to The Female Reader, Ferguson 
argues that the disparity between Wollstonecraft’s later desire 
to transform the 18th century woman through a “revolution in 
female manners” (229) and the seemingly conservative pedagogy of 
her didactic writings may be attributed to an early lack of a 
“radical” influence that affected her only in her later years, 
when she became associated with “[persons who were] relativist-
inclined—atheists, empiricists, and free thinkers rather than 
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idealistic traditionalists [who] provided support and an 
intellectual touchstone for the change in her thinking” (xvii). 
In addition, Ferguson views the ideological contradictions 
between the earlier and latter stages of Wollstonecraft’s 
writing, as well as the obvious differences between what 
Wollstonecraft advocates pedagogically and her life itself, as an 
oversight, or the result of a lapse in discernment, as she 
states: “the contrast between this message [women as “dutiful 
wives and mothers”] and the lives and situations of the female 
contributors to the anthology [of The Female Reader] escapes 
Wollstonecraft” [italics mine] (xxi).  Finally, both Ferguson and 
Todd suggest that Wollstonecraft’s didactic works were products 
of her penury, and that she was simply “catering to a known 
market” (Ferguson xxvi), or hesitant to write outside of an 
acceptable mode of feminine discourse early in her career.  
The dismissal of Wollstonecraft’s didactic writing speaks 
to a larger feminist tendency to ignore the relationship between 
late 18th/early 19th century feminism and didactic traditions. 
Didactic texts have gained a reputation in both feminist 
criticism as well as history of the book as repositories of 
authoritative masculine discourse that relegated women to the 
domestic sphere.1 For the most part, these texts did function to 
                                                 
1 This argument is elaborated (in various ways) in Nancy Armstrong’s 
Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (1987), 
Nan Johnson’s Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric in North America. (1991), 
Cathy Davidson’s Revolution and the Word (1986), Kate Flint’s The Woman 
Reader (1993), and Harvey Graff’s The Legacies of Literacy: 
Continuities and Contradictions in Western Culture and Society (1987). 
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inscribe particular notions of womanhood and what constituted 
appropriate feminine behavior; however, in overlooking these 
texts, we dismiss a large body of writing that functioned to 
shape literary culture in the romantic period and the first half 
of the 19th century.  William St. Clair’s recent study in the 
history of the book entitled The Reading Nation in the Romantic 
Period (2004) calls attention to the prolific circulation of 
didactic writing throughout the late 18th and much of the 19th 
century that “constitute[s] a body of texts which, if we are to 
be fair to the mentalities of the romantic period, deserve our 
attention” (St. Clair 276). Extending St. Clair’s study to 
address the specific relationship between didactic traditions and 
Wollstonecraft’s work, I will argue that her work was shaped by 
and, in turn, revised and appropriated these traditions, and in 
turn again affected the work of other women writers.  
In (re)reading and (re)thinking the work of Wollstonecraft  
through the lens of book history, I seek to call the opposition 
between feminism and didacticism into question—to complicate the 
feminist critical notion that texts by late 18th/early 19th 
century women writers were either ‘feminist’ or ‘didactic.’ In 
Chapters I-III, I will argue that Wollstonecraft deploys the same 
revisionary strategies in her didactic texts as she does in 
Vindication, appropriating authoritative masculine discourse to  
further establish the rights of woman. In Chapters IV and V, I 
will address the work of Jane Austen and Charlotte Brontë—two 
canonical women writers often identified as “feminists”—to argue 
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that they, like Wollstonecraft, borrow from and appropriate 
didactic traditions in order to establish feminist projects.  
 
Late 18th /Early 19th Century Didactic Traditions  
When I refer to “didactic texts” in general, I characterize 
a large body of writing that circulated widely during the late 
18th/early 19th centuries that incorporated didactic 
themes/strategies in order instruct readers often in conjunction 
with paratextual features such as prefaces, exercises, and other 
didactic apparatuses. As William St. Clair argues, didactic texts 
overwhelmed the book market in Britain during the romantic 
period, as writers attempted to reinforce the “mainstream 
ideology” in response to growing threats of political and social 
change (277). Many of these texts, ranging from social and 
domestic guides (often referred to in criticism as ‘advice 
manuals’ or ‘conduct books’) to textbooks devoted to literacy and 
other types of school instruction such as the elocutionary 
reader, were geared towards young women. The term “didactic” also 
applies to many late 18th/early 19th century novels, which, as Jane 
Spencer argues, were more like “dramatized conduct book[s] for 
young women” (142), advocating proper moral behavior as a 
necessary part of women’s duty. The time frame of my study 
reflects the rise and decline of influential didactic traditions, 
beginning in 1749 with the publication of Sarah Fielding’s The 
Governess, often recognized as the first didactic novel geared 
specifically towards young women. The date of 1847 marks the 
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publication of Jane Eyre and what I recognize as a critical turn 
away from the pedagogy Wollstonecraft and Fielding promote. 
Carr, Carr, and Schultz’s approach to 19th century textbooks 
in Archives of Instruction (2005) provides a useful model for 
understanding the complex relationships amongst didactic texts. 
Their recognition of 19th century textbooks in the U.S. as 
belonging to “traditions” rather than ‘types’ or ‘genres’ 
emphasizes the ways in which textbooks often borrow from and 
“rework” one another, as Carr, Carr, and Schultz “trace the 
intermittent migrations of routines, practices, and principles 
from one tradition to another” (17). I adopt the term “tradition” 
to signify the dynamic and fluid nature of didactic discourses 
disallowed by the term ‘genre,’ which reflects my larger project 
of recognizing how didactic texts are appropriated and revised in 
Wollstonecraft’s work. Throughout this study, I invoke common 
critical terms for specific didactic traditions such as “conduct 
book” and “elocutionary reader” and provide designations for 
traditions that have been hitherto unrecognized. In each case, I 
explain the conventional aspects of a didactic tradition based on 
widely-circulating exemplars that might be read as representative 
of what Carr, Carr, and Shultz refer to as the “shared features” 
of a tradition (16). In so doing, I essay to distinguish 





Feminism and the Discourse of Appropriation 
In most feminist critical contexts that address 
Wollstonecraft and other women writers of the late 18th/early 19th 
centuries, feminism is recognized as an ideological position or 
attitude that might be characterized according to categories 
espoused by postmodern feminism. Anne K. Mellor’s attempt to link 
Jane Austen’s work to Wollstonecraft’s Vindication exemplifies 
the common approach of characterizing late 18th century feminism 
using the terms and categories that have evolved out of 
first/second wave and (post)modern feminisms. She suggests that 
“it is crucial to see that Austen is neither the eighteenth-
century conservative so many critics have long described, nor the 
radical feminist Margaret Kirkham and others have recently 
claimed” (52). She goes on to describe Austen as a “moderate 
feminist.” This approach is inherently limited, as it seeks to 
apply terms that have evolved within a particular political 
movement to the work of women writers who had no such forum to 
establish a consolidated feminist agenda.  
In opposition to this common characterization, I will treat 
“feminism” as any discursive practice that seeks to subvert 
authoritative masculine discourse through appropriation. 
Understood in this way, a “feminist” approach is not necessarily 
an explicit or overt one; it might be recognized in the subtle 
redefinition of a term such as “virtue” or the revision of a 
didactic project. I have utilized Bakhtin’s theory of 
authoritative discourse which characterizes the struggle involved 
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in assimilating “the word of the fathers” as a model for 
understanding the ways in which women writers appropriated 
established masculine discourses prior to the advent of feminist 
political movements. In general, I invoke the term 
“appropriation” in the Bakhtinian sense—as the “assimilation” of 
another’s discourse that is “tightly interwoven with ‘one’s own 
word’” (“Novel” 345). However, as didactic texts are comprised of 
paratextual features that mark them as belonging to certain 
traditions, I also use “appropriation” to signify 
Wollstonecraft’s recasting of an earlier didactic structure or 
framework. At times, I qualify “appropriation” with a term that 
more accurately characterizes the process in relation to a 
specific didactic text. For example, in Chapter III, I use the 
term “refashioning” which I borrow from Carr, Carr, and Schultz 
to signify a method of adaptation specific to didactic 
traditions.  
This project does not work towards a recovery of didactic 
writing for its own sake, however. Rather, the following chapters 
underscore the ways in which women writers manipulated didactic 
traditions as a means of generating feminist projects. Showing 
how feminism and didacticism intersect opens up ways of thinking 
about the possibilities and limitations of late 18th/early 19th 
century feminist practices and, in turn, how we might make use of 
those practices today.  
  xvii
1.0  (RE)READING A VINDICATION: FEMINIST DISCOURSE AS 
APPROPRIATION 
Often recognized as feminism’s “manifesto,” Wollstonecraft’s A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman has consistently been 
characterized as representative of feminist positions that 
reflect the values of very diverse political and academic 
agendas. Carol H. Poston describes Wollstonecraft’s Vindication 
as a text that endures because is often subsumed by the interests 
of whatever feminist movement it appeals to, as she explains that 
“the history of the subsequent editions of A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman closely parallels the vicissitudes of the women’s 
movement: when feminism as a political cause comes to the fore … 
Mary Wollstonecraft’s work is one of the first to be reissued” 
(ix).  Advocates of the early women’s rights movement recognized 
in Wollstonecraft’s Vindication a powerful manifesto to reinforce 
the ideology of republican motherhood, and Wollstonecraft was 
established as an important figure in late 19th century feminist 
culture. Proponents of the early feminist movement focused on 
Wollstonecraft’s arguments concerning the improvement of women’s 
“moral responsibility” within the domestic sphere and overlooked 
those that called for more radical forms of political and “social 
change” (Brody 59). Critics of the seventies hoped to re-inscribe 
the ‘domesticated’ Wollstonecraft of the early feminists into the 
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politically radical context of the French Revolution, and were 
writing about authors like Wollstonecraft as a way to shape the 
emergent field of “women’s studies” (Sapiro 316-318).2 These 
readings are representative of positions critics frequently 
ascribe to when addressing Wollstonecraft in current critical 
contexts—she is either a ‘moderate’ feminist who hopes to 
ameliorate women through education or a ‘radical’ feminist who 
recognizes the condition of women as indicative of the need for 
more profound political or social change.3   
While Vindication has been lionized for its feminist 
approach and established as part of the feminist literary canon, 
Wollstonecraft’s didactic texts have often been dismissed as 
reinforcing normative 18th century educational standards for 
women. Usually, this distinction is made based on genre; critics 
recognize Vindication as a polemic that enables Wollstonecraft to 
voice her perspective regarding the improvement of women and 
establish a more ‘radical’ position than other women writers 
addressing similar issues in more ‘conservative’ didactic modes 
                                                 
2 For an elaboration of these feminist arguments, see Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage’s History of Woman 
Suffrage (New York: Fowler & Wells, 1881), Elizabeth Robins Pennel’s 
Mary Wollstonecraft (1885) and “A Century of Women’s Rights,” 
(Fortnightly Review,1890), Millicent Garrett Fawcett’s “A Pioneer of 
the Movement” (from The Case for Women’s Suffrage, 1907), Virginia 
Sapiro’s “Feminist Studies and the Discipline: A Study of Mary 
Wollstonecraft,” (1974), and Elissa S. Guralnick’s “Radical Politics in 
Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman” (1977). 
Excerpts from Pennel, Fawcett, and articles by Sapiro and Guralnick 
reprinted in Harriet Devine Jump’s Mary Wollstonecraft and the Critics, 
1788-2001, Vol. I. (New York: Routledge, 2003).   
3 See, for example, Alison Sulloway’s characterization of Wollstonecraft 
in Jane Austen and the Province of Womanhood (U of Pennsylvania, 1989) 
vs. Mellor’s characterization in Romanticism and Gender (Routledge, 
1993).  
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(Ferguson and Todd 320).  However, Wollstonecraft’s Vindication 
and her didactic texts are actually very similar in their 
discursive approach to masculine authoritative discourses. In 
both Vindication and her didactic texts, Wollstonecraft’s 
feminism is simultaneously a reinscription of authoritative 
discourses and an appropriation of them. Therefore, her feminist 
‘position’—which earlier critics have attempted to establish and 
categorize—is contingent upon the mode of masculine discourse to 
which she “responds” at a given point in the text, and is thus 
often described as fragmented and circuitous.4 Here, I will 
discuss Wollstonecraft’s approach to appropriating masculine 
authoritative discourses in Vindication as a theoretical model 
for characterizing the discursive practices of her didactic texts 
in subsequent chapters.  
Mitzi Myers remarks on the manner in which women of the 
late 18th/early 19th centuries simultaneously adopted and resisted 
established masculine discourses to assure their arguments a  
“proper hearing:”    
Subordinate groups like women must shape their world 
views through the dominant models, transforming their 
                                                 
4 Both Janet Todd and Miriam Brody have remarked on Vindication’s 
multitude of “digressions, contradictions, and asides” (what Brody 
refers to as Wollstonecraft’s “concentric” writing style), as 
Wollstonecraft will seemingly drop one subject and move on to another 
abruptly, or without explanation (Todd 186). Strangely enough, this 
tendency towards “digression,” Todd argues, is that which has enabled 
Wollstonecraft to “anticipate[] most positions of modern feminism” 
(186), or to “speak[] as much to the problems of women at the turn of 
the twenty-first century as it did to those of the contemporaries of 
Mary Wollstonecraft in 1792” (Brody 2). 
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own perceptions and needs as best they can in terms of 
received frameworks. If women’s alternative or 
counterpart models are not acceptably encoded in the 
prevailing male idiom, female concerns will not 
receive proper hearing…Since female models 
characteristically operate in terms of strategically 
redefining and rescripting traditional markers, the 
linguistic surface of such sexual pronouncements must 
be carefully scrutinized for imperfect integrations, 
submerged conflicts, covert messages—for all the 
meanings which hover interstitially. (quoted in Poston 
332) 
Myers calls attention to the possibility of women writers 
“strategically redefining and rescripting traditional markers,” 
but she does not elaborate on how to read “women’s alternate or 
counterpart models,” suggesting that we must “scrutinize[] [them] 
for imperfect integrations, submerged conflicts, covert messages—
for all the meanings which hover interstitially.” While Myers 
does enact a reading of both Wollstonecraft and Hannah Moore in 
which she demonstrates how various discourses might be recognized 
as part of a larger historical debate concerning women’s role in 
18th century society, she lacks a theoretical approach by which to 
identify “imperfect integrations, submerged conflicts, covert 
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messages.”5  Like Myers, feminist critics such as Mary Poovey and 
Laurie Finke acknowledge and have sought to analyze the various 
discursive manifestations of Wollstonecraft’s struggle with 
masculine discourses, yet none offers insight into the process by 
which Wollstonecraft enacts the “redefining or rescripting 
traditional markers.”6 A woman writing on the improvement of 
women in the late 18th/early 19th centuries inevitably entered a 
conversation dominated by men of letters that obliged her to 
contend—not just with an 18th century “male-dominated philosophic 
discourse” (Finke 20) in general, but with the discrete and 
nuanced discourses established by philosophers, political 
theorists, didactic writers, among others on the subject of 
women’s role in society. In “The Problem of Speech Genres,” 
Bakhtin describes the “complex and multiplanar” nature of the 
“work-utterance” (93, 75-76), a theoretical approach that allows 
us to read Vindication—not as a set of “covert messages”—but as 
                                                 
5 Myers’s approach (suggesting that critics “scrutiniz[e]” the text for 
“imperfect integrations, [etc.]”) could become somewhat challenging in 
relation to a text like A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, which is 
comprised of a variety of “received frameworks.” Although many of the 
“dominant models” Wollstonecraft adopts in  Vindication  are within the 
realm of common critical knowledge (and appear as footnotes in the 
annotated versions of the text), such as the Bible, Milton, Pope, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, among many others, when looking at 
Wollstonecraft’s earlier works (and the fact that she worked as a 
critic for the Analytical Review) it is evident that her influences 
extended beyond these larger literary and political figures to include 
writers on education  such as Catharine Macaulay (Letters on Education 
(1790)) Hester Chapone (Letters on the Improvement of the Mind (1773)), 
and Sarah Trimmer (Fabulous Histories (1784)).   
6 See Mary Poovey’s “The Gender of Genres in Late Eighteenth-Century 
England” and Laurie Finke’s “‘A Philosophic Wanton’: Language and 
Authority in Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman,” in 
Harriet Devine Jump’s Mary Wollstonecraft and the Critics 1788-2001 
(Routledge, 2003).  
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“a link in the chain of speech communication … with respect to 
other, related utterances” (93):  
However monological the utterance may be (for example, 
a scientific or philosophical treatise), however much 
it may concentrate on its own object, it cannot but 
be, in some measure, a response to what has already 
been said about the given topic, on the given issue, 
even though this responsiveness may not have assumed a 
clear-cut external expression. It will be manifested 
in the overtones of the style, in the finest nuances 
of the composition. (92)7  
As Bakhtin’s conception of the “work-utterance” suggests, we 
cannot “understand fully the style” of Wollstonecraft’s 
Vindication without first considering the diversity of its 
“dialogic overtones”—without imagining how the construction of 
Wollstonecraft’s feminist discourse serves as a “response to what 
has already been said on the given topic” of women’s education 
(92).  By locating the “others’ thoughts” to which Vindication 
“responds,” I would argue that we might identify the points at 
which Wollstonecraft appropriates authoritative discourse to 
establish the rights of woman. Utilizing Bakhtin’s theory 
concerning “authoritative discourse,” we might also identify this 
                                                 
7 In a Bakhtinian sense, the definition of “style” takes on a specific 
role in relation to his argument concerning the nature of the 
“utterance” (see above), and it is considered a direct result of  “how 
the speaker (or writer) senses and imagines his addressees” (95), which 
determines “my choice of a genre for my utterance, my choice of 
compositional devices, and, finally, my choice of language vehicles, 
that is, the style of my utterance” (96).  
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type of discourse’s discursive effects, thus rendering the 
“meanings which hover interstitially” recognizable as well.  
Bakhtin suggests that when a discourse is actualized and reified 
from positions of power (like masculine discourse in the 18th 
century), it 
…demands our unconditional allegiance…[and] permits no 
play with the context framing it, no play with its 
borders, no gradual and flexible transitions, no 
spontaneously creative stylizing variants on it. It 
enters our verbal consciousness as a compact and 
indivisible mass; one must either totally affirm it, 
or totally reject it. It is indissolubly fused with 
its authority—with political power, an institution, a 
person—and it stands and falls together with that 
authority. One cannot divide it up—agree with one 
part, accept but not completely another part, reject 
utterly a third part…Authoritative discourse cannot be 
represented—-it is only transmitted. (343-44)  
A discourse that “cannot be represented” but “only transmitted” 
leaves little latitude for argumentative “play,” as one must 
“totally affirm” or “totally reject” the discourse as it cannot 
be modified; one cannot nuance the discourse, or as Bakhtin 
suggests, “stylize” or “vary” it, which is the ‘grey area’ in 
which most successful arguments develop.  Laurie Finke’s 
description of the position of the writing subject in the polemic 
genre demonstrates that it was a likely forum for the total 
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affirmation or total rejection of authoritative discourse, as she 
suggests (quoting Walter Ong) that argument during the 18th 
century was considered a form of “combat” in which one engaged in 
either “defense” or “attack” of a particular polemic “position” 
(Jump 5). She further explains that, “As a woman, Wollstonecraft 
could not hope to be published without appropriating…this 
rhetorical prose, however incongruous it might seem for her sex” 
(Jump 5).   
However, Bakhtin’s theory concerning authoritative 
discourse allows for a discursive possibility that extends beyond 
the dichotomies of total affirmation/total rejection or (using 
Finke’s terms) defense/attack.  Bakhtin’s theory suggests that, 
when it is acknowledged as such, authoritative discourse “is only 
transmitted.” But the “dialogic interrelationship” existing 
between authoritative discourse and its counterpart, “internally 
persuasive discourse” reveals that “another’s discourse” can be 
“simultaneously authoritative and internally persuasive”—a 
“struggle” between the “authoritative word” on the one hand, and 
the “internally persuasive” word which “is denied all privilege, 
backed up by no authority at all, and is frequently not even 
acknowledged in society…” (Bakhtin 342).   Unlike “authoritative 
discourse,” “internally persuasive discourse” is “affirmed 
through assimilation, tightly interwoven with ‘one’s own word.’ 
In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally 
persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone else’s. Its 
creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that 
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such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes 
masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an 
isolated and static condition” (Bakhtin 345).   
Given the “dialogic interrelationship” between these two 
types of discourse, we might read Vindication as appropriating 
aspects of the masculine authoritative discourses that 
Wollstonecraft found to be internally persuasive, while totally 
accepting or totally rejecting those that remained merely 
authoritative to her. What Myers, Poovey, and Finke treat as 
Wollstonecraft’s acquiescence to authoritative discourse, I see 
as a dialogue taking place between the authoritative and the 
internally persuasive word that ultimately represents “an intense 
struggle within…for hegemony among various available verbal and 
ideological points of view, approaches, directions and values” 
(Bakhtin 346). We cannot, of course, know the nature of 
Wollstonecraft’s “struggle within” as she wrote Vindication or 
what attitudes she had towards specific types of discourses. 
However, Bakhtin’s description of the discursive effects of 
authoritative and internally persuasive discourses (i.e. 
transmission vs. assimilation) makes it possible to discern the 
features of such discourse in Wollstonecraft’s text. 
The most pervasive and profound example of Wollstonecraft’s 
appropriation of authoritative discourse involves her 
manipulation of Scripture. With more than thirty references to 
Biblical passages (not counting those invoked through Milton’s 
Paradise Lost), Wollstonecraft demonstrates that the Bible might 
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be appropriated in service of—rather than to undermine—an 
argument for the improvement of women.8 Dismissing the 
conventional monitory verses reinforcing women’s subjugation to 
man (i.e., Eve as Adam’s rib, man as the ‘head’ of the 
household), Wollstonecraft recognizes the “omnipotence” of a New 
Testament God, or “the supreme Being,” who is “just,” “wise,” and 
“good”—a God who aligns with what her “reason tells [her]” 
divinity should be (46). For instance, in Chapter II of 
Vindication entitled “The Prevailing Opinion of a Sexual 
Character Discussed,” Wollstonecraft writes  
Probably the prevailing opinion, that woman was 
created for man, may have taken its rise from Moses’s 
poetical story; yet, as very few, it is presumed, who 
have bestowed any serious thought on the subject, ever 
supposed that Eve was, literally speaking, one of 
Adam’s ribs, the deduction must be allowed to fall to 
the ground; or, only be so far admitted as it proves 
that man, from the remotest antiquity, found it 
convenient to exert his strength to subjugate his 
companion, and his invention to shew that she ought to 
have her neck bent under the yoke, because the whole 
                                                 
8 Wollstonecraft’s appropriation of Scripture in the interests of 
feminist goals anticipates the work of later women writers such as 
Charlotte Brontë (see Section entitled “Christianity Reconceived” in 
Chapter V) and activists in the first feminist movement such as 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who published a controversial revision of the 
Bible entitled The Woman’s Bible (1895).   
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creation was only created for his convenience or 
pleasure.  (26) 
By invoking religious authoritative discourse, Wollstonecraft 
appears to be working within the boundaries of male-dominated 
ideology, as she references “Moses,” “Adam’s ribs,” “Eve,” and 
“creation.”  Rhetorically, her ability to address this biblical 
“story” indicates that she, like any proper 18th century woman, 
has some knowledge of Biblical Scripture, thus anticipating 
attacks on her ignorance of woman’s God-given duty. However, by 
referring to the Scriptural rendering of Creation as a “story”  
authored by Moses, Wollstonecraft draws attention to the fact 
that it was written—not by an omnipotent God—but by a fallible 
man who might, in exercising his own will, “exert his strength to 
subjugate his companion.”  In describing it as a “poetical” work 
of “invention” she underscores its aesthetic and didactic (and 
therefore allegorical) functions, as she remarks that “few…who 
have bestowed any serious thought on the subject, ever supposed 
that Eve was, literally speaking, one of Adam’s ribs.” Her 
suggestion that those capable of rational thought could not take 
the story “literally” questions religious representation of it as 
an historical ‘fact’ by which to justify the oppression of women 
(as a mere ‘extension’ of Adam’s body). As a whole, 
Wollstonecraft’s response to Moses’s “work-utterance” 
simultaneously demonstrates her investment in that work (as 
worthy of response) as well as her rejection of it as indicative 
of man’s desire for “convenience or pleasure.”  
  11
Wollstonecraft’s response to Scripture extends beyond the 
parameters of acceptance and rejection (or mere transmission of 
that discourse), however. In the subsequent paragraph, she 
writes:  
Let it not be concluded that I wish to invert the 
order of things; I have already granted, that, from 
the constitution of their bodies, men seem to be 
designed by Providence to attain a greater degree of 
virtue. I speak collectively of the whole sex; but I 
see not the shadow of a reason to conclude that their 
virtues should differ in respect to their nature. In 
fact, how can they, if virtue has only one eternal 
standard? I must therefore, if I reason 
consequentially, as strenuously maintain that they 
have the same simple direction, as that there is a 
God. (26) 
Perhaps acknowledging that she has gone too far in questioning 
Moses’s “poetical story,” Wollstonecraft suggests that she does 
not “wish to invert the order of things”—or supplant a masculine 
religious discourse with a feminine one. However, having 
dismissed his story on the grounds that it is “poetical” rather 
than factual, she invokes “God” as the Being that might properly 
“invent” an “eternal standard” of “virtue.” Wollstonecraft thus 
appropriates Moses’s God as the means to correct his “convenient” 
rendering of Creation and as a “standard” by which to “maintain” 
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that virtue for men and women should both “have the same simple 
direction.”   
In the following chapter, Wollstonecraft again invokes God 
as “the supreme Being” or the “only solid foundation for 
morality,” reinforcing her distinction between the will of God 
and the will of men. She suggests that  
[f]or to love God as the fountain of wisdom, goodness, 
and power, appears to be the only worship useful to a 
being who wishes to acquire either virtue or 
knowledge. A blind unsettled affection may, like human 
passions, occupy the mind and warm the heart, whilst, 
to do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with our 
God, is forgotten…if women be educated for dependence; 
that is, to act according to the will of another 
fallible being [man], and submit, right or wrong, to 
power, where are we to stop?” (46, 48)   
Alluding to a line in the Old Testament book of Micah, “What doth 
the lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, 
and to walk humbly with thy God?” (6:8), Wollstonecraft 
manipulates Scripture to question women’s “dependence” on 
“fallible being[s].” Suggesting that, if allowed to act according 
to God’s “wisdom, goodness, and power,” women might, as Micah 
advises, “do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with our God,” 
Wollstonecraft undermines the notion that women should access God 
through men. Rather, she indicates that a “blind unsettled 
affection” might lead to acquiescence to the “wrong” sort of 
  13
“power,” thus rendering women “answerable for their conduct to a 
higher tribunal, liable to error” (48).  By revealing the 
potentially edifying effects of allowing women direct access to 
Scripture, Wollstonecraft appropriates God as a means of feminine 
access to “virtue,” “knowledge,” and even “power.”  
Having called into question long-standing religious 
doctrine, Wollstonecraft takes a similar approach to the work of 
her contemporaries. In the following passage, it is possible to 
locate—not just an investment in political concerns—but an 
assimilation of Thomas Paine’s discourse from his influential 
treatise on the Rights of Man. Wollstonecraft writes: 
Such a woman is not a more irrational monster than 
some of the Roman Emperors, who were depraved by 
lawless power. Yet, since kings have been more under 
the restraint of law, and the curb, however weak, of 
honour, the records of history are not filled with 
such unnatural instances of folly and cruelty, nor 
does the despotism that kills virtue and genius in the 
bud, hover over Europe with that destructive blast 
which desolates Turkey, and renders the men, as well 
as the soil, unfruitful…Let not men in the pride of 
power, use the same arguments that tyrannic kings and 
venal ministers have used, and fallaciously assert 
that woman ought to be subjected because she has 
always been so. –But, when man, governed by reasonable 
laws, enjoys his natural freedom, let him despise 
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woman, if she do not share it with him; and, till that 
glorious period arrives, in descanting on the folly of 
the sex, let him not overlook his own.  (44-45) 
There are various discursive similarities in this excerpt from 
Rights of Man, indicating that it is a text to which Vindication 
“responds:” 
…The natural moderation of Louis XVI contributed 
nothing to alter the hereditary despotism of the 
Monarchy. All the tyrannies of former reigns, acted 
under that hereditary despotism, were still liable to 
be revived in the hands of a successor. A casual 
discontinuance of the practice of despotism, is not a 
discontinuance of its principles; the former depends 
on the virtue of the individual who is in immediate 
possession of the power; the latter, on the virtue and 
fortitude of the nation…But men who can consign over 
the rights of posterity for ever on the authority of a 
mouldy parchment, like Mr. Burke, are not qualified to 
judge of this Revolution. It takes in a field too vast 
for their views to explore, and proceeds with a 
mightiness of reason they cannot keep pace with. (78) 
Notice how Wollstonecraft’s argument for the ‘rights of woman’ is 
couched in Paine’s discourse concerning the Rights of Man. She 
incorporates radical philosophic terms such as “despotism,” 
“virtue,” “reason,” and “power,” using Paine’s critique of 
“hereditary despotism” as a means of launching her own arguments 
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against women’s abuse of “lawless power” and men’s subjugation of 
women. Although Paine, like Locke and Rousseau, does not extend 
the “rights of posterity” to women, Wollstonecraft does not 
“stylize” or “vary” Paine’s argument by explicitly suggesting the 
obvious—that Paine’s argument for a “Nation” in which “every 
citizen is a member of the sovereignty” (82) should include women 
as well. However, what initially appears to be a “total 
affirmation” of Paine’s authoritative discourse shifts to 
Wollstonecraft’s appropriation of that discourse for her own 
purposes, as she extends Paine’s argument regarding “the 
hereditary despotism of the Monarchy” to women and finally 
suggests that, in a condition of “natural freedom,” man would 
“despise woman” if she were not also “governed by reasonable 
laws.”  Hence, in the course of one passage Wollstonecraft 
approaches Paine’s discourse as both authoritative, as she does 
not initially revise it to allow for the rights of woman, and 
internally persuasive, as she ultimately assimilates it, thus 
“awakening new and independent words” that criticize men such as 
Paine for failing to recognize their own complicity in using “the 
same arguments that tyrannic kings and venal ministers have used, 
[to] fallaciously assert that woman ought to be subjected because 
she has always been so.” 
Vindication not only appropriates authoritative discourses 
that Wollstonecraft seems to accept or respect, but also those 
that she “totally rejects.” In his influential educational 
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treatise entitled Émile,9 which Wollstonecraft openly repudiates 
in Vindication, Rousseau suggests that, in accordance with the 
laws of “Nature,” “ a woman who is naturally weak…must have the 
skill to incline [men] to do every thing which her sex will not 
enable her to do herself, and which is necessary and agreeable to 
her…She should learn to penetrate into [men’s] real sentiments 
from their conversation, their actions, their looks, and 
gestures” (349-50). To achieve this end, she is equipped with the 
“natural gift” of “cunning” and the “distinctive character[]” of 
“coquetry” (348).  In the following passage, Wollstonecraft 
“attacks” Rousseau’s position regarding the “natural” role of 
women in society: 
Rousseau declares that a woman should never, for a 
moment, feel herself independent, that she should be 
governed by fear to exercise her natural cunning, and 
made a coquettish slave in order to render her a more 
alluring object of desire, a sweeter companion to man, 
whenever he chooses to relax himself. He carries his 
arguments, which he pretends to draw from the 
indications of nature, still further, and insinuates 
that truth and fortitude, the corner stones of all 
human virtue, should be cultivated with certain 
restrictions, because, with respect to the female 
character, obedience is the grand lesson which ought 
                                                 
9 For a more thorough discussion of Émile and Rousseau’s conception of 
womanhood, see Chapter III. 
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to be impressed with unrelenting rigour…What nonsense! 
when will a great man arise with sufficient strength 
of mind to puff away the fumes which pride and 
sensuality have thus spread over the subject! If women 
are by nature inferior to men, their virtues must be 
the same in quality, if not in degree, or virtue is a 
relative idea; consequently, their conduct should be 
founded on the same principles, and have the same aim. 
(25-26)  
As Bakhtin’s account of authoritative discourse suggests, 
Wollstonecraft’s “total rejection” of Rousseau’s discourse 
serves—to a degree—to facilitate its transmission. As it is 
“indissolubly fused with its authority—with political power, an 
institution, a person—and … stands and falls together with that 
authority,” Wollstonecraft’s argument is grounded in an implicit 
acceptance of the terms of Rousseau’s discourse. Terms like 
“coquette,” “cunning,” “nature,” “virtue,” and “obedience” 
initially define woman and her sphere of action, but immediately 
following this vehement attack of Rousseau, Wollstonecraft 
exclaims “What Nonsense!” and commences to offer her own 
assimilation of his authoritative word.  Appropriating Rousseau’s 
notion of virtue, Wollstonecraft argues that women should have 
“virtues” that are “the same in quality, if not in degree” to 
those of men. Although she does not explicitly redefine the term, 
her assertion that it must “be founded on the same principles, 
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and have the same aim” as virtue in men alludes to a potential 
“rescripting” of the term according to her own principles.  
As these examples indicate, Wollstonecraft’s argument in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman is at once both a transmission 
of masculine authoritative discourse and an assimilation of that 
discourse into her own internally persuasive “word[s]”—what I 
have called an appropriation of it.  Such a text inevitably 
appears to digress or contradict, since Wollstonecraft 
“transmits” and appropriates the discourses of a variety of 
different authorities whose ideals often resist one another; 
beyond Paine and Rousseau, she takes on Pope, Milton, and Dr. 
John Gregory, among others. Readers anticipating a consistent 
defense or attack concerning the rights of woman are instead left 
to assess their relationship to the multitude of authoritative 
voices “interwoven with” Wollstonecraft’s—to determine how (if at 
all) two ideals operating within separate discursive registers 
(“virtue” as per Rousseau & educational theory vs. “natural 
freedom” from Paine & 18th century political thought) can coexist 
as penultimate goals for Wollstonecraft’s “revolution in female 
manners” (45). 
This is not, however, to limit the text’s discursive 
possibility to Wollstonecraft’s struggle with (and appropriation 
of) authoritative discourse. As a writer for the Analytical 
Review, Wollstonecraft read the work of women writers whose 
discourse was not recognized as authoritative. One such woman 
(whom Wollstonecraft reviewed favorably) was known for her 
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History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the 
Brunswick Line (1763-84), her “Whig sympathies,” and a 
controversial second marriage to a man 36 years her junior 
(Damrosch, et al. 247).  As Ralph Wardle and others have noted, 
Wollstonecraft “was considerably indebted to [Catharine 
Macaulay’s Letters on Education (1790)] for the formation of her 
own thesis…for in the Rights of Woman she was to repeat and 
develop almost every point which Mrs. Macaulay had made” (Poston 
219). A quick perusal of Macaulay’s section headings reveals the 
extent of Wollstonecraft’s indebtedness (she had reviewed Letters 
for the Analytical Review). References to “the Same” education 
for “Boys and Girls,” the lack of “Difference in Sex,” and a 
critique of the art of “Coquetry” indicate a substantial overlap 
between the ways in which these two women hope to ameliorate the 
condition of their sex. Consider the following passage from 
Macaulay’s Letters in relation to Wollstonecraft’s invective 
against Rousseau (above): 
Among the most strenuous asserters of sexual 
difference in character, Rousseau is the most 
conspicuous…never did enthusiasms and the love of 
paradox, those enemies to philosophical disquisition, 
appear in more strong opposition to plain sense than 
in Rousseau’s definition of this difference. He sets 
out with a supposition, that Nature intended to the 
subjection of the one sex to the other; that 
consequently there must be an inferiority of intellect 
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in the subjected party; but as a man is a very 
imperfect being, and apt to play the capricious 
tyrant, Nature, to bring things nearer to an equality, 
bestowed on the woman such attractive graces, and such 
an insinuating address, as to turn the balance on the 
other scale. Thus nature, in a giddy mood, recedes 
from her purposes, and subjects prerogative to an 
influence which must produce confusion and disorder in 
the system of human affairs. Rousseau saw this 
objection; and in order to obviate it, he has made up 
a moral person of the union of the two sexes, which, 
for contradiction and absurdity, outdoes every 
metaphysical riddle that was ever formed in the 
schools. In short, it is not reason, it is not wit; it 
is pride and sensuality that speak in Rousseau, and in 
this instance, has lowered the man of genius to the 
licentious pendant. (208) 
Despite the difference in the tone of the two critiques, as 
Wollstonecraft, in accordance with 18th century polemic style, 
engages in an ad hominem attack of Rousseau, while Macaulay 
carefully explains Rousseau’s position so as to be understood by 
a young pupil, the general course of these two arguments is very 
similar. Like Macaulay, Wollstonecraft seeks to expose the flaws 
in Rousseau’s doctrine of “sexual difference.” Both women refer 
to his alleged adherence to the immutable laws of “Nature,” his 
conception of woman as the “subjugated” or “inferior” sex, 
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finally emphasizing the “absurdity” or “nonsens[ical]” nature of 
this perspective—attributing it to “pride and sensuality.” 
However, although Macaulay later refers to the manner in which 
“[t]he principles and nature of virtue, which is never properly 
explained to boys, is kept quite a mystery to girls” (209), she 
does not, like Wollstonecraft, move toward a redefinition of 
Rousseau’s notion of virtue. Thus, Wollstonecraft extends 
Macaulay’s argument, as she “rescripts” masculine authoritative 
discourse for the purposes of establishing a (very) latent 
feminist discourse—one in which masculine ideals such as “virtue” 
might be applied to women as well.  
Overall, Vindication cannot be classified according to one 
specific argumentative approach or mode of discourse. 
Wollstonecraft did not write feminism’s “manifesto,” but 
struggled to recontextualize seemingly authoritative discourses 
amongst others that would necessarily undermine them: Rousseau’s 
doctrine of sexual difference could not stand long in 
conversation with Paine’s Doctrine of Equal Rights.  Conventional 
feminist categories like ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ may accurately 
characterize specific moments in Vindication, but they cannot 
encompass the entirety of what the text is—Wollstonecraft’s 
response to a multitude of other “work-utterances” that she 
ultimately appropriates to establish the Rights of Woman.  As I 
will argue in subsequent chapters, Wollstonecraft engages in a 
similar approach to masculine discourses in her pedagogical 
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writing as well, working to recast didactic convention and 
further define the terms of feminine virtue and rationality. 
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2.0  (RE)READING THE FEMALE READER 
Although book historians have found only one existing edition, 
Mary Wollstonecraft’s The Female Reader is worth rereading—not 
for its ‘originality’ (as in the case of Vindication), but for 
its revisions of the conventional 18th century approach to 
elocution. It is well known that Wollstonecraft made a living 
before the publication of her groundbreaking A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman (1792) writing and compiling didactic texts for 
young women. I will discuss Thoughts on the Education of 
Daughters (1787) and Original Stories from Real Life (1788) 
later, in some detail, but here I’ll note that these books, like 
The Female Reader, ostensibly reinforce rather than resist 
normative educational standards for women. This seeming 
inconsistency between Wollstonecraft’s pedagogical and polemical 
works is often remarked upon by feminist critics.10 Wollstonecraft 
herself in a famous passage from The Vindication provides the 
basic terms of this cultural analysis of “accomplishment” based 
education, which is what she offers (at least in part) in her own 
pedagogical works. She writes: 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Moira Ferguson’s Introduction to the reprint of The 
Female Reader and Janet Todd’s Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary 
Life. 
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The education of women has, of late, been more 
attended to than formerly; yet they are still reckoned 
a frivolous sex, and ridiculed or pitied by the 
writers who endeavor by satire or instruction to 
improve them. It is acknowledged that they spend many 
of the first years of their lives in acquiring a 
smattering of accomplishments; meanwhile strength of 
mind and body are sacrificed to libertine notions of 
beauty, to the desire of establishing themselves,— the 
only way women can rise in the world,— by marriage. 
And this desire making mere animals of them, when they 
marry they act as children are expected to act:— they 
dress, they paint, they nickname God’s creatures.— 
Surely these weak beings are only fit for a 
seraglio!...  I may be accused of arrogance; still I 
must declare that what I firmly believe, that all the 
writers who have written on the subject of female 
education and manners from Rousseau to Dr. Gregory, 
have contributed to render women more artificial, weak 
characters, than they would otherwise have been; and, 
consequently, more useless members of society. ***My 
objection extends to the whole purport of those books, 
which tend, in my opinion, to degrade one half of the 
human species, and render women pleasing at the 
expense of every solid virtue. (212-13, 218)  
  25
Wollstonecraft adamantly disapproves of Dr. Gregory and “the 
whole purport of those books” that are comparable to his advice 
book for young women, yet she includes excerpts from his work in 
The Female Reader (1789), among other selections that might also 
be said to “render women pleasing at the expense of every solid 
virtue.”  As a result, The Female Reader seems at variance with 
the reconceptualization of women’s education (as the 
“strengthening of mind and body”) that Wollstonecraft proposes in 
Vindication. However, in Chapter I, I point to the ways in which 
Wollstonecraft appropriates masculine authoritative discourse in 
the process of establishing her feminist project. Like 
Vindication, The Female Reader appropriates established masculine 
discourses on the subject of women’s education by 
recontextualizing them amongst others that may be read to call 
them into question, thus inviting young women to engage and 
struggle with the same “authoritative discourses” regarding 
womanhood that Wollstonecraft herself struggled with. This 
chapter will situate Wollstonecraft’s Reader within the larger 
historical debate concerning women’s reading practices in the 
late 18th/early 19th centuries, thus marking its relationship to 
other didactic texts for women during this time. I will argue 
that The Female Reader manipulates the generic hybridity of the 
didactic tradition, generating a feminist pedagogy that calls 
into question and potentially undermines masculine authoritative 
discourse concerning women’s ‘proper sphere.’ 
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Feminist critics and book historians such as Cathy 
Davidson, Kate Flint, Barbara Sicherman, Harvey Graff, Richard 
Altick, Reinhard Wittmann, Martyn Lyons, and others have 
commented on how the “reading revolution” of the late 18th/early 
19th centuries served to undermine the emphasis on traditional 
moral didactic reading practices for women. The critical tendency 
has been to emphasize the novel’s role as a genre that provided 
women with access to a more secularized form of education that 
was ultimately liberating as it introduced women to “the ways of 
the world" (Davidson 172). Citing Bakhtin, Davidson argues that 
“the complex intellectual and emotional activity of reading 
fiction empowers the hitherto powerless individual, at least 
imaginatively, by authorizing necessarily private responses to 
texts that function primarily as repositories for those 
responses” (162). Hence, readers of the novel are “empower[ed]” 
to determine to what extent the texts’ portrayals of women and 
their roles in society are legitimate ones. The way in which the 
novel engages in “dialogue” with readers is ultimately that which 
has distinguished it as a potentially subversive form. While the 
novel is often praised for its educational as well as liberating 
functions, texts that were packaged and/ or marketed as didactic 
such as the conduct book and the woman’s reader, are commonly 
disregarded as reinforcing moral and domestic education for 
women, or as subverting the new secular pedagogy that facilitated 
women’s progress in moving beyond the domestic sphere.  
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Yet the boundaries between novelistic and didactic 
discourses were often fluid and shifting during this 
revolutionary juncture in print history. Book historians such as 
Cathy Davidson and Martyn Lyons address the overlapping of 
didactic and novelistic discourses during the reading revolution, 
when writers and publishers sought to maintain marketability for 
texts that might be perceived as too ‘risqué’ and to cater to 
readers that still understood reading primarily as a means of 
moral edification. Yet traditional moral didactic features of 
women’s didactic texts have often been seen as exemplary of the 
misogynist ideologies that may have served as an impetus to their 
production. In Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History 
of the Novel (1987), Nancy Armstrong represents them as an 
accessory to the dominant ideology, characterizing the function 
of women’s “conduct books” (which would fall under the “social 
guide” designation, and may also be termed “advice manual”) as 
the writer’s attempt to “define” and disseminate  her/his 
understanding of women’s purpose in 18th century England: She 
writes: “…many different kinds of writers felt compelled to add 
their wrinkles to the female character…one can usually infer a 
social identity from the female virtues to which the writer 
grants highest priority, for these virtues are inevitably linked 
to functions which  writer feels are essential to good household 
management” (65).  Similarly, in “Gender and Rhetorical Space in 
American Life, 1866-1910,” Nan Johnson investigates women’s 
“rhetoric manuals” in post Civil War America, and explains that 
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didactic texts for women may have served to relegate women to a 
“domestic rhetorical sphere” (33). Although Kate Flint provides 
an excellent analysis of some of the ways in which advice manuals 
worked to direct and restrict women’s reading, helping them to 
establish reading habits meant to exercise “memory” and 
“reasoning,” even encouraging them to read critically, she 
ultimately dismisses these findings and the texts themselves as 
“a confirmation and consolidation of the dominant ideology of the 
period” (116). Davidson gives the didactic text little more than 
a brief (although positive) nod in her fourth chapter of 
Revolution and the Word,11 and in a later chapter defines the 
advice manual in the conventional manner—as “represent[ative] 
[of] the conservative or traditional role of women” (126). In 
both Davidson and Flint, this characterization of the advice 
manual simultaneously serves to stigmatize it as a product of the 
dominant ideology, while (either implicitly or explicitly) 
highlighting the empowering function of the novel.  
In accordance with Wollstonecraft’s own critique of “those 
books” that “degrade one half of the human species, and render 
women pleasing at the expense of every solid virtue,” didactic 
                                                 
11 In her discussion of the novel’s effect on female readers, Davidson 
also acknowledges the role of didactic texts in general as having had 
an important function in post-Revolution America. She explains that 
“publishers were quick to meet a growing demand for self-help books and 
social guides, textbooks and teacher’s manuals…[etc]. The very 
proliferation of these self-improvement books attests to an emerging, 
broadly based interest in education that encompassed men and women, 
city and country citizens, and specifically addressed unprivileged 
readers” (65, 69). She also addresses a few “teacher’s manuals” that 
she considers to demonstrate a progressive pedagogy inspired by 
“educational reformers” (68). 
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texts for women did function to consolidate the dominant ideology 
of the period, discussing issues of women’s dress and decorum 
with the same meticulous detail as one might encounter in a 
present day textbook on geography or science. However, in 
dismissing didactic texts for women as always reinforcing the 
dominant ideology regarding women’s roles, we risk overlooking 
the unique possibilities didactic traditions opened up for women 
writers.  Although didactic texts were usually marketed and 
“packaged” as acceptable according to traditional conceptions of 
women’s education, their contents did not necessarily reflect the 
paratextual materials. With the exception of certain ‘single 
author’ conduct books, which I address below, didactic texts 
geared toward women were not necessarily consistent entities that 
cohered to one overriding project, as the writer of a didactic 
text for women often compiled and/or adapted preexisting 
materials, themes, or strategies—which might or might not have 
aligned with the project asserted or advertised in the prefatory 
note and other surrounding paratext. Like Vindication, these 
texts might be read as responses to or dialogues among the “work-
utterances” of other writers that often vary or even disagree in 
opinion, and therefore the texts often seem to lack argumentative 
coherence—what appears to be a definition of the writer’s project 
in a preface may be called into question or even directly 
contradicted by other components of the text. This was especially 
true of the elocutionary reader, as the anthology was usually 
comprised of a set of reading passages collected from various 
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(and sometimes disparate) sources. The discursive hybridity of 
didactic traditions provided Wollstonecraft with the authorial 
latitude to appropriate and organize pre-existing texts in 
subversive ways. I will read The Female Reader in relation to two 
widely circulating conduct books to argue that Wollstonecraft 
recasts these approaches by placing them ‘in conversation with’ 
other 18th century perspectives regarding women’s proper sphere. 
2.1 ESTABLISHING DIDACTIC CONVENTION: THE ENDEARING 
FATHER AND THE MORALIZING MENTOR 
Didactic texts for women are interesting and complicated textual 
artifacts, even when they function to disseminate established 
masculine discourses regarding women’s roles. Probably the most 
widely circulating form of didactic text devoted to the 
‘improvement’ of women was the conduct book, also referred to in 
critical contexts as the “advice manual.” Hoping to position and 
engage readers as ‘receptive pupils’ and to offset their 
otherwise monologic approach to instruction, writers/compilers of 
conduct books incorporated didactic apparatuses of various sorts 
(tables of contents, headings, prefaces) and enlisted certain 
stylistic features of the novel in service of their didactic 
projects. Bakhtin provides a comprehensive analysis of novelistic 
discourse in terms of its differences from other discursive modes 
(such as didacticism); and, his theory of novelistic discourse 
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which breaks down the components of novelistic style into 
specific “compositional-stylistic unities” provides a way of 
understanding how didactic texts deployed novelistic strategies 
in order to engage readers. The most common novelistic strategy 
employed by didactic texts is the “stylization of the various 
forms or semiliterary (written) everyday narration (the letter, 
the diary, etc.)” (Bakhtin, “Novel” 262). For example, one of the 
most effective uses of this type of “stylization” appears in 
Susanna Rowson’s widely-circulating novel entitled Charlotte 
Temple. Cathy Davidson explains how Rowson’s own interjections 
within the plot sequence12 demonstrate to her readers that she is 
reaching out to a formerly ignored readership of “the young woman 
reading her way into adulthood in a society in which neither she 
nor her reading is taken seriously” (xvii). Rowson’s intermittent 
use of “everyday narration” in which she addresses her readers as 
though she were writing them a personal letter serves to endear 
her  “as a concerned parent, a counseling friend” (Davidson 
xvii).  
Susanna Rowson’s approach of speaking directly to (and 
attempting to endear herself to) a young female readership was a 
common approach in earlier didactic texts for women.13 Seventeen 
                                                 
12 Charlotte Temple is the story of a poor, young English woman who, 
misled by a dissolute schoolteacher, allows herself to be seduced by a 
wealthier man. She travels with him to the U.S., where he (tricked by a 
conniving friend) deserts her for a more desirable woman.  At the end, 
despite her parents’ hopes for her return, she dies homeless and alone 
after the birth of her illegitimate child.  
13 A multitude of didactic novels and didactic texts for women 
circulating during the late 18th and 19th centuries deployed stylistic 
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years before the publication of Charlotte Temple, women were 
reading one of the most widely-circulating conduct books of the 
late 18th to mid 19th century, Dr. John Gregory’s A Father’s 
Legacy to his Daughters.  These “Letters…[supposedly] written by 
a tender father, in a declining state of health, for the 
instruction of his daughters, and not intended for the public” 
(Gregory A3) were originally published in London in 1774 and, 
selling “by the thousands” (Wardle 216), went through an 
estimated print run of 19, 500 copies between 1774 and 1813 (St. 
Clair 604).  The intention of engendering a “friendship” with the 
reader is established early on in Legacy, as Gregory suggests 
that “…you will hear, at least for once in your lives, the 
genuine sentiments of a man who has no interest in flattering or 
deceiving you.—I shall throw my reflections together without any 
studied order, and shall only, to avoid confusion, range them 
under a few general heads” (6). The Preface’s presentation of the 
text as a private “legacy” addressed to a specific set of 
“daughters” that its readers (or “you”) might ‘overhear’ invites 
readers to engage in an intimate relationship with the so-called 
                                                                                                                                                 
attributes of the novel in order to entertain and edify readers. The 
following texts deploy strategies similar to those I discuss here: The 
Governess: or, Little Female Academy (Sarah Fielding 1749), Mentoria 
(Ann Murry 1778), Original Stories from Real Life (Mary Wollstonecraft 
1788), The Young Lady’s Parental Monitor: Containing I. Dr. Gregory’s 
Father’s Legacy to his Daughters. II. Lady Pennington’s Unfortunate 
Mother’s Advice to her Absent Daughters. III. Marchioness de Lambert’s 
Advice of a mother to her daughter. (1790), Letters on Subjects of 
Importance to the Happiness of Young Females, Addresses by a Governess 
to her Pupils (Helena Whitford 1799), and A Mirror for the Female Sex: 
Historical Beauties for Young Ladies, Intended to Lead the Female Mind 
to the Love and Practice of Moral Goodness (Mary Pilkington 1799).   
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“father.” Undoubtedly hoping that the intimacy of the 
relationship he has established will preclude any disagreement 
with his educational precepts, Gregory makes his authority seem 
even less obtrusive by generating an air of uncertainty about the 
extent of his knowledge, as he suggests that “the advices which I 
shall give you will be very imperfect, as there are many nameless 
delicacies in female manners, of which none but a woman can 
judge” (11). Despite the inherently authoritative persona of the 
patriarchal father, readers are not directly confronted by 
“authoritative discourse,” or asked to “‘recite[] by heart’” 
(Bakhtin, “Novel” 341) that which he dictates, but are invited to 
consider “the genuine sentiments” of a father-figure who, unlike 
a real father, will not command his daughter to “look at me while 
I’m talking!” but remains physically absent. Also, this less 
intrusive authority has “head[ed]” and  “range[d]” his subjects 
so that she can revisit and therefore (ideally speaking) 
reconsider them—dismissing that which ultimately does not “matter 
to” her (Bakhtin, “Novel” 345).  Thus, as a result of Gregory’s 
simultaneously authoritative yet non-threatening persona, the 
readerly “daughter” can, despite the norm in 18th century society, 
regard her “father” as her friend.  
However, this “friend” may not be described as secular and 
liberating in the way that Rowson is: Gregory does not “tell[] 
the reader that she is not alone in a world in which she has not 
legal or political identity” by sympathizing with her plight 
(Davidson xvii). Instead, Gregory focuses on how she might avoid 
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such moral degradations, for the Charlotte Temples of the world 
would not exist had they followed his guidelines for proper 
female behavior; as he writes, “While I explain to you that 
system of conduct which I think will tend most to your honor and 
happiness, I shall, at the same time, endeavor to point out those 
virtues and accomplishments which render you most respectable and 
most amiable in the eyes of my own sex” (8).  Although a woman 
might second guess such sentiments, in the absence of the other 
stylistic unities of the novel, Gregory’s text does not provide 
any other perspectives (utilizing someone else’s discourse) 
beyond his own “unmediated, direct” suggestions (Bakhtin, 
“Dostoevsky” 189). While readers might experience all of the ways 
in which Charlotte Temple was affected by the other characters in 
the novel, and conclude that her plight was not entirely her 
fault, such a woman represented in an “unmediated discourse” has 
only herself to blame. For instance, Gregory writes, “As I look 
on your choice of husband to be of the greatest consequence to 
your happiness, I hope you will make it with the utmost 
circumspection. Do not give way to a sudden sally of passion, and 
dignify it in the name of love” (126). Here, we cannot see, even 
with a slight “orientation toward someone else’s discourse” what 
passionate “sally” may “sudden[ly]” overtake a young woman, or by 
what insidious means her “circumspection” may be suppressed. On 
the other hand, Rowson enables readers to envision Charlotte’s 
temptations—embodying them in the language of a profligate 
schoolmistress and a convincing, handsome young man.  
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Although more limited in scope than Charlotte Temple, 
Legacy introduces readers to stylized letter format—a common 
component of novelistic discourse—which allows Gregory to 
approach his audience as “friend.” He by no means hopes however 
to encourage his daughters (or readers in general) to befriend 
other texts that might have a similar effect. Gregory is so 
concerned about the potential repercussions involved in improper 
reading choices that he suggests that he is at a “great[] loss” 
(54) in terms of what to recommend, but provides very specific 
instructions in terms of what to avoid: 
But if you find, on a strict self-examination, that 
marriage is absolutely essential to your 
happiness…shun as you would do the most fatal poison 
all species of reading…which warms the imagination, 
which engages and softens the heart, and raises the 
taste above the level of common life. If you do 
otherwise, consider the terrible conflict of passions 
this may afterwards raise in your breasts. If this 
refinement once takes deep root in your minds, and you 
do not obey its dictates, but marry from vulgar and 
mercenary views, you may never be able to eradicate it 
entirely, and then it will embitter all your married 
days. (117-118)  
Gregory voices one of the most common fears in regards to women’s 
reading—that inciting the “imagination” will render a woman 
incapable of accepting the realities of married life (Flint 74). 
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Although Gregory utilizes a novelistic convention to lure readers 
into a relationship with the text, he simultaneously reminds 
women that they should not seek out and enter into such a 
relationship with other, less suitable texts. Hence, the didactic 
text becomes a site of uncomfortable tension between catering to 
“worldly” interests and maintaining a relationship to traditional 
moral didacticism. However, Gregory’s moralizing advice is 
offered in a ‘loving’ manner that essays to convince readers to 
embrace that discourse. He does not suggest that such reading 
will render women poor and useless wives from a masculine 
perspective, but expresses concern for the fact that it will 
“embitter” their lives. In a similar instance, Gregory indicates 
a sincere desire to assist his daughters in making good marital 
choices. He writes “…I could never pretend to advise whom you 
should marry; but I can with great confidence advise whom you 
should not marry…Do not marry a fool; he is the most intractable 
of all animals; he is led by his passions and caprices, and is 
incapable of hearing the voice of reason…A rake is always a 
suspicious husband, because he has only known the most worthless 
of your sex…” (123-124). By trying to convince readers that he is 
concerned with their happiness and well-being in the world 
(unlike the “fatal poison” offered by the salacious novel), 
Gregory invites young women to embrace his moral didactic message 
regarding womanhood—ultimately that marriage is “of greatest 
consequence to your happiness.”  
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“Frequently praised, reprinted, anthologized, quoted from, 
and copied by others” (St. Clair 592), Hester Chapone’s Letters 
on the Improvement of the Mind (1773), like A Father’s Legacy to 
his Daughters, boasted an “extraordinarily long print run” (St. 
Clair 275). Chapone was part of a group of conservative yet 
“well-educated” 18th century women known as the Bluestockings, and 
her Letters “became a standard text for issue to young ladies, a 
handbook on the acquisition of respectable middle-class 
femininity” (Guest 60).14 In service of this project, Chapone 
establishes herself as a mentor to her “niece” or to “you,” her 
readers; and, although “you” have “parents, who are both capable 
and desirous of giving you all proper instruction, yet I who love 
you so tenderly, cannot help fondly wishing to contribute 
something, if possible, to your improvement and welfare” (6). 
However, whereas Gregory attempts to deemphasize his 
authoritative persona by suggesting the potentially fallible 
nature of his masculine perspective on certain subjects that 
“none but a woman can judge” (11), Chapone makes a more direct 
claim to her reader’s “attention,” suggesting that “I will hope 
that [you] may be engaged, by seeing on paper, from the hand of 
one of your warmest friends, Truths of the highest importance, 
which, though you may not find new, can never be too deeply 
engraven on your mind” (6). Also, unlike Gregory, Chapone offers 
                                                 
14 For a comprehensive discussion of the Bluestockings and their 
political and literary contributions to late 18th century society, see 
Harriet Guest’s “Bluestocking Feminism” in Reconsidering the 
Bluestockings (2003).  
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instruction not only in religion and marriage but also in 
geography and history, which would ultimately become relatively 
standard school subjects for young women. However, the letters 
devoted to “Geography and Chronology” as well as “the Manner and 
Course of Reading History” do little to offset (intellectually) 
the normative regimen established in the first eight letters 
involving “Study of the Holy Scripture,” “the Regulation of the 
Heart and Affections,” “the Government of the Temper,” “Economy” 
(or household management), and “Politeness and Accomplishments.” 
Chapone also reinforces the idea of marriage as essential to a 
woman’s happiness, making evident the necessity for all of her 
previous advice concerning religion and decorum: 
If you love virtue sincerely, you will be incapable of 
loving an openly vicious character. But, alas!—your 
innocent heart may be easily ensnared by an artful 
one—and from this danger nothing can secure you but 
the experience of those, to whose guidance God has 
entrusted you:  may you be wise enough to make use of 
it!—So will you have the [surest?] chance of attaining 
the best blessings this world can afford, in a 
faithful and virtuous union with a worthy man, who may 
direct your steps in safety and honour through this 
life, and partake with you the rewards of virtue in 
that which is to come. (72)  
By calling attention to the importance of ensuring “a faithful 
and virtuous union with a worthy man,” suggesting that her 
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niece/readers “be wise enough” to enlist the aid of an 
experienced guardian in making a decision, Chapone has more to 
offer on the subject than Gregory, who suggests he can only 
advise “whom you should not marry.” She further elaborates on the 
subject of marriage, suggesting that “whatever romantic notions 
you may hear, or read of, depend upon it, those matches are the 
happiest which are made on rational grounds” going on to admonish 
those who might consider following “passion” over “duty and 
prudence.” Although she does not embark on a full-fledged attack 
of reading for pleasure, Chapone also hints at the detrimental 
effects such reading might engender, as it allows for the 
cultivation of “romantic notions” that could undermine the 
potential for a match made on “rational grounds” (which is 
ultimately, Chapone implies, one that aligns with the parent’s 
choice).  She does allow for the possibility of remaining single 
(what Gregory refers to disparagingly as becoming an “old maid”), 
but it is ambiguously left to the intervention of “Providence,” 
and presented as a ‘last resort’ when all other (marital) options 
fail. Chapone further disassociates readers from this option by 
talking about it in relation to “the unmarried woman” rather than 
in relation to “you:” “But, if this happy lot [marriage] be 
denied you, do not be afraid of a single life. A worthy woman is 
never destitute of valuable friends, who in a great measure 
supply to her the want of nearer connections…The calamities of an 
unhappy marriage are so much greater than can befal a single 
person, that the unmarried woman may find abundant argument to be 
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contented with her condition, when pointed out to her by 
Providence” (73). 
These texts seem (aesthetically speaking) to achieve little 
beyond hailing readers into a particular subject position—that  
of aspiring middle class wife; therefore, it is easy to see why 
Wollstonecraft (as well as feminist critics) “object[ed]” “to the 
whole purport of those books, which tend, in my opinion, to 
degrade one half of the human species, and render women pleasing 
at the expense of every solid virtue.”  Mary Wollstonecraft’s The 
Female Reader, although ostensibly reinforcing normative 
educational standards for women, recontextualizes these 
conventional approaches to women’s education in such a way that 
readers might struggle with (rather than submit to) their advice. 
Her approach invites us to rethink the binary between feminism 
and didacticism—to imagine the possibility that women’s didactic 
writing might be read as a subversive form.  
2.2 THE FEMALE READER: RECONTEXTUALIZING CONVENTIONAL 
ADVICE 
The elocutionary movement that flourished from the mid 18th 
century as a means to enable British provincials to speak in the 
proper “‘English tongue’” (Miller quoting Sheridan 18) became a 
common subject of study in both England and the U.S. Texts 
compiled in response to this movement, such as William Enfield’s 
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widely-circulating elocutionary reader entitled The Speaker 
(1774), usually incorporated an apparatus that modeled how to 
pronounce letters appropriately and to pay attention to aspects 
of oral delivery such as intonation and speed (Cohen 107). The 
apparatus was followed by an anthology of passages to practice 
reading, often comprised of excerpts from various contemporary 
and/or canonical authors’ works in both poetry and prose, usually 
including “….excerpts of select sentences, poetry, fiction, 
drama, dialogues, historical narrative, descriptive passages, and 
essays” (Carr, Carr, and Schultz 112).  Carr, Carr, and Schultz 
emphasize the cultural influence of the reader in the United 
States, suggesting that such texts “helped create a vocabulary 
for feelings, beliefs, and values, and the activity populated the 
imagination with biographies, narratives, dialogues, and poetic 
expression, with what would become literary culture” (85). 
Depending on a woman’s social and economic status, 
practicing proper elocution in the late 18th century could mean 
learning to sound like a lady, or, if one was already a lady, to 
add to one’s repertoire of accomplishments—reading aloud or 
reciting a passage was an activity that might entertain a group 
of family, friends, or suitors. Writers/compilers of the women’s 
reader often claimed that the selection of readings they included 
in the anthology would improve the minds and character of young 
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ladies.15 Addressing 19th century “advanced readers designated for 
girls,” Carr, Carr, and Shultz argue that these texts “mark 
gender differences” by “diminish[ing] the traditional emphasis on 
public oratory and politics, and favor[ing] the kind of writing 
about daily life circulating in women’s fiction and periodicals” 
(125). Because elocutionary readers for women emphasize the 
domestic rather than the public sphere as the appropriate site 
for elocutionary performance, critics such as Nan Johnson view 
such books as texts that reinforced normative educational 
standards for women.  
Compiling one of the first elocutionary textbooks for women 
in the late 18th century,16 Wollstonecraft manipulated the limited 
set of feminine-appropriate materials she had to draw from in 
complex and interesting ways. Hired in 1788 to review 
contemporary writing for Joseph Johnson’s Analytical Review, 
Wollstonecraft had professional experience when it came to 
                                                 
15  For instance, the widely-circulating American reader entitled The 
Hemans Reader for Female Schools (1847) argued that “The Lessons, 
contained in this book, have been selected with great care, from a 
large amount of material examined for the purpose. Every article has 
been carefully studied with reference to its instructive 
character…especially with regard to its adaptedness to the cultivation 
of the female mind and heart” (Preface).  
16  For other examples of elocutionary textbooks for women, see the 
following: The Lady’s Preceptor; or, a Series of Instructive and 
Pleasing Exercises in Reading; for the Particular use of Females; 
Consisting of a Selection of Moral Essays, Narratives, Letters (Mr. 
Cresswick 1792),The Female Speaker (Anna Laetitia Barbauld 1811), 
Elegant Lessons, or The Young Lady’s Preceptor (Samuel Whiting 1824), 
Introduction to The Young Ladies’ Elocutionary Reader: Containing a 
Selection of Reading Lessons, Together with the Rudiments of Elocution: 
Adapted to Female Readers (William & Ann Russell 1845), The Heman’s 
Reader for Female Schools: Containing Extracts in Prose and Poetry.(T. 
S. Pinneo 1847), Young Ladies’ Reader (Charles Sanders 1865), and Five 
Minute Readings for Young Ladies (Walter Fobes 1886).  
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reading and writing critically about what contemporaries had to 
offer on the subject of women’s education.  As Vindication’s 
Chapter V entitled “Animadversions on Some of the Writers Who 
Have Rendered Women Objects of Pity, Bordering on Contempt” 
suggests, this experience gave her particular insight into the 
relationships between various authorities on the subject of 
women’s education in terms of how their theories reflected and 
differed from one another. In the Preface to The Female Reader, 
she states: “In the present volume …, the subjects are not only 
arranged in separate books, but are carefully disposed in a 
series that tends to make them illustrate each other; linking the 
detached pieces seems to give an interest to the whole, which 
even the slightest connection will not fail to produce” (iv). 
Here, Wollstonecraft explains that she has not only arranged 
passages according to conventional generic groupings, but that 
she has also arranged them by subject within those broader 
headings. Even if the text cannot fully dramatize the 
interactions of different perspectives as novels do, The Female 
Reader generates novelistic effects by means of the meticulous 
arrangement of its reading passages. In “Discourse in the Novel,” 
Bakhtin describes how novelistic discourse, as its “images” are 
“born in… [internally persuasive] soil,” (348), provides the 
reader with a sense that she can complete the various “internally 
unresolved dialogues among characters (seen as embodied points of 
view) and between the author himself and his characters” (348-
49). In contrast to “authoritative discourses” comprised of 
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“images of official-authoritative truth, images of virtue (of any 
sort: monastic, spiritual, bureaucratic, moral, etc.)” (344), 
novelistic discourse lends itself to private reading specifically 
because it can become the site of one’s own “struggle” for 
“individual consciousness” (345). The Female Reader may allow for 
“struggle” or the development of “individual consciousness” as 
its reading passages are arranged in such a way that a variety of 
(mostly well-known) writers seem to be ‘in conversation,’ and the 
different selections ‘speak to’ one another on various subjects. 
Oftentimes an excerpt of what would otherwise seem to be 
“authoritative discourse” is directly contradicted, or 
appropriated and discussed in a different way by an excerpt from 
another text. In this way, readers are asked to distinguish 
between “internally persuasive discourse and authoritarian 
enforced discourses that do not matter to us, that do not touch 
us.” (Bakhtin, “Novel” 345). Given the discursive possibilities 
of this genre, Wollstonecraft compiled a Female Reader that 
tempts readers to extend their own authority—to question or apply 
a subject or idea into “new contexts that dialogize it” or to 
make it theirs (Bakhtin, “Novel” 345-46).  
Writing under the pseudonym “Mr. Cresswick, Teacher of 
Elocution”17 Wollstonecraft situates her project in relation to an 
                                                 
17 In their prefatory note on the text, Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler 
suggest that The Female Reader was attributed to Wollstonecraft in 
Godwin’s Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
(1798), and that Mr. Cresswick “a popular writer of conduct books…was 
almost certainly an acquaintance of Wollstonecraft through her 
publisher, Joseph Johnson” (54). I am dubious about Mr. Cresswick’s 
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already established, traditionally masculine form of education, 
suggesting that her Reader is modeled after Enfield’s Speaker and 
that the text includes reading passages in prose and poetry 
(divided into conventional categories such as “Narrative Pieces,” 
“Moral and Didactic Pieces,” etc.).  She also emphasizes the 
feminine-appropriate nature of the text, remarking in the title 
page as well as the preface that it is “for the improvement of 
young women.” However, Wollstonecraft’s Reader might be more 
accurately designated as an appropriation of Enfield’s 
elocutionary framework than an adaptation or ‘feminine 
appropriate’ version of his Speaker. The Female Reader adopts 
Enfield’s overarching organizational structure, and the paratext 
surrounding The Female Reader (i.e., the title page and the 
initial nod to Enfield in the Preface) serves to camouflage the 
unconventional aspects of the text.  Its pedagogical project, 
however, ultimately defines quite differently than The Speaker’s, 
omitting the necessary apparatus to model how to read the 
passages appropriately. And, after remarking on the significance 
of Enfield’s work, Wollstonecraft goes on to “subordinat[e]” the 
study of elocution to another pedagogical project. She writes:  
The main object of this work is to imprint some useful 
                                                                                                                                                 
“popularity” as a conduct book writer, as I have not encountered any 
such writing by him (or her?) in the course of my study of 18th century 
didactic texts. However, he/she does seem to have authored another 
elocutionary textbook (noted above) entitled The Lady’s Preceptor; or, 
a Series of Instructive and Pleasing Exercises in Reading; for the 
Particular use of Females; Consisting of a Selection of Moral Essays, 
Narratives, Letters (1792). While the text bears little resemblance to 
The Female Reader in terms of pedagogical project, one Worldcat 
citation actually names Wollstonecraft as the author.  
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lessons on the mind, and cultivate the taste at the 
same time—to infuse a relish for a pure and simple 
style, by presenting natural and touching descriptions 
from the Scriptures, Shakespeare, &c.[…]Females are 
not educated to become public speakers or players; 
though many young  ladies are now led by fashion to 
exhibit their persons on a stage, sacrificing to mere 
vanity that diffidence and reserve which characterizes 
youth, and is the most graceful ornament of the sex. 
But if it be allowed to be a breach of modesty 
for a woman to obtrude her person or talents on the 
public when necessity does not justify and spur her 
on, yet to be able to read with propriety is certainly 
a very desirable attainment…It would be needless to 
repeat here the trite remark which proves an 
undeniable fact—that  the ignorant never read with 
propriety; and they must ever be accounted ignorant 
who are suddenly made wise by the experience of 
others, never brought to a test by their own feeble 
unexercised reason. (iv-v) 
Wollstonecraft’s emphases on the importance of “cultivat[ing] the 
taste,” “a relish for pure and simple style,” and “read[ing] with 
propriety”18 marks her indebtedness to Hugh Blair’s often quoted 
                                                 
18 For a comprehensive study of the ways in which Blair’s Lectures was 
“copied, redacted, quoted, and silently paraphrased” in other didactic 
contexts in the 19th century U.S., see “Reproducing Rhetorics” in Carr, 
Carr, and Schultz’s Archives of Instruction.  
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Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), and like her 
reference to Enfield, situate The Female Reader within a well-
established and acceptable mode of didactic discourse.  However, 
Wollstonecraft defines her project apart from this conventional 
approach, as she expresses her interest in “imprint[ing] lessons 
on the mind”—not as an auxiliary goal—but as the “main object” of 
the work,  and her reference to the “feeble unexercised reason” 
of the “ignorant” alludes to the “strength of mind” she later 
talks of cultivating in Vindication. Although Wollstonecraft 
discusses some of the standards of voice training, such as 
“observing stops,” she departs from Enfield in her appeal to a 
classical form of imitation-based writing pedagogy as a means of 
enabling young women to “form the judgment” and “write 
correctly.” Through the elaboration of this pedagogical approach, 
Wollstonecraft marks her primary focus as the development of 
readers’ “understanding:” 
In the beginning only prevent their acquiring bad 
habits; instruct them in the common methods of 
observing stops and articulating each syllable; and as 
the mind is stored with arranged knowledge they will 
insensibly read well, interested in the sentiments 
they understand…When a girl arrives at a more advanced 
age it would still be more useful to make her read a 
short lesson, and then transcribe it from her memory; 
and afterwards let her copy the original, and lead her 
to remark on the mistakes she has made. This method 
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will exercise the memory and form the judgment at the 
same time:  she would learn to write correctly, and 
retain the precepts which in some measure composed 
herself, and a kind of emulation would be excited from 
which no bad consequences could possibly follow. If 
this employment is allowed to occupy two mornings 
every week, at the end of four or five years the 
understanding will have received great strength, and 
the pupil will express herself both in speaking and 
writing, provided she has tolerable capacity, with a 
degree of propriety that will astonish those that have 
not adopted the same plan. (vi, xii-xiii) 
Disregarding the conventional emphases on voice training, 
Wollstonecraft instead calls readers’ attention to reading 
transcribing, copying, remarking on the mistakes she has made, 
suggesting that these “method[s]” will “exercise the memory.” As 
such, her pedagogical project for The Female Reader is allied 
with the kind of female education that she proposes in 
Vindication—an education that will ultimately infuse a woman’s 
“understanding” with “great strength.” Thus, The Female Reader 
marks its larger conceptual departure from Enfield, appropriating  
The Speaker’s structural design (a preface followed by anthology 
of organized reading passages) for the purposes of establishing a 
feminist pedagogical project.  
The Female Reader’s appropriation of The Speaker’s 
structure is more elaborate, however, than the preface indicates, 
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as Wollstonecraft arranges the reading passages in a way that 
might allow for the development of readers’ “judgment” and 
“understanding” as well. The first sixteen pages of The Female 
Reader are devoted to a section entitled “Select Desultory 
Thoughts,” which includes 66 short passages excerpted from the 
work of contemporary authors and periodicals, about one quarter 
of which are written by established female authors (Hester 
Chapone, Wollstonecraft herself, and Madame de Genlis) and 
another quarter of which are comprised of excerpts from the works 
of Dr. John Gregory19 and Swiss philosopher and minister Johann 
Kaspar Lavater.20  Sections including brief, 1-3 sentence reading 
passages were commonly included in elocutionary readers as a 
‘warm up’ before commencing the longer exercises; the 
conventional heading for this type of section was “Select 
Sentences,” and the exercises were generally coupled with some 
type of didactic apparatus to indicate how to read the sentences 
(sometimes, for example, accent marks above each word). 
Wollstonecraft does not incorporate an elocutionary apparatus to 
guide the reading of “Thoughts,” and the designation of the 
                                                 
19 Like critics and historians of today, Wollstonecraft also saw 
Gregory’s Legacy as the epitome of useless, accomplishment-based 
education for women (see excerpt from Vindication above). Her later 
criticism of his work leads one to question her intentions in including 
him in The Female Reader.  
20 The fact that Wollstonecraft draws a large percentage of the excerpts 
in “Thoughts” from the work of women writers could also be argued as a 
way in which she challenges normative moral and domestic educational 
standard for women. Wollstonecraft, Chapone, and Genlis may be 
considered paradigms of the type of education Wollstonecraft hopes to 
promote, as they were all professional writers, working outside the 
accepted bounds of feminine “accomplishments.”   
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section as a set of “Thoughts” rather than “Sentences” serves to 
emphasize cognition over rote repetition of syntactical 
constructs, thus underscoring Wollstonecraft’s larger project of 
“imprint[ing] some useful lessons on the mind.” Her use of the 
term “Desultory,” seems to belie (and perhaps camouflage) her 
efforts to “carefully dispose” subjects “in a series that tends 
to make them illustrate each other” (iv). Even in these short 
passages, Wollstonecraft “links” “the detached pieces” in such a 
way that writers of divergent opinions engage ‘in conversation 
with’ one another regarding similar subjects. 
The possibility for ‘conversation’ exists in other 
elocutionary readers for women that succeeded The Female Reader 
(see footnote 16) since ‘feminine appropriate’ reading material 
was relatively limited and therefore excerpts on similar subjects 
were often juxtaposed; however, Wollstonecraft’s suggestion that 
she has arranged the passages beyond the broader categories that 
she appropriates from Enfield “to make them illustrate each 
other” signals her departure from elocutionary pedagogy, which, 
at this point, was not overtly concerned with cultivating the 
mental faculties beyond the capacity for rote memorization. The 
‘conversation’ Wollstonecraft’s careful arrangement generates 
suggests that authoritative discourse may be questioned, put into 
dialogue with other discourses,  either resisted or made one’s 
own (Bakhtin, “Novel” 345-346), ultimately allowing  the 
“understanding” to achieve “great strength.”  
The first short reading passage that Wollstonecraft 
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includes is one form Dr. Gregory’s philosophical treatise A 
Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Mankind (1765):21 
“As the two sexes have very different parts to act in life nature 
has marked their characters very differently, in a way that best 
qualifies them to fulfill their respective duties in society” 
(1).  Following what would have been, given Gregory’s status as 
an expert on women’s education at this time, a very authoritative 
tidbit regarding the “natural” state of sexual difference, 
Wollstonecraft has included a piece by “Mrs. Chapone.” While 
Chapone’s advice in Letters would seem to reinforce Dr. Gregory’s 
statement regarding the sexes “fulfill[ing] respective duties in 
society,” Wollstonecraft’s choice of quotation—when isolated from 
the larger context of Letters—actually seems to implicitly call 
it into question. The following excerpt points to the fallibility 
of the present state of sexual difference:  
Whilst men are proud of power, of wealth, dignity, 
learning, or abilities, young women are usually 
ambitious of nothing more than to be admired for their 
persons, their dress, or their most trivial 
accomplishments. The homage of men is their grand 
object: but they only desire them to be in love with 
their persons, careless how despicable their minds 
                                                 
21 Dr. John Gregory was a well-respected moral philosopher and physician. 
For more information regarding his interesting (albeit unorthodox) 
contribution to the medical field, see Robert Baker and Laurence 
MCcullough’s “Medical Ethics' Appropriation of Moral Philosophy: The 
Case of the Sympathetic and the Unsympathetic Physician” in Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal (Volume 17, Number 1, March 2007, 3-22).  
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appear, even to those their pretended adorers. (1)  
On its own, Chapone’s acerbic criticism of the female character 
adheres to conventions of traditional moral didactic discourse 
for women. Women’s overindulgence in their physical 
characteristics, or their “persons” was a common topic of late 
18th century writers. However, the juxtaposition of Chapone’s 
statement with Gregory’s seems to position him as her addressee, 
altering her discourse from moral didactic (with a group of young 
women as her audience) to polemic (with another well known writer 
on women’s education as her audience).  Although Chapone does not 
contradict Gregory’s assertion that “the two sexes have very 
different parts to act in life,” she seems to qualify this 
statement and make it “hers,” emphasizing the fact that this 
“natural” expectation that each sex should “fulfil their 
respective duties in society” (Gregory) has left women with mere 
“trivial accomplishments” in contrast to men’s “power,…wealth, 
dignity, learning, [and] abilities.” The fact that a female 
appears to be questioning and appropriating Gregory’s 
authoritative masculine discourse in order to make her own, 
rather perceptive point invites the reader to engage in the 
conversation as well—to determine whose perception of sexual 
difference is a more accurate one. 
 After the rather officious statement by Mrs. Chapone, we 
encounter a quote from Johann Kaspar Lavater, a Swiss writer 
admired by Wollstonecraft (Todd 192) who worked with Goethe on 
Essays on Physiognomy (1789-98). Wollstonecraft does not quote 
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him in the anthology section of The Female Reader (or “Books”), 
but she includes him in “Select Desultory Thoughts” in 16 out of 
66 entries, as his Aphorisms on Man (1788) provides a variety of 
short adages to include in this segment.22 His short and 
ostensibly innocuous comment “All finery is a sign of littleness” 
(1), like Chapone’s, seems a familiar example of the traditional 
moral discourse offered to young ladies at this time. However, 
his point echoes Chapone’s statement regarding women’s ambition 
“to be admired for their persons, their dress, or their most 
trivial accomplishments” above all else. Lavater’s perception of 
“finery” as demonstrative of “littleness” seems to reinforce 
Chapone’s criticism concerning women’s attempt to attain “the 
homage of men” by superficially focusing on their “persons” or 
“dress,” and consequently failing to take the condition of “their 
minds” into account. In his apparent agreement with Chapone, 
Lavater assumes the position of distinguished male author 
expressing solidarity with a woman—one who has called into 
question Dr. Gregory’s perspective on the role of womanhood. 
Therefore, readers may engage with the positions of these three 
interlocutors—whether one sees them as an expert on women’s 
education who has just received his comeuppance, a Bluestocking 
with an incisive intellect, and a philosopher who agrees with the 
Bluestocking, or simply a man challenged by a woman who is 
                                                 
22 Wollstonecraft provides the names of most authors included in The 
Female Reader but usually excludes the names of the original texts from 
which excerpts are derived. To locate original source texts, see Janet 
Todd and Marilyn Butler’s annotated version of The Female Reader in The 
Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Vol. 4 (William Pickering, 1989).  
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‘backed up’ by a man, one is nevertheless invited to question and 
complete this clearly unconventional exchange.  
“Select Desultory Thoughts” features many ‘conversations’ 
amongst distinguished interlocutors, each addressing a different 
topic. Gregory, Wollstonecraft (signed ‘O’) and Madame de Genlis 
(French educationist) share ideas concerning proper interaction 
with servants on pages 4-5. From there, subjects range from 
“decency” to “charity” to overeating to thinking for oneself. 
Gregory, Chapone, Lavater, and Genlis are at the forefront, while 
occasionally (particularly towards the end) Wollstonecraft 
includes excerpts from four different popular journals: Clio, 
Seed, Connoisseur, and Spectator (Ferguson xx), two from 
Proverbs, one excerpt from Young, one from Swift, and finally one 
from Hugh Blair. Female interlocutors are unavoidable, as 
Wollstonecraft, Genlis, and Chapone together contribute 25 of the 
66 entries. Wollstonecraft integrates the women’s 25 entries 
throughout “Thoughts,” making certain that no discussion is 
lacking in a woman’s perspective. Considering the subjects that 
these selections address, none of them in and of themselves would 
appear to challenge traditional moral educational standards for 
women. However, Wollstonecraft’s textual arrangement of the 
passages into clusters of specific subjects puts them ‘in 
conversation’ with one another; therefore, “Thoughts” may be seen 
as a forum in which varying interlocutors—four educators, one 
philosopher, two professional writers, a rhetorician, four 
current periodicals, the Bible—regardless of sex, can converse 
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and contradict, therefore enabling readers to question and 
appropriate the conversation at hand into their own “internally 
persuasive” discourse. 
  These ‘conversations’ take place throughout The Female 
Reader. The majority of reading passages, like those in “Select 
Desultory Thoughts,” are comprised of excerpts from contemporary 
writers and periodicals, about a quarter of which are written by 
women.  Under this larger heading of “Moral and Didactic Pieces,” 
Wollstonecraft has loosely arranged the 38 passages according to 
subject matter. For instance, readings 16-19 are titled “On the 
Government of the Temper,” “On Obedience,” “On Humility,” and “On 
Politeness” –all devoted to some aspect of behavior, and are 
distinguishable from the preceding group of  six devoted to 
female “Employment,” and the following group of 3 devoted to 
“Sensibility” and “Sentiment.” One such group of readings is 
dedicated to “Dress.” Although ostensibly a very appropriate 
subject of discussion according to conventional moral standards 
for women’s education, the conversation that ensues renders such 
an assumption questionable.  
Once again, Gregory is excerpted as ‘the authority’ on 
women’s education, and his masculine authoritative discourse 
seems impervious to inquiry, as he states 
Do not confine your attention to dress to your public 
appearances. Accustom yourselves to habitual neatness, 
so that in the most careless undress, in your most 
unguarded hours, you may have no reason to be ashamed 
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of your appearance. You will not easily believe how 
much we consider your dress as expressive of your 
characters. Vanity, levity, slovenliness, folly, 
appear through it. An elegant simplicity is an equal 
proof of taste and delicacy. (64) 
Here, Gregory emphasizes the importance of dress as indicative of 
a woman’s “character,” and therefore suggests that women should 
not only provide ample “attention to dress” for the purpose of 
“public appearance,” but should also make sure to maintain 
“habitual neatness” at all times. He then refers to the need for 
women to adhere to a common ideal of the late 18th century 
reinforced by various writers on the subject of women’s conduct 
and behavior of the time—“elegant simplicity.” The somewhat 
undefined achievements of “taste and delicacy” are also 
emphasized, and it is left to the young lady’s own discretion to 
determine exactly how to accomplish and maintain these standards. 
Perhaps a bit befuddled, readers will next encounter a passage on 
“The Same Subject” signed “M. Wollstonecraft” (from Thoughts on 
the Education of Daughters (1787)).23 Despite Gregory’s 
uncompromising position, the presence of another interlocutor 
immediately invites readers to question the implications of the 
dialogue, as Gregory’s authoritative discourse appears to be 
appropriated and expanded upon by Wollstonecraft:  
                                                 
23 With the exception of this instance, all of Wollstonecraft’s original 
work that appears in The Female Reader is marked either as “Original 
Stories” to indicate that a passage is excerpted from this earlier 
work, or simply “O”. (In this case, excerpts come from Thoughts on the 
Education of Daughters, perhaps signed “O” to signify ‘original.’) 
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By far too much of a girl’s time is taken up in dress. 
This is an exterior accomplishment; but I chose to 
consider it by itself. The body hides the mind, and it 
is in its turn obscured by the drapery. I hate to see 
the frame of a picture so glaring as to catch the eye 
and divide the attention: dress ought to adorn the 
person, and not to rival it. It may be simple, 
elegant, and becoming, without being expensive; and 
ridiculous fashions disregarded, while singularity is 
avoided. The beauty of dress (I shall raise 
astonishment by saying so) is its not being 
conspicuous in one way or another; when it neither 
distorts or hides the human form by any unnatural 
protuberances. If ornaments are much studied a 
consciousness of being well dressed will appear in the 
face; and surely this mean pride does not give much 
sublimity to it. ‘Out of the abundance of the heart 
the mouth speaketh.’ And how much conversation does 
dress furnish which surely cannot be very improving or 
entertaining. (64) 
In and of itself, Wollstonecraft’s passage would not ‘raise the 
eyebrow’ of a strict moralist—her emphases on dressing so as to 
be “simple, elegant, and becoming” are standard expectations (see 
Gregory’s), and given her history as an educator, she is perhaps 
addressing a group of young bourgeois women who cannot afford to 
indulge in “expensive” “drapery” or “ornaments” and therefore 
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must rely on the appearance of their “mind[s]” instead.  However, 
juxtaposed in ‘conversation’ with Gregory, Wollstonecraft  
directly contradicts his masculine authoritative notion that 
“Dress” should be underscored as an important feminine 
accomplishment. Whereas he suggests that attention to dress 
should be an “habitual” activity, Wollstonecraft calls attention 
to the fact that “too much of a girl’s time is taken up in 
dress.” His assertion that dress is “expressive of your 
characters,” coupled with his lack of practical guidance in the 
matter of dressing with “elegant simplicity,” implies that poor 
dress is in some way inextricably tied to poor character, as he 
states that “[v]anity, levity, slovenliness, folly, appear 
through it.” This linking of feminine character to outward 
appearance is challenged by Wollstonecraft’s presentation of 
“simpl[icity]” and “elegan[ce]” in dress as qualities that can be 
achieved through proper and practical choices, as she reminds 
young ladies that “dress ought to adorn the person, not rival 
it,” and that one should avoid dress that is too “expensive” or 
“distorts or hides the human form by unnatural protuberances.” 
She also challenges this notion that dress is an accurate 
representation of one’s inner self by asserting that “The body 
hides the mind, and it is in its turn obscured by the drapery.” 
Clothing is not so much indicative of one’s inner self, as it is 
capable of concealing it. She reinforces this point by including 
a quote from the New Testament Book of Matthew which reads “‘Out 
of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh,’” to which she 
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adds “And how much conversation does dress furnish which surely 
cannot be very improving or entertaining.” Here, she indicates 
that it is the appearance of the heart, not one’s outfit, that 
should be the most important aspect of a woman’s dress, and that 
paying too much attention to dress will affect one’s ability to 
engage in “entertaining” conversation—that which is truly 
“expressive of [one’s] character.” 
Ultimately, Wollstonecraft’s assertion that “the mind” 
should not be “obscured” by “drapery,” and a woman should dress 
in such a way as to let her “heart” be the focus of her admirers 
is a clear contradiction of Gregory’s emphasis on dress as 
representative of feminine “character,” and therefore an 
essential feminine accomplishment. Her contradiction of Gregory’s 
seemingly inadequate discussion of the subject invites readers to 
complete the dialogue—perhaps to question the validity of 
masculine authoritative discourse. Regardless of whether or not 
readers knew who “M. Wollstonecraft” was, what is important is 
that Gregory has lost the argument once again, as Wollstonecraft 
appropriates moral didactic discourse for women and transforms it 
into something practical for a female audience interested in 
learning how to achieve the abstract ideal of “elegance.”   
However, Wollstonecraft gives a woman the last word in the 
conversation. As if to affirm Wollstonecraft’s final statement 
regarding the lack of “improving or entertaining” “conversation” 
  60
involved in the subject of dress, “Mrs. Trimmer”24 equally exposes 
the insignificance of the subject in the following excerpt 
entitled “Dress Subservient to Useful Purposes:”  
Working for the poor is a species of charity which 
forms a part of the prerogative of our sex, and gives 
to those who have leisure for it an opportunity of 
doing much good with very little trouble and expense. 
Were it more generally practiced by young people it 
would moderate that inordinate love of dress, which 
renders many, who cannot afford to employ milliners 
and mantua-makers, literally slaves to fashion: they 
would be ashamed to covet such a variety of ornaments 
when they beheld what trifles gratify others of the 
same species with themselves (65).  
On its own, Trimmer’s statement would by no means be considered a 
challenge to masculine authoritative discourse—the suggestion 
that young ladies should engage in “charity” work is not uncommon 
in Evangelical tracts during this time. However, following 
Wollstonecraft’s discussion, Trimmer seems to speak to 
Wollstonecraft’s assertion that “far too much of a girl’s time is 
taken up in dress,” conveniently entering the conversation to 
offer “an opportunity of doing much good” that she hopes will 
                                                 
24 Author of the widely-circulating children’s book Fabulous Histories 
(1786), Mrs. Sarah Trimmer was known as a proponent of the “Sunday 
School movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries” 
(Ward 177). Wollstonecraft also takes excerpts from Trimmer’s The 
Economy of Charity (1787) which “was influential in promoting the 
establishment of Sunday Schools for poor children” (Ward 177).  
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“moderate that inordinate love of dress, which renders 
many…literally slaves to fashion.” With her assertion that “they 
[young ladies] would be ashamed to covet such a variety of 
ornaments when they beheld what trifles gratify others,” Trimmer 
simultaneously reinforces Wollstonecraft’s statement that a 
woman’s dress should not be “conspicuous” or “expensive,” but 
also seems to chastise both Wollstonecraft and Gregory for 
dwelling on the subject, the “inordinate love of ”which has 
already done much damage to the pocketbooks of many “slaves to 
fashion.” Furthermore, how could one spend a moment longer 
contemplating such a trivial issue as a woman’s dress when there 
are “others of the same species” who must be satisfied with mere 
“trifles”?  Clearly, Trimmer offers another perspective on the 
subject of “Dress,” complicating a young woman’s capacity to 
“complete” the dialogue—should she buckle under Gregory’s 
authoritative discourse which suggests that her reputation is on 
the line and spend all day and night trying to look “elegant”? 
Follow Wollstonecraft’s guidelines to achieving a “simple” and 
“elegant” appearance, and let her “heart” speak rather than her 
clothes? Forget about dress altogether and spend her time doing 
charity work? This conversation has left readers with many 
questions to consider. 
Throughout The Female Reader, the works of women writers 
are free to converse with and contradict those of men of any 
profession—philosopher, rhetorician, renowned author. In the 
later Books, six other women authors are introduced, all of whom 
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either wrote professionally or were part of the Bluestocking 
group25 such as Elizabeth Carter (Poems on Several Occasions 
(1762)), Anna Laetitia Barbauld (Hymns in Prose for Children 
(1781)), and Charlotte Smith (Elegaic Sonnets, and Other Essays 
(1784)). Together, according to Moira Ferguson, women writers 
comprise about “one-third” of the “selections from contemporary 
eighteenth-century writers,” and, Ferguson also explains that 
they are all “female-identified in varying ways” (xx). This 
selection of women authors agrees with, questions, and undermines 
the authority of other well known and respected male 
contributors, such as Shakespeare, Steele, and Swift. By 
implementing this unique organizational strategy, Wollstonecraft 
appropriates Enfield’s didactic approach as a way of establishing 
a feminist project. Although it does not explicitly address the 
rights of woman, The Female Reader encourages young women to 
think for themselves, therefore fostering the kind of learning 
that Vindication promotes. The Female Reader’s appropriation of 
elocutionary pedagogy calls into question the opposition between 
didacticism and feminism and invites us to reconsider the 
                                                 
25 In “Bluestocking Feminism,” Harriet Guest describes the women of the 
Bluestocking group as “well-educated but not aristocratic women” who 
were “linked through correspondence as well as social interaction in 
London, Edinburgh, and perhaps Dublin, from around 1750 to the early 
decades of the nineteenth century” (60). Women in the Bluestocking 
group “spent much of their time socializing with men” and were 
generally “conservative” in their views regarding the improvement of 
women, since “their appearance as published authors was sanctioned by 
their reputation for conventional feminine skills” (59, 61). Their 
publications were “widely read and celebrated in the second half of the 
eighteenth century” (60). Some prominent Bluestocking women were Hester 
Chapone, Elizabeth Carter, Catherine Talbot, and Elizabeth Montagu(60). 
Chapone, Carter, and Talbot appear in The Female Reader.  
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possibilities that women’s didactic writing might allow for 
feminist studies. The following chapter furthers this 
investigation into Wollstonecraft’s appropriation of didactic 
texts and traditions by exploring the ways in which Original 
Stories (1788) and Thoughts on the Education of Daughters (1787) 
manipulate masculine discourses to establish feminist projects as 
well.  
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3.0  ORIGINAL STORIES AND THOUGHTS ON THE EDUCATION OF 
DAUGHTERS: “REFASHIONING” ‘EXPERT’ ADVICE 
Wollstonecraft’s appropriation of Enfield’s elocutionary 
framework enabled her to recontextualize established discourses 
on women’s “proper sphere,” thus encouraging readers to question 
these otherwise authoritative perspectives. However, 
Wollstonecraft’s appropriation of the work of didactic writers 
that specifically address women’s education is more complex, as 
she not only adapts didactic structures, but also works to revise 
these writers’ arguments regarding women’s education. While they 
specifically address this process in relation to 19th century 
literary texts, Carr, Carr, and Schultz describe the process by 
which compilers in various textbook traditions “reappropriated” 
and “refashioned” earlier rhetorics and provide a model for 
understanding how Wollstonecraft appropriated the didactic 
projects of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile and Dr. John Gregory’s 
A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters. They suggest that it was 
general practice for compilers of early rhetorics to 
simultaneously “amplify and narrow the effects and influence of 
earlier rhetorics, transforming more fully and diversely 
elaborated arguments into a few memorable positions…[and] 
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dispossess arguments from earlier authors, diminishing the 
distinctive stylistic or conceptual qualities that might identify 
them with a specific historical and theoretical position” (47).     
In Original Stories, Wollstonecraft enacts this process of 
reappropriation as she refashions Rousseau’s representation of 
Sophy in Émile. Wollstonecraft’s refashioning of Gregory’s Legacy 
takes on the form of a more generalized response to his work, as 
she integrates sections into Thoughts on the Education of 
Daughters that reflect those in Legacy, revising his perspective 
on female conduct, love, and marriage. Wollstonecraft’s 
“reappropriat[ion]” and “refashioning” of “older texts” can tell 
us a great deal about her attitudes regarding the improvement of 
women, as she further elaborates arguments from A Vindication of 
the Rights of Woman in her didactic texts.    
 Throughout Vindication, one of Wollstonecraft’s primary 
goals is to refute leading male authors regarding the subject of 
women’s education. Two whom she explicitly critiques are Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Dr. John Gregory:  She suggests “I may be 
accused of arrogance; still I must declare what I firmly believe, 
that all the writers who have written on the subject of female 
education and manners from Rousseau to Dr. Gregory, have 
contributed to render women more artificial, weak characters, 
than they would otherwise have been; and, consequently, more 
useless members of society” (22).  She offers more lengthy 
refutations in Chapter 5, entitled “Animadversions on Some 
Writers,” in which she also provides some commentary on Dr. 
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Fordyce, another widely recognized authority on female education, 
and recognizes (and questions) the work of women writers who have 
also contributed to the improvement of women.  However, despite 
Wollstonecraft’s rejection of the principles established within 
Gregory’s A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters (1774) and 
Rousseau’s Émile (1762), she adopts certain aspects of Gregory’s 
and Rousseau’s didactic methodologies in her Thoughts on the 
Education of Daughters (1787) and Original Stories from Real life 
(1788) while simultaneously rejecting other ideas that fail to 
adhere to her feminist pedagogical project. 
3.1 REFASHIONING ÉMILE: REDEFINING THE TERMS OF FEMININE 
VIRTUE 
In Mary Wollstonecraft, Moira Ferguson and Janet Todd remark on 
the similarity between the “general ideas” of Original Stories 
and Rousseau’s Émile, making a quick reference to 
Wollstonecraft’s “need to change the gender of the pupils” 
(322).26  Although it is easy to find a move towards audience 
                                                 
26  There are actually some profound differences between the two texts. 
Rousseau’s Émile is a treatise on education intended for men of 
intellect whereas Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories (1788), which 
features fictional stories that teach practical lessons, is intended 
for both “teacher” and “pupil” to learn from and enjoy. Although 
Rousseau takes on an “imaginary pupil” (Émile), he does so, not for the 
purposes of connecting with potential learners, but in order to 
reinforce “the rules which call for proof” or to show “how my theories 
may be put into practice” (18).  Rousseau makes it clear that his 
regimen is not a practicum that should be adopted by parents, as he is 
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accommodation like “chang[ing] the gender of the pupils” 
insignificant, when taking into consideration the nature of  
didactic traditions, noticing even the seemingly insignificant or 
‘routine’ alterations might lead to a better understanding of the 
ways in which Wollstonecraft appropriates Rousseau’s educational 
project.27 The similarity of “general ideas” is not surprising—
that Wollstonecraft “amplifies” the notion that children should 
be raised, not by ignorant nurses but by capable parents or what 
Rousseau terms “good tutor[s]” is easily attributable to the fact 
that philosophers such as Rousseau and Locke (from whom Rousseau 
borrows many of his educational precepts) were recognized by many 
as leading educational theorists in 18th century thought. She also 
“narrows” this idea, as she spends no time explaining the reasons 
for which her tutor must ‘rescue’ these privileged children from 
the flawed upbringing of “ignorant” servants, whereas Rousseau 
devotes paragraphs to explaining why underlings should not be 
responsible for raising children of the upper-classes. 
Wollstonecraft also “dispossesses” Rousseau by adopting (without 
citing) the larger conceptual framework of Émile—that of 
                                                                                                                                                 
noted as having responded in the following way to a man who suggested 
that he educated his son according to the precepts established in the 
book: “‘Good Heavens! So much the worse for you, sir, and so much worse 
still for your son.’” (vii). Instead, Émile is “not so much a treatise 
on education as the visions of a dreamer with regard to education” (2).    
27 In Archives of Instruction, Carr, Carr, and Schultz suggest that when 
characterizing a textbooks’ project, it is important to consider that 
“what is important is often apparent in small, routine gestures…in ways 
not necessarily visible in a preface, table of contents, or index. 
Local details or variations—in, for example, a biographical headnote, 
the exercises a student is assigned to do, or a listing of the common 
tropes—can signal the changing interests of the larger project” (Carr, 
Carr, and Schultz 205). 
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developing a child’s “judgment…by way of observation and 
experience” (vii) throughout the formative stages of life—and 
revising it to adhere to the expectations of a (young) female 
audience. In this process of “amplifying,” “narrowing,” and 
“dispossessing” Rousseau’s discourse, Wollstonecraft, like other 
woman writers such as Sarah Fielding (The Governess 1749), Ann 
Murry (Mentoria (1778)) and Catharine Macaulay (Letters on 
Education (1790)), adapts the figure of the wise mentor in 
service of her own pedagogical project.28
Rousseau’s project in tutoring Émile, although ostensibly 
student-centered, is actually more of an opportunity for Rousseau 
(in accordance with enlightenment principles) to demonstrate the 
superiority of the “natural man.”29  Rousseau’s “imaginary pupil,” 
through whom he plans to demonstrate “how [his] theories 
[regarding education] may be put into practice” (18), is obliged 
to undergo a method of childrearing that is in “harmony with… 
                                                 
28 Original Stories is actually part of two larger didactic traditions—
the ‘woman as pedagogue’ tradition, and the rational moralist 
tradition—which I will address at length in Chapters IV and V. Here, I 
am concerned with her relationship to Rousseau, which I will take up 
again in Chapter IV as part of my discussion of the rational moralists 
in children’s literature, for whom Rousseau was an important influence.   
29 A preoccupation of other enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke 
and Thomas Hobbes, the idea of man in a ‘state of nature’ involved 
imagining how he would have developed without having to conform to the 
strictures of civilized society. Rousseau explains his conception of 
Nature (and thus the natural) in the following way: “We are born 
sensitive and from our birth onwards we are affected in various ways by 
our environment. As soon as we become conscious of our sensations we 
tend to seek or shun the things that cause them, at first because they 
are pleasant or unpleasant, then because they suit us or not, and at 
last because of judgments formed by means of the ideas of happiness and 
goodness which reason gives us. These tendencies gain strength and 
permanence with the growth of reason, but hindered by our habits they 
are more or less warped by our prejudices. Before this change they are 
what I call Nature within us” (7).   
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natural tendencies” (7),  which involves “maternal feeding, 
bodily freedom…, physical training…, development of the senses, 
exercise of the judgment through sensory experience and contact 
with things, [and] the approach to abstract knowledge by way of 
observation and experience” (vii). Having been tutored thus from 
“birth to manhood,” appealing to the enlightenment belief that 
“man should [not] be alone,” Rousseau suggests in the final book 
that “Emile is now a man, and we must give him his promised 
helpmeet. That helpmeet is Sophy” (321).30 Although it has taken 
320 pages to adequately educate the “natural man,” Rousseau 
excuses himself from the task of educating the “natural woman” in 
the following way: 
…women are always exclaiming that we educated them for 
nothing but vanity and coquetry, that we keep them 
amused with trifles that we may be their masters; we 
are responsible, so they say, for the faults we 
attribute to them. How Silly! What have men to do with 
                                                 
30 Rousseau’s idea of the “helpmeet” seems to have influenced both 
Wollstonecraft and her daughter, Mary Shelley. Shelley’s famous novel 
Frankenstein (1818), a social commentary in which she “provokes 
attention to the differences that were fracturing modern 
[revolutionary] society—the view of political radicals as monsters; the 
class differences that made the poor seem monstrous…the racial 
differences that made African slaves seem subhuman to those profiting 
from the slave trade” (Damrosch et al. 811), depicts a very different 
monster than one might encounter in sensationalized 20th century 
versions. In Chapter 17, a hitherto compassionate “monster" driven to 
“fiendish rage” by man’s cruelty and indifference, demands that his 
estranged creator “create a female for me” to ease his loneliness, much 
like Rousseau’s assertion that Émile should have a “helpmeet” so that 
he might not be “alone.” Like Wollstonecraft, however, Shelley revises 
Rousseau’s idea, representing woman as having the capacity to improve 
man, as the monster requests a “female” so that his “evil passions” 
might be quelled, whereas Rousseau suggests that woman functions merely 
to “please” man and “stimulate[] man’s passions” (323). 
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the education of girls? What is to hinder their 
mothers educating them as they please? There are no 
colleges for girls: so much the better for them!...Who 
is it that compels a girl to waste her time on foolish 
trifles? Are they forced, against their will, to spend 
half their time over the toilet, following the example 
set them by you? (327) 
Despite Rousseau’s clear refusal (on the part of mankind) to 
accept responsibility for “the education of girls,” he has a very 
specific understanding of Sophy’s function according to “the 
physical and moral order” (321). Although exercising influence 
over man as a result of her ability to “stimulate[] man’s 
passions,” Sophy’s primary goal is “to be pleasing in his sight, 
to win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend 
him in manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant 
and happy” Ultimately, Rousseau explains, “these are the duties 
of woman for all time, and this is what she should be taught 
while she is young” (328). It is this depiction of “Sophy,” 
Émile’s “helpmeet” who should be (by nature) “weak and passive,” 
that Wollstonecraft “reappropriates” in her writing of Original 
Stories.   
In “Pedagogy as Self Expression in Mary Wollstonecraft: 
Exorcising the Past, Finding a Voice,” Mitzi Myers discusses 
Wollstonecraft’s appropriation of Rousseau’s male mentor, 
suggesting that Wollstonecraft “convert[s] another mutating 
genre—children’s literature—into a woman’s form, displacing the 
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male tutors of Rousseau and Thomas Day with her female mentoria” 
(201). In so doing, the Original Stories demonstrate “…how women 
can school themselves toward self-command and psychic self-
sufficiency” (201-203). However, Wollstonecraft’s appropriation 
of the “male tutor” also serves to undermine established 
masculine discourse regarding feminine duty, as she “refashions” 
Rousseau’s idea of Sophy as slavish dependant, who was made “to 
please and be in subjection to man” (322). She recasts his tutor 
as a female figure who is uninterested in the “foolish trifles” 
that Rousseau suggests are the primary occupation of the female 
sex, relying instead on “reason” to guide her judgment. 
Wollstonecraft’s mentoria, Mrs. Mason, educates two recently 
orphaned upper-class girls (Mary and Caroline) through various 
experiences with “real life,” as well as stories that correspond 
to and illustrate the consequences of the girls’ various faults. 
To facilitate this approach, Wollstonecraft divides the twenty-
five chapters by lesson (for example, the first three chapters 
are devoted to “The Treatment of Animals,” with subsequent 
chapters dealing with issues of “Anger,” “Lying,” “Dress,” 
“Prayer,” “Charity” etc.(362-65). As Myers suggests, the very 
existence of Mrs. Mason, who takes on the responsibility of 
“mother-teacher,” would undermine Rousseau’s suggestion that 
Sophy “cannot fulfil her purpose without [man’s] aid, without his 
goodwill, without his respect,” as her pupils strive—not to 
please man—but to please Mrs. Mason. However, Wollstonecraft’s 
refashioning of Rousseau’s natural woman moves beyond her 
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recasting of the male mentor as “mother-teacher.” Incorporating 
the various manifestations of Sophy’s “feminine virtues”—
coquetry, cunning, and utter dependence upon man—Wollstonecraft 
recasts Sophy, not as the “natural woman,” but as an “irrational 
monster” who, in the absence of man, can access neither Reason 
nor God.  
In Vindication Wollstonecraft refutes Rousseau’s 
description of woman as possessing “natural” propensities towards 
certain characteristics, such as cunning and coquetry. 
Wollstonecraft’s attack on Rousseau’s position concerning women’s 
role in society in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman allows 
her to appropriate his notion of virtue in accordance with her 
feminist project; however, Original Stories extends the work of 
Vindication by further redefining Rousseau’s notion of virtue, 
suggesting that women should strive to please God rather than 
man. For instance, Rousseau makes the following claim (using a 
hypothetical example) regarding the female sex, despite the fact 
that, as Wollstonecraft suggests in Vindication, he has had very 
little experience observing them: 
Here is a little girl busy all day with her doll; she 
is always changing its clothes, dressing and 
undressing it…We have here a very early and clearly-
marked bent; you have only to follow it and train it. 
What the little girl most clearly desires is to dress 
her doll, to make its bows, its tippets, its sashes, 
and its tuckers; she is dependent on other people’s 
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kindness in all this, and it would be much pleasanter 
to be able to do it herself. Here is a motive for her 
earliest lessons, they are not tasks prescribed, but 
favours bestowed. Little girls always dislike learning 
to read and write, but they are always ready to learn 
to sew. They think they are grown up, and in 
imagination they are using their knowledge for their 
own adornment. (331) 
What Rousseau advocates for Sophy is an education according to 
nature—what she seems to “desire” is what her mother should 
encourage and cultivate in her. A clever justification for the 
subjugation of women, Rousseau appeals to the sovereignty of 
nature to maintain that women delight in trifles and therefore 
should not be exposed to more rigorous subjects such as reading 
and writing. Claiming that the adherence to what nature intended 
is the mark of woman’s virtue (as it is in men), Rousseau 
establishes a different set of virtues for both sexes, based on 
the belief that “The Most High…has endowed man with boundless 
passions, together with a law to guide them, so that man may be 
alike free and self-controlled…endowed with reason by which to 
control them. Woman is also endowed with boundless passion; God 
has given her [only] modesty to restrain them” (323), leading to 
the necessity that woman “be at the mercy of man’s judgment” 
(328).  
Original Stories illustrates the consequences of educating 
according to one’s natural “bent” by refashioning the character 
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of Sophy into the young “Jane Fretful.”31 Jane’s emergence is 
prompted by a dispute between Mary and Caroline, which becomes so 
vehement that a young bird that the girls were caring for is 
trampled in the process. Mrs. Mason then invokes the following 
story to illustrate the result of being governed by one’s 
“passion:” 
Jane Fretful was an only child. Her fond, weak mother 
would not allow her to be contradicted on any 
occasion. The child had some tenderness of heart; but 
so accustomed was she to see every thing give way to 
her humour, that she imagined the world was only made 
for her…A lady, who visited her mother, brought with 
her one day a pretty little dog. Jane was delighted 
with it; and the lady, with great reluctance, parted 
with it to oblige her friend. For some time she 
fondled, and really felt something like affection for 
it: but one day it happened to snatch a cake she was 
going to eat, and though there were twenty within 
reach, she flew into a violent passion, and threw a 
stool at the poor creature….and the poor wretch 
                                                 
31 Original Stories’ deployment of the exemplary ‘everywoman’ character 
(e.g. Jane Fretful, Lady Sly, Mrs. Trueman) marks its relationship to 
larger didactic traditions linked to Sarah Fielding’s educational novel 
The Governess (1749) and John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress (1678, 1684), 
which I will discuss at length in Chapters IV and V. It is important to 
note that Original Stories’ exemplary everywoman characters were not 
given names to reflect their particular virtues or faults until the 
third edition (in the first two editions Jane Fretful was “Jane B”, 
Lady Sly was “Lady L.” and so forth). The edition I am working with is 
the third (1796), which also features illustrations by William Blake.   
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languished two days, suffering the most excruciating 
torture. (381) 
This little anecdote demonstrates that if allowed to pursue her 
natural “bent,” woman will not, as Rousseau suggests, use her 
God- given “modesty” to “restrain” her “passion” (323). Rousseau 
argues that even “the tiniest little girls” are “controlled by 
‘What will people think of you?’” (329), and therefore require 
little education beyond “their conduct, their manners, [and] 
their behaviour” in public (325); Original Stories instead 
emphasizes that she will allow “every thing to give way to her 
humour,” causing suffering even for those she supposedly feels 
“affection” for. Incorporating the image of a “pretty little dog” 
as opposed to another human being, Original Stories dramatizes 
the extent to which “violent passion” can lead one to exercise 
“lawless power” (Vindication 44) upon creatures considered to be 
less capable of reason, much as Mary and Caroline’s passion 
destroyed their little pet. Wollstonecraft goes on to describe 
the quality of life that a child permitted to indulge her passion 
will experience, suggesting that “…anger soon distorted her 
regular features, and gave a forbidding fierceness to her 
eyes…She had not, by doing good, prepared her soul for another 
state, or cherished any hopes that could disarm death of its 
terrors, or render that last sleep sweet—its approach was 
dreadful!” (382). Describing the embittered state of Jane 
Fretful’s life, in which even her “features” were eventually 
“distorted” by “anger,” Original Stories rejects Rousseau’s logic 
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that a woman’s virtue can be defined by the extent to which she 
learns to “please and to be in subjection to man,” revealing that 
a much more serious educational regimen is required to address 
women’s faults. More importantly, Original Stories exposes the 
absurdity of “virtue” as being relative according to sex, since 
Jane Fretful might ultimately become quite good at ‘pleasing men’ 
through feminine arts despite her propensity for rage and 
violence, but she certainly could not be called virtuous by any 
standard. Original Stories indicates that a woman of real virtue 
is subject only to God, and it is by “doing good,” not by 
“pleasing” men, that woman might “prepar[e] her soul for another 
state” (382). Therefore, reappropriating Rousseau’s character of 
Sophy into the “real life” story of Jane Fretful, Original 
Stories emphasizes that it is in the acquisition of this type of 
virtue—not through Rousseau’s version—that one maintains “her 
reputation and her good name” (Rousseau 325), since Jane 
Fretful’s “marks of convulsive anger…followed her to the grave, 
on which no one shed a tear. She was soon forgotten; and I only 
remember her, to warn you to shun her errors” (Wollstonecraft 
382). 
Rousseau’s emphasis on modesty as one of the feminine 
virtues, that which he suggests will ultimately restrain woman’s 
“passions,” is allied to another feminine “virtue” that 
Wollstonecraft attacks in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 
that of coquetry. For Rousseau, modesty is understood to restrain 
the passions by obliging a woman—not actually to dispel the 
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passion—but “to conceal [her] desires” (349) from public notice. 
The practice of coquetry arises out of necessity, which Rousseau 
describes as “one of the distinctive characters of the sex. Self-
possession, penetration, delicate observation, this is a woman’s 
science; the skill to make use of it is her chief accomplishment” 
(348). This “science” enables a woman to get what she wants 
despite the modesty that prohibits her from explicitly requesting 
it.  In Vindication, coquetry is a form of falsehood that 
camouflages and indulges the passions rather than allowing 
“reason [to] teach passion to submit to necessity; or… the 
dignified pursuit of virtue and knowledge [to] raise the mind 
above those emotions which rather imbitter than sweeten the cup 
of life, when they are not restrained within due bounds” (31). 
Whereas Vindication’s attack on Rousseau only alludes to the ways 
life may be “imbitter[ed]” by engaging in coquetry, Original 
Stories reappropriates the figure of Sophy to reveal its 
detrimental effects, demonstrating how one might instead “attend 
strictly to truth” in order to maintain a relationship with “the 
Author of good, the Fountain of truth” (384).  
In Émile, Rousseau suggests that “it is said that women are 
false. They become false. They are really endowed with skill not 
duplicity; in the genuine inclinations of their sex they are not 
false even when they tell a lie…The more modest a woman is, the 
more art she needs, even with her husband. Yes, I maintain that 
coquetry, kept within bounds, becomes modest and true” (348). If 
encouraged to perfect this art, Rousseau maintains that Sophy 
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will have a better chance of actualizing her “legitimate desires” 
by “indicating her inclinations without open expression” (348). 
Wollstonecraft’s character of Lady Sly has also adopted the 
“science” of coquetry, and she has learned to manipulate this 
supposed virtue to engage in falsehoods that gratify her far 
beyond any “legitimate” desires.  
This woman has a little soul, she never attended to 
truth, and obtaining great part of her fortune by 
falsehood, it has blighted all of her enjoyments. She 
inhabits that superb house, wears the gayest clothes, 
and rides in that beautiful carriage without feeling 
pleasure. Suspicion, and the cares it has given birth 
to, have wrinkled her countenance, and banished every 
trace of beauty, which paint endeavors in vain to 
repair…She imagines that every person she converses 
with means to deceive her; and when she leaves a 
company, supposes all they ill they may say of her, 
because she recollects her own practice…She cannot 
pray to God—He hates a liar! (385) 
This story is prompted by a lie that Mary and Caroline tell Mrs. 
Mason, and it serves to illustrate what the embittering effects 
of coquetry might involve. Not only is this woman unable to enjoy 
any of her finery as it was attained through “falsehood,” but she 
is also haunted by “suspicion” that others are as false as she 
is. Once again, Original Stories establishes God, not man, as the 
ultimate judge of feminine virtue, indicating that Lady Sly 
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“cannot pray to God” since “the Searcher of hearts reads your 
very thoughts; [so] that nothing is hid from him” (383), and that 
even “[t]ones of voice, motions of the hand or head, if they make 
another believe what they ought not to believe, are lies, and of 
the worst kind; because the contrivance aggravates the guilt” 
(383). In so doing, Original Stories refutes Rousseau’s claim 
that “coquetry, kept within bounds, becomes modest and true,” 
since, in the absence of man, there is no way of maintaining 
these “bounds.” Like Jane Fretful, Lady Sly escaped the 
discerning “judgment” of the men in her life, learning the art of 
coquetry at a young age. Her penchant for falsehood began as a 
mere entertainment, as she “used to say pert things, which the 
injudicious people about her laughed at, and called very witty. 
Finding that her prattle pleased, she talked incessantly, and 
invented stories, when adding to those that had some foundation 
was not sufficient to entertain the company” (386). Original 
Stories demonstrates the dangers of Rousseau’s understanding of 
feminine virtue by redefining the term in relation to God’s 
judgment rather than man’s. Although the art of coquetry allows 
for the fulfillment of women’s “needs” in this life (depending on 
her husband’s goodwill, of course), Original Stories reminds 
readers that, in pursuing “trifling gratification” they run the 
risk of “wantonly forfeit[ing] the favour of Him, from whom you 
have received life and all its blessings” (383). Rousseau and his 
fellow men may disapprove of a woman of “frankness and 
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uprightness,” but God—as Original Stories emphasizes—“hates a 
liar!” (385).  
Other manifestations of Sophy emerge throughout Original 
Stories; she appears as a young woman who obsesses about her 
appearance, a negligent woman named Mrs. Dowdy, and even in the 
oftentimes self-indulgent behavior of the two young orphans, Mary 
and Caroline, whose passions lead them to such faults as 
affecting airs and overeating. Regardless of the circumstance, 
Sophy’s character is always improved by virtue, which 
Wollstonecraft describes, finally, in relation to the worthy 
character, Mrs. Trueman, who “loves truth, and [] is ever 
exercising benevolence and love. From the insect, that she avoids 
treading on, her affection may be traced to that Being who lives 
for ever. And it is from her goodness her agreeable qualities 
spring” (436). Ultimately, by refashioning Rousseau within the 
didactic tradition, Original Stories allows for the redefinition 
of masculine discourse concerning “feminine virtue” as a female-







3.2 REFASHIONING A LEGACY: REDEFINING THE RULES OF CONDUCT 
Wollstonecraft’s Thoughts on the Education of Daughters (1787) 
also redefines masculine discourses by addressing expectations of 
female conduct and the institutions of love and marriage as 
characterized by Dr. John Gregory. Gregory was not the only 
authority on women’s education to address female conduct, love, 
and marriage, but he does so thoroughly, devoting an entire 
section to each subject. Wollstonecraft acknowledges the 
influence of Gregory’s A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters (1774) 
in Vindication, suggesting that “I cannot silently pass over 
arguments that so speciously support opinions which…have had the 
most baneful effect on the morals and manners of the female 
world” (96).  Like Émile, Gregory’s Legacy serves to reinforce 
masculine conceptions of womanhood as based primarily on feminine 
“virtues and accomplishments” (Gregory 13). Gregory divides his 
Legacy into three sections, which he suggests that he has 
“throw[n]…together without any studied order” (12), entitled 
“Conduct and Behaviour,” “Amusements,” and “Friendship, Love, 
Marriage”—the former two sections both geared towards the 
accomplishment of the latter.  
Like Gregory, Wollstonecraft arranges her Thoughts into 
sections with headings that designate the topics she will 
address, and the extended title of Thoughts marks it as a 
conventional conduct book, as it reads with Reflections on Female 
Conduct, in The more Important Duties of Life.  While the overall 
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tenor of Thoughts reflects the conventional didactic tone of the 
conduct books, Wollstonecraft does not adopt a letter format in 
order to address a fictional daughter/pupil (and, thus, “you,” 
the reader),32 but rather essays to “point out some important 
things with respect to female education” throughout the stages of 
life, or, as her headings indicate, from “The Nursery” to 
“Boarding-Schools” (5). Reflecting the experience of a woman who 
has headed a school for girls, Thoughts refashions the 
conventional conduct book approach by addressing the problems 
inherent in the current system of educating daughters rather than 
providing a set of ‘rules’ or maxims by which “you,” the 
fictional daughter and reader, might learn to enact appropriate 
female behavior.33  
Wollstonecraft’s refashioning of the conduct book tradition 
is first signaled by her departure from the conventional 
“religion,” “behavior,” “accomplishment” headings; while some 
headings do reflect these general topics, others serve to 
                                                 
32 For further elaboration on the conventional conduct book approach and 
Gregory’s relationship to that tradition, see Chapter II.  
33 In “Pedagogy as Self-Expression in Mary Wollstonecraft: Exorcising the 
Past, Finding a Voice,” Mitzi Myers addresses Thoughts on the Education 
of Daughters as autobiographical—as one of the various “educational 
modes” through which Wollstonecraft “achieved the authoritative 
pedagogic voice, the defined writing self, that allowed her escape to a 
larger, freer life as an educational philosopher and cultural critic.” 
While Myers’s insightful reading of Thoughts as a text that 
“progressively recodifies the rules of exemplary female behavior” has 
informed my work, her larger argument regarding Wollstonecraft’s 
didactic texts as exemplary of “a revelatory autobiographical voice” 
(80) obscures their relationship to didactic traditions that, I would 
argue, Wollstonecraft seeks to refashion. Myers sees Wollstonecraft’s 
didactic texts as modes through which she developed her “educational 
voice heard in her mature work” (80), whereas I see them doing the same 
kind of work in their appropriation of masculine discursive modes and 
arguments.   
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designate particular problems that she will address such as 
“Unfortunate Situation of Females, Fashionably Educated, and Left 
without a Fortune.” And, the sections entitled “Artificial 
Manners,” “Love,” and “Matrimony,” might be read as responses to 
Gregory’s advice in “Conduct and Behaviour” and “Friendship, 
Love, and Marriage,” as they elaborate on how Wollstonecraft 
“differs in opinion” on these subjects (Vindication 100). Unlike 
her approach to Émile, Wollstonecraft does not “amplify” and 
“narrow” Gregory’s position—she simply “dispossesses” it, as she 
adopts Legacy’s larger conceptual approach in addressing these 
issues without crediting Gregory, revising them to reflect her 
own pedagogical project.  
In “Friendship, Love, Marriage,” Gregory advises his 
daughters how to decide upon a suitable husband, as “you [his 
daughters] may attain a superior degree of happiness in a married 
state, to what you can possibly find in any other” (67).  
However, he actually admits to having little knowledge on the 
subject, remarking that “from what I have said, you will easily 
see that I could never pretend to advise whom you should marry; 
but can with great confidence advise whom you should not marry” 
(77). In the preface to Thoughts on the Education of Daughters, 
Wollstonecraft seems to be aware of this lack of paternal 
knowledge regarding the education of young women, suggesting “It 
is true, many treatises have been already written; yet it 
occurred to me, that much still remained to be said” (5). In 
Vindication, Wollstonecraft describes Gregory’s advice as a 
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“system of slavery,” in which he attempts to delineate a set a 
rules for his daughters’ “Conduct and Behaviour” in public so 
that they may perfect “female excellence” for the purposes of 
catching a husband (33). She quotes the following passage from 
Gregory’s section devoted to “Conduct and Behaviour,” questioning 
“the necessity that the behaviour of the whole sex should be 
modulated to please fools:”  “‘Be even cautious in displaying 
your good sense. It will be thought you assume a  superiority 
over the rest of the company.—But if you happen to have any 
learning, keep it a profound secret, especially from the men, who 
generally look with a jealous and malignant eye on  a woman of 
great parts, and a cultivated understanding.’” Not only does 
Wollstonecraft belittle Gregory’s observations on the subject of 
behavior, but she also incorporates her own perspective, thus 
gesturing towards a redefinition of the term.  
The remarks [in A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters] 
relative to behaviour, though many of them very 
sensible, I entirely disapprove of, because it appears 
to me to be beginning, as it were, at the wrong end. A 
cultivated understanding, and an affectionate heart, 
will never want starched rules of decorum—something 
more substantial than seemliness will be the result; 
and, without understanding the behaviour here 
recommended, would be rank affectation. Decorum, 
indeed, is the one thing needful!—decorum is to 
supplant nature, and banish all simplicity and variety 
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of character out of the female world. Yet what good 
end can all this superficial counsel produce? It is, 
however, much easier to point out this or that mode of 
behaviour, than to set the reason to work; but, when 
the mind has been stored with useful knowledge, and 
strengthened by being employed, the regulation of the 
behaviour may safely be left to its guidance. 
(Vindication 97-98) 
Whereas Gregory’s notion of behavior involves the concealment of 
one’s “understanding” for the purposes of avoiding the censure of 
men’s “malignant eye,” Wollstonecraft recognizes it as a natural 
result of “setting the reason to work,” or “storing” one’s mind 
with “useful knowledge.” In opposition to the idea that 
appropriate behavior requires a set of rules that might be 
“regulated” while the “understanding” is “concealed,” 
Wollstonecraft emphasizes the possibility that it might be “left 
to [the] guidance” of “the mind.”  Thoughts serves to extend this 
claim from Vindication, further redefining Gregory’s “decorum”-
based approach to behavior to one that is rooted in a disavowal 
of “rank affectation” in favor of a “cultivated understanding” 
(Thoughts 5).  
In a section addressing “Artificial Manners,” 
Wollstonecraft writes, “That gentleness of behaviour, which makes 
us courteous to all, and that benevolence, which makes us loth to 
offend any, and studious to please every creature, is sometimes 
copied by the polite; but how aukward is the copy!...As humility 
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gives the most pleasing cast to the countenance, so from 
sincerity arises that artlessness of manners which is so 
engaging” (14).  Although Thoughts and Vindication both argue 
that proper behavior is cultivated from within rather than 
imposed from without, Thoughts elaborates on the positive effects 
of behavior that reflects a “cultivated understanding.” What 
young lady does not hope to be “courteous to all,” avoid 
“offend[ing] any,” and “please every creature?” If these 
“benevolen[t]” qualities are not amenable to her interests, 
Thoughts also promises that she who allows her conduct to emanate 
from “humility” and “sincerity” might enjoy a “pleasing cast to 
the countenance,” and “manners” that others may find “engaging.” 
While Gregory implies that the reward for adherence to his rules 
for behaviour may be the approbation of the other sex, 
Wollstonecraft appeals to feminine vanity, explaining that “[s]he 
who suffers herself to be seen as she really is, can never be 
thought affected. She is not solicitous to act a part; her 
endeavor / is not to hide; but correct her failings, and her face 
has of course that beauty, which an attention to the mind only 
gives” (14).   
Having thus redefined (and emphasized the “satisfaction” 
resulting from) the notion of proper feminine behavior as 
naturally radiating from a “well ordered mind” (15,14),   
Wollstonecraft establishes alternative discourses on love and 
marriage consistent with this cognitive approach to feminine 
conduct. In Vindication, she ponders “how women are to exist in 
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that state where there is to be neither marrying nor giving in 
marriage, we are not told. For though moralists have agreed that 
the tenor of life seems to prove that man is prepared by various 
circumstances for a future state, they constantly concur in 
advising woman only to provide for the present” (34). Although 
she provides an incisive observation regarding the degraded 
condition of women at this time, in her criticism of “moralists” 
who fail to “prepare” women “for a future state,” Wollstonecraft 
does not move beyond polemic assertion to indicate how she 
imagines making better provision for a woman’s “future.”  
Thoughts, however, allows for an elaboration of this claim, 
further elucidating Wollstonecraft’s perspective regarding the 
improvement of women.  
As his remark in the preface suggests, Gregory is very 
apprehensive about whether or not marriage will indeed make his 
daughters happy, vacillating from one position to another on the 
subject, even presenting his daughters (although grudgingly) with 
the possibility of becoming “Old Maids.” However, in accordance 
with Vindication’s argument (above), Gregory’s way of addressing 
a situation in which “there is to be neither marrying or giving 
in marriage” is to avoid its implications, as he appeals to the 
solution that would only be available to some, the monetary 
allowance. He writes 
But, I confess, I am not enough of a patriot to wish 
you to marry for the good of the public: I wish you to 
marry for no other reason but to make yourselves 
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happier. When I am so particular in my advices about 
your conduct, I own my heart beats with the fond hope 
of making you worthy the attachment of men who will 
deserve you, and be sensible of your merit. But heaven 
forbid, you should ever relinquish the ease and 
independence of a single life to become the slaves of 
a fool, or a tyrant’s caprice…As these have always 
been my sentiments, I shall do you but justice, when I 
leave you in such independent circumstances as may lay 
you under no temptation to do from necessity what you 
would never do from choice. (69-70) 
Rather than providing his daughters with a means of discerning 
that which will make them “happy” from a “tyrant’s caprice,” 
Gregory proposes to give them a choice by leaving them in 
financially “independent circumstances.” However, his desire to 
leave his daughters with a “choice” in determining whether or not 
to marry is complicated by his description of love, which, from 
his perspective, is initiated –not by the woman—but by the man, 
as he suggests “What is commonly called love among you, is rather 
gratitude, and a partiality to the man who prefers you to the 
rest of your sex; and such a man you often marry, with little of 
either personal esteem or affection…a woman in this country has 
very little probability of marrying for love” (52-53). To assuage 
this reality, Gregory explains that “nature…has wisely and 
benevolently assigned you a greater flexibility of taste on the 
subject” (54).  
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 Thoughts undermines Gregory’s notion of marriage as 
justified by mere “partiality” and “flexibility of taste” on the 
part of the woman, invoking reason (rather than gratitude) as the 
basis for one’s choice.  In her section on “Love,” Wollstonecraft 
claims that “I think there is not a subject that admits so little 
of reasoning on as love…Perhaps, before they begin to consider 
the matter, they see through the medium of passion, and its 
suggestion are often mistaken for those of reason” (28). 
Redefining Gregory’s concept of love as acquiescence to the 
“gratitude” of a man who “prefers her,” Thoughts emphasizes that 
“we should always try to fix in our minds the rational grounds we 
have for loving a person, then we may be able to recollect them 
when we feel disgust or resentment” (29). Representing love as a 
state that will be maintained rather than the means by which one 
“attach[es]” the affections of a man (Gregory 53), the next 
section entitled “Matrimony” demonstrates how Gregory’s concept 
of marriage preparation as enhancing the feminine accomplishments 
might indeed constitute a “system of slavery:”  
In youth, a woman endeavors to please the other sex, 
in order, generally speaking, to get married, and this 
endeavor calls forth all her powers. If she has a 
tolerable education, the foundation only is laid, for 
the mind does not soon arrive at maturity, and should 
not be engrossed by domestic cares before any habits 
are fixed. The passions also have too much influence 
over the judgment to suffer it to direct her in this 
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most important affair; and many women, I am persuaded, 
marry a man before they are twenty, whom they would 
have rejected some years after…A woman of feeling must 
be very much hurt if she is obliged to keep her 
children out of her father’s company, that their 
morals may not be injured by his conversation…Many are 
but just returned from a boarding-school, when they 
are placed at the head of a family, and how fit they 
are to manage it, I leave the judicious to judge. (31) 
Describing matrimony as the management of “domestic cares,” 
Thoughts reveals the fact that it may just as easily become a 
“miserable situation” as a comfortable one, and therefore 
requires a greater level of education than that of the behavior 
and conduct appropriate to “female excellence.” Choice should not 
be limited to the “gratitude” a young woman might feel for a male 
suitor or a father’s allowance, but should instead constitute an 
exercise of the judgment in regards to a man’s “principle[s]” 
(31), since she will ultimately be called upon to run his 
household and educate his children. This characterization of 
marriage advocates the type of relationship necessary for women 
to experience love as friendship, in which the woman who 
“exercises her mind will, by managing her family and practicing 
various virtues, become[s] the friend, and not the humble 
dependent of her husband” (Vindication 29). Thus, Thoughts 
exposes the emptiness of Gregory’s discourse concerning love and 
marriage, as his approach fails to account for how women are to 
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manage their “duties” post-matrimony, instead encouraging them 
make the acquisition of marriage the “endeavor” that “calls forth 
all her powers,” leaving little room for reflection in regards to 
this “important affair.” Redefining the terms of love and 
marriage as enduring conditions rather than fleeting ideals, 
Thoughts on the Education of Daughters illustrates how the 
endearing Gregory might be understood as “tyrannic,” while 
simultaneously providing a sense of how a woman might conceive of 
marriage as preparation for a “future state” rather than an 
occupation of the “present” (Vindication 34). 
Despite their reputation as uninteresting precursors to 
Wollstonecraft’s groundbreaking feminist work, Original Stories 
and Thoughts on the Education of Daughters serve to clarify (by 
means of stories or examples) and extend the arguments she 
proposes in her now famous ‘feminist manifesto.’ Original Stories 
further defines her concept of virtue, while Thoughts serves to 
justify the grounds for her vehement attack of the ‘endearing’ 
Gregory. Therefore, these texts call into question the common 
assumption that didactic texts for women were merely tools of 
social control, revealing instead how they might work to redefine 






4.0  WOLLSTONECRAFT’S “OTHER WOMEN:” FEMINIST PEDAGOGIES 
IN PRIDE AND PREJUDICE AND SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 
The feminist critical tendency to lionize Wollstonecraft’s 
Vindication while dismissing her pedagogical writing extends to 
criticism that tries to establish a Wollstonecraftian legacy in 
the work of (post)romantic women writers such as Jane Austen and 
Charlotte Brontë. Feminist critics seek to establish a 
relationship between Austen and Brontë’s work and the more 
radical and overtly polemicized versions of late 18th century 
feminism they see represented in A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman. However, sharing Wollstonecraft’s commitment to feminist 
pedagogy, the work of Austen and Brontë borrows from earlier 
didactic traditions and, more specifically, reflects the pedagogy 
established in Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories (1788). In the 
final two chapters, I will situate Wollstonecraft’s Original 
Stories within two distinct didactic traditions, the woman as 
pedagogue and rational moralist traditions,34 which also include 
Sarah Fielding’s educational novel The Governess (1749). The 
                                                 
34 I have adopted the term “rational moralist” from Demers and Moyles’s 
From Instruction to Delight: An Anthology of Children’s Literature to 
1850 (1982). For further discussion of my adaptation of the term, see 
Chapter VI, footnote 39. 
  93
subsequent chapters underscore the ways in which didactic 
traditions simultaneously overlap with and depart from one 
another.  
Both the woman as pedagogue and rational moralist 
traditions incorporate exemplary female figures that, I argue, 
are adapted into and play significant roles in Austen’s Sense and 
Sensibility (1811) and Pride and Prejudice (1813) and Brontë’s 
Jane Eyre (1847). By adapting these traditions, Austen and Brontë 
generate pedagogies that emphasize women’s capacity to cultivate 
reason and virtue in the absence of male influence. Making 
structural connections between Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories 
and Austen (in Chapter IV) and  Brontë (In Chapter V), I will 
argue that Austen’s work reflects Wollstonecraft’s in its 
emphasis on the importance of female relationships as a necessary 
part of the learning process, while Brontë’s 19th century 
representation of feminist pedagogy sanctions rivalry and 
antagonistic relationships amongst women.  I recognize the change 
in feminist pedagogical approach from Austen to Brontë as marking 
a significant transformation in the understanding of feminism 
from the late 18th century to the mid 19th century, as feminism as 
a shared goal amongst women gave way to the quest for feminism as 
individualism. As we continue to establish the rights of woman in 
postmodern society, I suggest that we might incorporate 
Wollstonecraft’s work into our own teaching as a way of 
challenging the self-serving version of feminism that Jane Eyre 
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promotes and helping students learn to appropriate and revise 
masculine authoritative discourses of the 21st century.  
*** 
 “We need to examine female images in Jane Austen’s work in 
relation to the liberationist philosophy of that ‘feminist 
tradition’ which precedes Jane Austen in the writings of Mary 
Wollstonecraft, and which, of course, has blossomed into the 
feminist revolt of our time” (Brown 324).  Lloyd W. Brown’s 1973 
call for a reading of Austen through the lens of Wollstonecraft’s 
“liberationist philosophy” situates the larger feminist project 
of “reclaiming Mary Wollstonecraft” in relation to the literary 
era in which she wrote—the romantic period.35  In arguing for the 
recognition of Wollstonecraft as a harbinger of or a central 
figure within the rise of a romantic era feminism characterized 
by an emphasis on “rational thought” (Lau 221), critics such as 
Beth Lau, Anne Mellor, Margaret Kirkham, Alison Sulloway, and 
Susan J. Wolfson focus on her as a “feminist theorist” (Sulloway 
5) whose discourse of “feminine romanticism” may be read in the 
works of Jane Austen and other woman writers of the romantic 
                                                 
35  In “Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice,” from A Companion to 
Romanticism, Beth Lau explains the controversy surrounding Austen’s 
inclusion in the Romantic canon, and there are various studies that 
address the extent to which Austen might really be considered a 
“Romantic” writer, such as Clara Tuite’s Romantic Austen (2002) and 
William Deresiewicz’s Jane Austen and the Romantic Poets (2004). 
However,  I use the term Romantic to delineate the specific (although 
now arguable) time period during which both Austen and Wollstonecraft 
wrote—not as a means of describing their work as incorporating certain 
“Romantic” topoii or imbibing a certain “spirit of the age” as 
described by Meyer Abrams, or as reflecting an  “ideology located in 
specific political and social events” as per Jerome McGann  (Mellor 13, 
1).   
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period.  Anne Mellor’s Romanticism and Gender offers the most 
comprehensive discussion of Wollstonecraft as the propagator of a 
“feminine Romantic ideology:” she suggests that “in contrast to a 
masculine Romantic ideology, an ideology that affirmed the rights 
and feelings of the natural man, Wollstonecraft propounded an 
equally revolutionary but very different ideology… grounded in a 
belief in the rational capacity and equality of woman” (33). Like 
Mellor, other characterizations of Wollstonecraft as a “spirit” 
that seems to have “taken control of [Charlotte Brontë’s] pen” 
(Diedrick 22-23) or of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
(1792) as “constituting the essence of post-Enlightenment 
rational feminism” (Kirkham 236), or as a feminist “‘voice’”  
whose “‘echoes’” might be heard “ throughout Jane Austen’s 
novels’” as “themes of the Wollstonecraftian revolution” 
(Sulloway reading Nina Auerbach 49), posit her as the 
consolidating force of feminist thought during this era. This is 
not to say that critics fail to acknowledge the existence of 
other “infamous” feminist figures such as Mary Hays and Catherine 
Macaulay (Sulloway 4-5); however, Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman, considered to be “the most favorably 
reviewed, widely read, and … lastingly influential feminist tract 
of the period” (Mellor 39), is generally recognized as that which 
augurs the feminist “spirit of the age.”   
The historical reality of book circulation in the romantic 
period as documented by William St. Clair in The Reading Nation 
in the Romantic Period (2004) calls these claims into question. 
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When considering Vindication’s influence on later texts, print 
history reveals that Vindication’s mark on literary culture was 
quite limited, especially in comparison to the widely circulating 
mass of conduct books that dominated the book market at that time 
(St. Clair 275), and women writers such as Catharine Macaulay 
made similar claims regarding the inferior education of women. I 
do not intend to belittle the achievement of Vindication—it 
should go without saying that a woman writing polemic at this 
time might be considered a pioneer simply for her unprecedented 
manipulation of a hitherto ‘masculine’ genre. And I would suggest 
that we may identify Wollstonecraft’s relationship to women 
writers such as Jane Austen, but not by recognizing 
Wollstonecraft as a feminist “spirit,” “voice,” or purveyor of 
“romantic ideology” that emerges in their work.  Rather, I would 
like to suggest that Wollstonecraft and Austen both share a 
relationship to a didactic tradition of women’s writing that 
emphasizes the importance of female relationships in the 
acquisition of reason and virtue.  More specifically, both 
incorporate exemplars of reason-based and accomplishment-based 
female education, which emerge throughout the Wollstonecraft 
canon, and are first established in her quasi-novelistic conduct 
book entitled Original Stories (1788).  
 St. Clair challenges the notion of Wollstonecraft as 
purveyor of “feminine romanticism.” He addresses the relationship 
of print culture to the reading public during this time by 
careful analysis of “the governing structures which determined 
  97
the texts that were made available for reading in the romantic 
period” (St. Clair 13). In Chapter XIV entitled “Horizons of 
Expectations,” St. Clair describes how we might read 
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman as an 
“outlier” against the backdrop of the “weighted statement” of 
“conduct texts” proliferating throughout the “reading population” 
at this time (276-77). Despite the fact that Vindication “is 
often said to have been immediately influential and to have 
continued to be so,” St. Clair suggests that “when situated in 
its material and cultural context, however, a different pattern 
emerges” (277). Ultimately, “with only a few thousand copies of 
the book manufactured during the whole of the first century after 
first publication, a figure often surpassed by Scott and Byron on 
the day of publication, it would have been difficult, and 
unusual, for anyone, woman or man, to find and read the book” 
(St. Clair 278).  By questioning the likelihood of a sustained 
readership for Vindication, St. Clair challenges the validity of 
claims that Vindication laid the groundwork for the feminist 
“revolution.”  
While we cannot measure influence by the weight of 
print of competing texts, for every family that had 
access to the Vindication, there were probably fifty 
or a hundred which owned a book which advised against 
Wollstonecraft’s ideas … The fact that Wollstonecraft 
dashed off the Vindication so quickly may suggest that 
she was already familiar with the arguments which had 
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perhaps been the subject of a hundred conversations. 
In this individual case, and without lapsing into 
exaggerations about the power of great books, we can, 
I suggest, read Wollstonecraft’s Vindication as 
representative of a broader consciousness which, 
because of her unusual talents and opportunities, she 
was able uniquely to turn into print. In terms of 
impact, however, from what we know of the 
constructions of ideal femininity prevalent from the 
eighteenth century until the suffragist movements at 
the end of the nineteenth, Wollstonecraft’s book made 
little or no difference to general attitudes to women 
and scarcely dented the mainstream ideology of 
femininity prevalent through most of society. It was 
simply overwhelmed. (279) 
As St. Clair suggests, Wollstonecraft’s influence cannot be 
discerned in a later text as a “voice” or a set of feminist 
principles, since Vindication synthesizes and reifies ideas that 
“had perhaps been the subject of a hundred conversations.” 
Although valuable in their attempt to imagine how 
Wollstonecraft’s “revolutionary ideology permeated the writing of 
such novelists as Maria Edgeworth, Jane Austen, Susan Ferrier, 
Helen Maria Williams, … and many others” (Mellor 39), feminist 
critical approaches have failed to identify a material link 
between Wollstonecraft and her successors—one that demonstrates 
Wollstonecraft’s contribution to this commonplace set of feminist 
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“arguments.”  The brief and discontinuous nature of Vindication’s 
print run reinforces the idea of the text as an interlocutor 
within “a broader consciousness” that ultimately “made little or 
no difference to general attitudes to women.”   
I am not denying the possibility that women writers sought 
out (or encountered via happenstance) the few copies of 
Vindication circulating amongst friends or coteries. However, 
given the circumstances of print culture at this time, in which 
there was “a boom in the publishing both of conduct books … and 
didactic texts” that  “appear to have been given and received 
throughout the reading population” (St. Clair 275-276), it is 
more likely that writers outside of Wollstonecraft’s immediate 
sphere of influence got to know her as the writer of her didactic 
text for young women entitled Original Stories from Real Life 
(1788), which, unlike Vindication, was still available to readers 
in 1820 (St. Clair 658). Whereas Vindication was first printed as 
a “long pamphlet” comprised of “an essentially ephemeral type of 
print” which later “disappeared from the catalogues of … 
circulating libraries … before the turn of the century” (277-
278), Original Stories was an illustrated book that, like other 
didactic texts of the period, may have been (according to the 
fashion) “rebound in leather” and displayed in the library,36 or 
                                                 
36 St. Clair explains that expensive leather bindings were essential 
during the romantic period, as it was difficult to “turn over the pages 
or to find the place” in a text that was in its original, temporary 
binding of “cardboard covered with blue or grey sugar paper” (192). 
Texts left in their original condition did not last long, given that 
“[w]rappers quickly curled and boards fell off” (192). He further 
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incorporated “into circulating libraries and school rooms” (St. 
Clair 275). Reprinted in both 1791 and 1796, it is plausible that 
Original Stories served to introduce later (post)romantic 
writers—not to the radical “voice” of Vindication, but to the 
didactic teachings of Original Stories’ paradigm of feminine 
virtue, Mrs. Mason.  
Although Wollstonecraft published two other didactic texts 
for women or girls entitled Thoughts on the Education of 
Daughters (1787) and The Female Reader (1789), they went out of 
print well before Original Stories; neither text was reprinted, 
nor were they available for purchase after 1794 (St. Clair 658-
659). Unlike Wollstonecraft’s other didactic texts, Original 
Stories incorporated fictional elements and (in a few editions) 
illustrations as a means of engaging readers. Engraved by William 
Blake, the plates depict Mrs. Mason, her two orphaned upper-class 
charges, Mary and Caroline, and a variety of other characters in 
scenes that correspond to the educational scenarios that unfold. 
However, unlike conduct books for women that often featured a 
parent or mentor figure,37 Wollstonecraft establishes an 
educational regimen that moves beyond instruction designed 
(either implicitly or explicitly) to make women more marketable 
as potential wives. Rather than addressing the young female 
                                                                                                                                                 
explains that one might expect to find expensive binding “on books of 
philosophy, travel, antiquities, sermons, poetry, and conduct, but only 
occasionally on novels” (193). Because book prices included original 
retail as well as binding, “in the romantic period the new books of the 
time were expensive luxuries which could be bought, if at all, only by 
the richest groups in society” (St. Clair 196).  
37 See my discussion of Gregory and Chapone in Chapter II. 
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reader in regards to the various accomplishments it hopes to 
instill in her, the Preface to Original Stories reveals its 
relationship to 18th century  philosophical thought, calling into 
question “the present state of society:” 
These conversations and tales are accommodated to the 
present state of society; which obliges the author to 
attempt to cure those faults by reason, which ought 
never to have taken root in the infant mind. … I 
believe those who examine their own minds will readily 
agree with me, that reason, with difficulty, conquers 
settled habits, even when it is arrived at some degree 
of maturity; why then do we suffer children to be 
bound with fetters, which their half-formed faculties 
cannot break … But to wish that parents would, 
themselves, mould the ductile passions, is a 
chimerical wish, for the present generation have their 
own passions to combat with, and fastidious pleasures 
to pursue, neglecting those pointed out by nature: we 
must therefore pour premature knowledge into the 
succeeding one; and, teaching virtue, explain the 
nature of vice. Cruel Necessity. (359) 
Original Stories’ Preface reveals that, like Vindication, the 
text emphasizes reason (rather than alluring accomplishments) as 
the means of achieving feminine virtue. Criticizing the “present 
generation,” Wollstonecraft moves beyond the construction of 
“conduct” literature to establish a theoretical groundwork for a 
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conceptually based educational regimen, in which “[t]he tendency 
of reasoning obviously tends to fix principles of truth and 
humanity on a solid and simple foundation; and to make religion 
an active, invigorating director of the affections, and not a 
mere attention to forms (360). She suggests she has chosen a 
fictional approach to facilitate active reflection, as “the Tales 
which were written to illustrate the moral, may recall it, when 
the mind has gained sufficient strength to discuss the argument 
from which it was deduced” (360).  Wollstonecraft’s construction 
of a reason-based educational regimen marks her relationship to 
“a large group of authors who wrote improving books for children 
between 1750 and 1850” identified as “rational moralists” who, 
influenced by the educational philosophies of Locke and Rousseau,  
sought to “cultivate rational thought and moral judgment” in 
children (Demers and Moyles 121).38 To achieve this end, the 
textual tradition established by the rational moralists featured 
“‘carefully designed narratives, and...positive as well as 
negative examples to shape children’s understanding. All 
emphasized tutelage: most of their stories featured a hired 
tutor, but sometimes a parent is the principal dispenser of 
information’” (Demers and Moyles 121).39 Probably the most 
                                                 
38 Writers such as Thomas Day and Maria Edgeworth published didactic 
texts representative of this philosophy.  For further reading on the 
rational moralists, see Patricia Demers and Gordon Moyles’s  From 
Instruction to Delight: An Anthology of Children’s Literature to 1850. 
(Oxford, 1982).    
39 Demers and Moyles characterize the work of the rational moralists in 
terms of the philosophy that inspired them. However, I refer to their 
work as part of a tradition, as their texts share common features with 
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influential of the female rational moralists is Sarah Fielding, 
whose The Governess; Or, The Little Female Academy (1749) 
“marks...new directions in children’s literature” as the first 
children’s book “directed at young women” and perhaps “the first 
English novel written for children” (Ward 29-30, 28). Like 
Wollstonecraft, Fielding appropriates “Lockean educational 
philosophy,” showing that “girls as well as boys are capable of 
exercising reason” (Ward 30).   
The didactic design of texts that comprise the rational 
moralist tradition generates a different type of relationship to 
readers than conduct books that incorporate the parent or mentor 
figure. Rather than addressing didactic precepts to a fictional 
pupil in a series of letters, the ‘recipient’ of which 
necessarily becomes “you” the reader, texts in the rational 
moralist tradition generate fictional learning situations in 
which the mentor/tutor/parent figure interacts with the pupils, 
affirming their agency as moral and intellectual subjects capable 
of learning through example. To encourage readers to learn from 
the scenarios as well, the stories are designed to “engage and 
hold the reader’s attention” through “varying degrees” of 
“narrative, dialogue, characterization, and incident” (Demers and 
Moyles 122).  Fielding’s narrative structure takes on the form of 
a female-centered “communal bildungsroman” in which girls learn 
through positive and negative female role models “to see the 
                                                                                                                                                 
one another (elaborated above) that reflect their philosophy of 
education.  
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rewards of virtuous living” (Ward 33).40  The Governess and thus—
to varying degrees—many of its adaptations that emerged 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries derive their didactic 
frameworks from John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress (1678), part 
of the “old canon” of English literature that was “produced in 
the largest numbers” during the romantic period (St. Clair 131).  
Representative of the puritan providential tradition,41 Pilgrim’s 
Progress describes the perils of an ‘everyman’ traveler named 
Christian who embarks on a spiritual journey fraught with 
everyman characters such as Obstinate, Mistrust, Atheist, etc. 
who attempt to dissuade him from reaching the holy destination of 
“Mount Zion” or the Kingdom of God. Christian relies on 
characters such as Piety, Charity, and Prudence to guide him to 
                                                 
40 Adaptations of Fielding took on different forms, and did not 
necessarily adhere to her rational moralist philosophy. Some of the 
more noteworthy are Eliza Haywood’s didactic novel entitled The History 
of Miss Betsy Thoughtless (1751), Maria Edgeworth’s “The Good French 
Governess” (1801), and Mrs. Sherwood’s evangelical adaptation of The 
Governess (1820). Fielding’s text might also be recognized as a 
predecessor of 19th century novels such as Louisa May Alcott’s Little 
Women and Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre that recast the journey plot of 
Pilgrim’s Progress as female bildungsroman.   
 
41In The Reluctant Pilgrim (1966), J. Paul Hunter offers a comprehensive 
description of the various attributes of the 18th century “providence 
tradition” which “focuses upon the strange and surprising aspects of 
[…] events and interprets them within a religious and philosophical 
framework which invests them with important meaning. And providence 
literature reflects the pattern of Christian experience central to the 
Puritan myth and organizes its exempla into a dramatic realization of 
the historical cycle, seen teleologically.” He suggests that Pilgrim’s 
Progress might be characterized as “spiritual biography,” in the sense 
that “ultimately the pilgrimage of an allegorical figure through life 
is not far from the typical journey through life of a real person,” in 
which events “are validated relative to the total pattern of an 
individual’s life, and the events are ‘improved’ appropriately in order 
to draw the reader himself to a special view of religion and to a 
personal practice of higher morality” (73, 90).  
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his intended destination. In Part I, Christian’s wife, like Eve, 
attempts to steer him in the wrong direction, as she and other 
“Relations” “thought to drive away his [spiritual] distemper by 
harsh and surly carriages to him: sometimes they would deride, 
sometimes they would chide, and sometimes they would quite 
neglect him” (9). However, in Part II (1684), recognizing the 
error of her ways, she embarks on her own journey to the 
Celestial City. Mirroring the perils endured by Christian, 
Christiana encounters everywoman characters that try to either 
guide or mislead her along the way such as Mercie and Mrs. 
Timorous.   
The Governess recasts Bunyan’s allegorical journey towards 
Eternal Life as a fictional female-centered journey towards the 
acquisition and development of reason and virtue, in which 
everywoman characters such as  Miss Jenny Peace and Miss Lucy Sly 
exemplify the best (and worst) qualities a woman might possess.  
However,  The Governess dispenses with the quest plot of 
Pilgrim’s Progress, emphasizing instead the building of  “‘an 
ideal female society’” (Ward 35); and, “the process of 
reformation” takes place in “a little Arbour” where Jenny Peace 
(a paradigm of feminine virtue) and the other eight pupils share 
their “free time” along with fairy tales and stories that prompt 
the telling of  “life stories”  which “highlight[] the various 
faults that marked their behavior prior to coming to Mrs. 
Teachum’s school” (Ward 33). Like The Governess, Original Stories 
makes use of storytelling and life histories as a means of 
  106
exemplifying virtuous and unacceptable behaviors; however, 
Wollstonecraft adapts Bunyan’s quest plot into the domestic 
framework of her narrative, extending her pupils’ reach beyond 
the insularity of the boarding school to which Mrs. Teachum’s 
pupils are generally confined, allowing them to encounter “real 
life” both in their daily routines and through Mrs. Mason’s 
stories that are supposedly derived from it.  Mrs. Mason takes an 
active role in the girls’ learning experience, introducing Mary 
and Caroline to various people from different walks of life—from 
“Honest Jack the shipwrecked Sailor” to “a Poor Family in 
London”—guiding them in the process of learning from life 
experience.   
Like Pilgrim’s Progress, Original Stories is comprised of 
“incidents” that seem “mundanely inconsequential;” however, as 
they are the “unimaginary problems of living besetting the 
average man and woman of the time,” they ultimately enable Mrs. 
Mason’s adolescent charges “to learn[] by experience” (Keeble 
xiv-xv). And, given that Mary and Caroline “were shamefully 
ignorant [and] had caught every prejudice that the vulgar 
casually instill” (361), their behavior during these various 
encounters with life experience provides the opportunity for Mrs. 
Mason to relate how their bad behavior manifests itself in the 
lives of everywoman characters such as Jane Fretful and Lady Sly. 
For instance, in addressing Mary’s negligence in dress, Mrs. 
Mason invokes their acquaintance ‘Mrs. Dowdy’ as an example of 
what happens when “indolence” in such matters becomes habitual—
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“she is sometimes a disgusting figure, and, at others, a very 
taudry flirt” (409-410). In contrast, however, Mrs. Mason 
suggests “of all the women whom I have ever met with, Mrs. 
Trueman seems the freest from vanity, and those frivolous views 
[regarding dress] which degrade the female character” (410). 
Wollstonecraft’s representation of poor female education as a 
problem that affects the behavior of women marks Original 
Stories’ larger conceptual departure from The Governess; rather 
than establishing “an ideal female society” that “represents the 
children in a state of nature,” where, even at the end of the 
text, Mrs. Teachum’s pupils (with the exception of Jenny Peace) 
remain part of this “well-regulated Society” (Ward 35, Fielding 
175), Wollstonecraft establishes a female-centered didacticism 
that anticipates young girls becoming women, evidenced in her 
representation of Mrs. Mason (rather than Fielding’s 14 year old 
Jenny Peace) as the central exemplary figure. In the end, Mary 
and Caroline say goodbye to Mrs. Mason and are now considered 
“candidates for [her] friendship” rather than her pupils, and 
they are left to the task of exercising reason and virtue in 
their own lives. The idea that the girls’ youth will ultimately 
give way to womanhood surfaces throughout Original Stories in 
Wollstonecraft’s emphasis on how virtuous/problematic behaviors 
in childhood reflect and eventually translate into more profound 
(mis)behaviors in adulthood, and thus, like Wollstonecraft’s 
other didactic writings, Original Stories functions to educate 
women as well as girls.  
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As a female-centered pedagogy, Original Stories serves to 
extend the argument of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman by 
elaborating terms that it leaves relatively undefined—namely what 
it means to enact feminine virtue and rationality. Although 
predominantly didactic rather than polemic, Original Stories 
reinforces the various “cornerstones” of “feminine Romantic 
ideology,” the most prominent of which are the representation of 
“the rational woman, rational love, … the preservation of the 
domestic affections, [and] responsibility for the mental, moral 
and physical well-being and growth of all the members of the 
family” (Mellor 38). However, it is not in this general 
representation of the “rational” woman that we might discern 
Wollstonecraft’s relationship to Austen or other (post) romantic 
woman writers; as I suggest above, the “cornerstones” of 
“feminine Romantic ideology” could easily be attributed to other 
women writers such as Macaulay or Hays.  Wollstonecraft’s  
contribution to the discourse concerning women’s education at 
this time might be recognized in her  fixation on Rousseau’s 
ideal (weak and dissipated) woman, who appears throughout the 
Wollstonecraft canon in personal anecdotes, hypothetical 
scenarios, and as fictionalized characters, usually in 
conjunction with a (re)imagined counterpart. In Original Stories, 
she (and her counterparts) are exemplified in the everywoman 
characters that Mrs. Mason invokes to demonstrate the effects of 
good and bad female behaviors. Original Stories also furthers the 
conventional argument for the “rational woman” in its 
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representation of a female-centered space where women learn from, 
question, and respond to one another, thus depicting a learning 
experience that takes place wholly in the absence of male 
influence.  Undermining conventional representations of the 
‘domestic’ space in terms of what it lacks—the discipline and 
intellectual rigor afforded by the male interlocutor—Original 
Stories suggests that the home and its various intersecting 
locales (where one shops and visits) serve as ideal sites for 
women to cultivate reason and virtue. Austen’s Pride and 
Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility, like Wollstonecraft’s 
Original Stories, deploy female-centered pedagogies that 
incorporate characters to exemplify the effects of poor female 
education, teaching the heroine(s) how to better adhere to the 
principles of reason and virtue. 
 Similar to feminist studies that note the achievement of 
Wollstonecraft’s work in Vindication while overlooking her 
redefining of established didactic traditions in Original Stories 
and The Female Reader, current feminist critical approaches to 
Austen imagine didacticism as a mode of writing she sought to 
escape, as this mode’s association with male conduct book writers 
and conservative women writers seemed to promote conformity to 
normative expectations of female behavior and conduct (see, e.g., 
Spencer 143).  Didacticism is thus recognized as the antipode of 
feminism and, in the mid 20th century, came to be understood as 
the antipode of pleasurable reading as well.  In Jane Austen and 
the Didactic Novel (1983), a critical study of Austen as 
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“intending to manipulate and educate her readers’ responses” 
(10), Jan Fergus remarks on the modern tendency to eschew 
associating Austen’s work with didacticism:  
…although Austen’s powers to delight are almost 
universally acknowledged, her successfully didactic 
methods and intentions are now seldom claimed. 
Sometimes they are even resented when discovered. A 
hostility to these intentions, resulting in 
obliviousness, is perfectly illustrated when Andrew 
Wright asks: if Marianne Dashwood ‘is meant merely to 
exemplify an unlaudable predisposition to 
‘enthusiasm,’ why is she so lovable?’ (10) 
Calling attention to the opposition established between 
instructing readers and delighting them, Fergus herself 
nonetheless attempts to determine the didactic strategies 
deployed by Austen’s novels that enable them to “educate” 
readers’ “judgment and sympathy”  without invoking the didactic 
traditions in which the “imperfect heroine” and the “technique of 
contrast” emerge (7).42 Fergus understands Austen’s work as 
                                                 
42 Fergus recognizes Austen’s didactic strategy as a response to the 
conventional assumptions of “moralists of the period” who made use of 
exemplary characters, believing that “readers were likely to imitate 
the actions and adopt the sentiments of characters in fiction” (4). 
Eschewing “the perfect characters who became a convention of 
didacticism,” Austen “constructs among the feelings, judgments, 
predicaments and conduct of all her characters parallels and contrasts 
so elaborate and insistent that the reader cannot escape comparing, 
weighing and evaluating” (7). By means of this approach, Fergus argues 
that Austen “educate[s] her readers’ responses” (7).  However, didactic 
writers such as Fielding and Wollstonecraft employed imperfect 
characters as well as the technique of contrast in service of their 
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influenced by the 18th century novel, primarily the work of Samuel 
Richardson, which also essays to “elicit and control [“the 
reader’s response to fiction”] for didactic purposes” (61). 
However, Fergus’s understanding of Austen as exercising an 
“emotional didacticism” does not account for whom and to what end 
her didactic approach might be useful or beneficial.  Therefore, 
Fergus’s project reveals the extent to which didacticism was 
discredited as a way of understanding Austen, as her own approach 
to didacticism serves not to elaborate on the relationship Austen 
shares with didactic traditions, but to emphasize the function of 
didacticism as pleasure or as a training of the emotions rather 
than the intellect or moral capacity.   
Jane Spencer addresses Austen’s relationship to didacticism 
in The Rise of the Woman Novelist (1986); unlike Fergus, Spencer 
does so by recognizing Austen’s work as “aris[ing] out of a 
tradition [her precursors] established” (167).  Spencer marks 
Austen’s relationship to the didactic tradition of the “reformed 
heroine” which, she argues, “serve[d] as a kind of dramatized 
conduct book for young women” (142) and included texts by women 
writers such as Eliza Haywood, Sarah Fielding, Fanny Burney, and 
Maria Edgeworth. This novel generally featured a “fallible, but 
unfallen heroine, who learned from her mistakes and reformed her 
ways” (142), demonstrating that “women are capable of moral 
growth” (143). Focusing on the figure of the “lover-mentor” who 
                                                                                                                                                 
didactic projects, which Austen has adapted and developed into 
novelistic discourse.  
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enables the heroine to “reform her ways,” Spencer reads Austen’s 
novels as recasting the lover-mentor figure, not as a “morally 
superior guardian,” but as the heroine’s equal in moral capacity 
(169).  Spencer argues that, in Austen’s appropriation of this 
tradition, “the picture of the learning heroine…is most fully and 
convincingly developed” (169). While Spencer acknowledges 
Austen’s interest in “expos[ing]….the shortcomings of the usual 
female education,” she suggests that associations between Austen 
and Wollstonecraft’s Vindication are strained, since “didacticism 
is not, for [Austen], a method to be transformed into an attack 
on male authority and prerogative” (168).  
However, Spencer overlooks the ways in which Austen’s 
representation of the heroine as a “woman who can rise above 
trifling and frivolity and deserves to be treated as a rational 
creature” reflects the work of Fielding and Wollstonecraft in the 
female rational moralist tradition, which shares various 
affinities with the reformed heroine tradition.  Eliza Haywood’s 
didactic novel The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless (1751) 
which, as Spencer argues, offers “a full treatment of the theme 
of the reformed heroine” (147) exhibits multiple similarities to 
Fielding’s The Governess, primarily in its deployment of the 
exemplary and allegorically named female figure and its 
representation of female reform as recognized in a “moment of 
self-knowledge” (Spencer 152). The tradition of the reformed 
heroine departs from female-centered pedagogies such as 
Fielding’s and Wollstonecraft’s by downplaying the importance of 
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the heroine’s relationship to other women,  representing the 
lover-mentor figure (or a man) as the primary impetus for the 
heroine’s process of acquiring self-knowledge.  Focusing on 
Austen’s appropriation of the lover-mentor figure, Spencer 
doesn’t acknowledge the importance of female relationships in 
Austen’s novels that reflect the female rational moralists’ 
emphasis on women’s “moral growth” as something that might be 
acquired in the absence of male influence and be exercised in the 
interests of virtue—not merely as a means of acquiring a husband.  
Critics often regard the most important relationship in 
Pride and Prejudice as the one that develops between Elizabeth 
and Darcy, or recognize the text, as Nina Auerbach has argued, as 
a representation the nature of female life in the “the larger 
community of England” in which “men… create whatever strength of 
sisterhood we see in the novel” (Auerbach 332). Although, as 
Spencer argues, Darcy takes on an important role in Elizabeth’s 
learning process, Elizabeth also learns from the women who 
threaten to undermine her happiness with Darcy.  Austen’s work 
reflects Wollstonecraft’s representation of female-centered 
pedagogy as a way of teaching the “learning heroine” to avoid the 
pitfalls of the conventional late 18th century education for 
women, which generally emphasized ‘pleasing’ men through artifice 
and feigned delicacy.  
There is no direct evidence (in juvenilia or 
correspondence) to suggest that Austen read Wollstonecraft or 
Fielding, but Austen’s works often allude to and manipulate 
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various doxa established by didactic traditions.  In Jane Austen 
and the Province of Womanhood (1989), Alison Sulloway remarks on 
the influence of conduct books on Austen’s writing, suggesting 
that “Austen’s fiction and her correspondence from her earliest 
writing days ironically reflects the restricted province in which 
her sex had placed her. The hitherto unrecognized savagery of her 
juvenilia, the plight of her heroines and the varied responses of 
each one to conduct-book wisdom, clerical or lay, patriarchal or 
radical or moderate feminist, all indicate how much Austen had 
absorbed ‘the woman question’”(41). She describes further 
connections between Austen’s work and the conduct book tradition,  
evidenced by Austen’s “satiric war upon [Rev. James] Fordyce” 
(23-24), whose Sermons to Young Women (1766) appears in Pride and 
Prejudice as  Mr. Collins’s failed attempt to engage the Bennet 
sisters with a reading from a “book of a serious stamp” (Austen 
47). Referencing Gregory’s A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters, 
Sulloway demonstrates how some of the conventional 
representations of male suitors in conduct books are exemplified 
in Austen’s works such as “the egotistical seducer, who looks and 
behaves tenderly, but who promises nothing,” who might be 
recognized in  “Austen’s George Wickham, Henry Crawford, John 
Willoughby, and Frank Churchill” (27). She goes on to describe 
“Elizabeth Bennet’s engagement to Darcy,” which is characterized 
by “gratitude” for his preference to her, as a “recreat[ion]” of 
Gregory’s monitory advice which suggests “‘not one’ out ‘of a 
million’ Englishwomen was likely to ‘marry with any degree of 
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love’” (28). Given Austen’s various representations and 
manipulations of well-established doxa from the conduct book 
tradition, we might also draw connections between Austen’s work 
and the didactic texts written by the female rational moralists.  
She is known to have “read and admired” women writers in the 
reformed heroine tradition such as Fanny Burney and Maria 
Edgeworth, so it is certainly possible that her overlapping 
interest in the conduct book tradition and that of the reformed 
heroine led her to take an interest in Fielding’s The Governess 
(who also wrote in the reformed heroine tradition) or one of its 
adaptations circulating throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.  
As Austen was part of the “minor gentry” (Sulloway 17), an 
educational novel or set of didactic stories would have been a 
likely possession for a family with two daughters and possibly a 
part of the reading regimen at the boarding school she attended. 
 
4.1  SOPHY AS “THE OTHER WOMAN” IN PRIDE AND PREJUDICE AND 
SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 
In Vindication, Wollstonecraft rebukes “sensualist[s]” who 
“endeavor to keep women in the dark” to ensure the existence of a 
“play-thing” for themselves. Within the context of this diatribe, 
she references Émile, Rousseau’s treatise on education: 
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I now principally allude to Rousseau, for his 
character of Sophia is, undoubtedly, a captivating 
one, though it appears to me grossly unnatural; 
however it is not the superstructure, but the 
foundation of her character, the principles on which 
her education was built, that I mean to attack […] Is 
this the man, who, in his ardour for virtue, would 
banish all the soft arts of peace, and almost carry us 
back to Spartan discipline? … How are these mighty 
sentiments lowered when he describes the pretty foot 
and enticing airs of his little favorite! (24-25)  
Explicitly vilifying, Wollstonecraft accuses Rousseau of 
establishing a rigorous standard of virtue for his ‘pupil’ Émile, 
while Émile’s “helpmeet” Sophy learns to put on “enticing airs” 
for the purposes of “pleasing” men (22).  As Rousseau’s exemplar 
for his system of education, in which “obedience” is a woman’s 
primary virtue, Sophy is represented throughout Vindication as 
the antipode of the rational woman. Wollstonecraft’s hypothetical 
description of a woman “trained up to obedience,” for example, 
recalls Sophy’s traits: 
But supposing, no very improbable conjecture, that a 
being only taught to please must still find her 
happiness in pleasing;—what an example of folly , not 
to say vice, will she be to her innocent daughters! 
The mother will be lost in the coquette, and, instead 
of making friends of her daughters … they invite 
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comparison, and drive her from the throne of beauty, 
who has never thought of a seat on the bench of reason 
… It does not require a lively pencil, or the 
discriminating outline of a caricature, to sketch the 
domestic miseries and petty vices which such a 
mistress of a family diffuses. Still she only acts as 
a woman ought to act, brought up according to 
Rousseau’s system. She can never be reproached for 
being masculine, or turning out of her sphere; nay, 
she may observe another of his grand rules, and, 
cautiously preserving her reputation free from spot, 
be reckoned a good kind of woman. Yet in what respect 
can she be termed good? She abstains, it is true, 
without any great struggle, from committing gross 
crimes; but how does she fulfil her duties? Duties!—in 
truth she has enough to think of to adorn her body and 
nurse a weak constitution.[…] These are the blessed 
effects of a good education! These the virtues of 
man’s help-mate! (48-49) 
Recognizing the ways in which Sophy’s poor education might affect 
her domestic relationships, Wollstonecraft extends the 
conventional conduct book argument regarding coquetry43  to the 
                                                 
43 Addressed in both Gregory’s A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters (1774) 
as well as Hester Chapone’s Letters on the Improvement of the Mind 
(1773), women who engaged in the art of coquetry led men on so that 
they might be flattered and admired. Coquetry was considered a 
dangerous vice, as it ruined a woman’s reputation and jeopardized the 
prospect of marriage.  
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post-marital condition, suggesting that a woman only interested 
in attracting men with her “beauty” will inevitably view her 
daughters as “rivals.” This is, however, acceptable according to 
Rousseau’s “grand rules” which, reinforcing physical weakness as 
a feminine virtue, ultimately render women incapable of 
fulfilling their domestic “duties.”  Sophy’s lack of education is 
not only a detriment to her own family, but also to anyone who 
has the misfortune to depend on her, as Wollstonecraft suggests,  
I once knew a weak woman of fashion, who was more than 
commonly proud of her delicacy and sensibility. She 
thought a distinguishing taste and puny appetite the 
height of all human perfection, and acted 
accordingly.—I have see this weak sophisticated being 
neglect all the duties of life, yet recline with self-
complacency on a sofa, and boast of her want of 
appetite as a proof of delicacy[…]Yet, at the moment, 
I have seen her insult a worthy old gentlewoman, whom 
unexpected misfortunes had made dependent on her 
gratitude. (44)  
Sophy imbibes all of the qualities of this “irrational monster,” 
as she fails to nurture her children, her dependents, and her 
husband, wasting away in indolence, self-deprivation, and “self-
complacency.” Eventually her beauty fails her, leaving her with 
nothing but “a spring of bitterness,” making way for puerile 
sentiments of “jealousy or vanity” (27). Wollstonecraft shows 
that educating women to please men ironically constitutes 
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“preparation[] for adultery,” since “the woman who has only been 
taught to please will soon find that her charms are oblique as 
sunbeams, and that they cannot have much effect on her husband’s 
heart when they are seen every day… she will try to please other 
men; and in the emotions raised by the expectation of new 
conquests, endeavour to forget the mortification her love or 
pride has received” (84,27).  
As I argue in Chapter III, Sophy’s vices may be recognized 
in Original Stories everywoman characters—each  amplifying one of 
the particular faults outlined above (in Vindication). Serving 
the important didactic function of exemplifying what not to do, 
Sophy manifests herself as the hot-tempered Jane Fretful, the 
deceitful Lady Sly, and the perpetually vain fashion victim Mrs. 
Dowdy.  Wollstonecraft’s representations of these debased and 
debauched women set her apart from other contemporary writers 
arguing for improved women’s education. Whereas writers such as 
Catharine Macaulay emphasize how women should obtain their 
education, Wollstonecraft elaborates the detrimental effects of 
the current system through anecdotes from personal experience and 
hypothetical scenarios in Thoughts and Vindication and through 
fictional characters in Original Stories, Mary, and Maria.  
 Exemplars of poor female education play various roles 
throughout Austen’s work for the same reason they emerge in 
Original Stories—to attempt to undermine (and therefore to test) 
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the virtue of the stories’ heroines.44 Though Austen’s Northanger 
Abbey and later novels incorporate exemplars of poor female 
education that lead the heroine astray,45 the titles of Sense and 
Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice signal the novels’ 
relationship to the exemplary strategies of the female rational 
moralists who emphasized the particular faults that a reason-
based education might remedy, often in conjunction with their 
positive alternatives. And, like Mary and Caroline, the female 
protagonists in Sense and Sensibility as well as Pride and 
Prejudice are a pair of sisters, whose “ignoran[ce]” regarding 
certain matters (e.g., Elizabeth Bennet’s prejudice and Marianne 
Dashwood’s sensibility) requires that they learn through 
experience. These texts mirror the female-centered learning 
                                                 
44 In “The Polemics of Incomprehension: Mother and Daughter in Pride and 
Prejudice,” Jean Ferguson Carr  addresses another of Pride and 
Prejudice’s marginalized female figures in her discussion of the 
“disvalued fictional role” of Mrs. Bennet, who she sees as 
representative of “a cultural concern over what is perceived as women’s 
and, more explicitly, mothers’ responsibilities and failures”  (74, 
81).  She argues that Mrs. Bennet’s  “failures and inadequacies”  that 
“embarrass” Elizabeth actually point to their similar “struggle with 
patriarchal powers’ (74). Carr suggests that while it may seem that 
Elizabeth has “risen above the devalued position of her mother….Lizzie 
shares more with her mother than her father or the narrator 
acknowledges or than she herself can recognize” (74).  She further 
argues that Mrs. Bennet’s  “embarrassing outbreaks concern Lizzie 
partially because they proclaim what she must conceal and partially 
because the reception of these remarks shows Lizzie the contradictory 
proscriptions for women” (78). In order to succeed as “the heroine 
[who] wins property and wealth through daring and rebellion,” Elizabeth 
must take on the role of “a ‘bad daughter” to her unworthy mother” 
(80). Like the exemplars of poor female education that I will discuss 
here, Mrs. Bennet is a woman that Elizabeth must avoid becoming if she 
is to find happiness with Darcy.  
45For example, in Northanger Abbey, Catherine Morland befriends the vain 
and coquettish Isabella Thorpe who slights Catherine’s brother by 
seeking the affection of a wealthier man. Catherine later regrets their 
friendship upon discovery of Isabella’s cunning and selfish behavior.  
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experience that Wollstonecraft constructs in Original Stories, in 
which young women acquire principles of reason by observing the 
faults (and virtues) of other women. And, as Stuart M. Tave 
explains in Some Words of Jane Austen, the heroine’s overcoming 
of the figure of the conniving female (or, in Tave’s terms, “the 
other woman”) ultimately allows for the fulfillment of the 
quintessential Austen ending, in which  
all the heroines find happy endings and they all 
deserve them, as each has, in one way or another, 
worked, suffered, learned. But if they do not get more 
than they deserve they often seem to arrive at, or be 
helped to, the happy ending by a stroke of luck, such 
as the sudden and fortunate removal of the other woman 
… at the right moment. What seems to be more important 
than the sudden and fortunate event, however, because 
it precedes the ending again and again, in whatever 
manner the end is produced, is that the heroine is 
prepared to accept unhappiness … She must really see 
it as a loss, absorb it as an irreversible fact, and 
then come to terms with herself and go ahead with what 
she must do now. (17-18) 
Thus, for Austen’s “happy ending” to come to fruition, the “other 
woman” must disappear, but not before the heroine “accept[s]” the 
fact that her adversary has succeeded—that she has indeed won 
Edward Ferrars or that she will convince Mr. Darcy to marry Miss 
de Bourgh. However, like Mary and Caroline in Original Stories, 
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both the Bennet and Dashwood sisters must contend with more than 
one “other woman” that threatens their achievement of happiness.  
Austen’s novelistic representations of “other women” function 
much like Wollstonecraft’s various representations of Sophy;  in 
order for the Misses Bennet and Dashwood to achieve their 
desires, they, like Mary and Caroline, must overcome the greatest 
of feminine temptations—becoming her. In so doing, they serve to 
demonstrate the outcome of adhering to principles of feminine 
virtue as outlined in Original Stories, suggesting that it is the 
acquisition of reason (rather than accomplishments) that leads to 
happiness.   
 Austen’s “other woman” characters, represented as 
antagonists in her novels, are much more developed than 
Wollstonecraft’s everywomen, however. Mrs. Mason invokes Original 
Stories’ everywoman characters in order to reinforce a particular 
didactic perspective (e.g., on truth telling or dress) that she 
is in the process of explaining to Mary and Caroline. These 
static representations of Sophy do not converse with Mary and 
Caroline themselves, but are objects of representation within 
Mrs. Mason’s own “direct, unmediated discourse” (Bakhtin, 
“Dostoevsky” 199). Within Austen’s novelistic framework, however, 
the “other woman” characters are represented as “speaking 
persons” through their own distinct discourse and therefore 
affect the discursive life of the other characters (Bakhtin  
332). As Bakhtin explains, in an ideal context, novelistic 
discourse is comprised of “internally unresolved dialogues among 
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characters (seen as embodied points of view)…the life experience 
of the characters may be resolved as far as plot is concerned, 
but internally they remain incomplete and unresolved” (348-49). 
Such an effect, in turn, allows the reader to complete this 
“dialogue” amongst characters that remains “incomplete and 
unresolved” making it “half” hers  (Bakhtin 345), enabling her to 
question or apply new word(s) into “new contexts that dialogize 
it” (Bakhtin 346). As embodiments of particular worldviews, 
Austen’s “other women” take on their own ideological significance 
beyond mere allegorical exemplification. They are women of rank, 
of beauty, or of notoriety—in other words, representations of 
individuals that might exist in the world, and their speech and 
actions reflect their respective worldviews (Bakhtin 332-334). 
Hence, readers have the opportunity to question these worldviews 
and decide for themselves how to respond to them, whereas in 
Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories, readers’ responses are 
explicitly directed by Mrs. Mason, who describes her female 
exemplars as either good or bad examples. This is not to say that 
Austen does not also encourage readers to respond in certain ways 
to the “other women” in Pride and Prejudice and Sense and 
Sensibility. As Jan Fergus has argued, Austen deploys particular 
structural strategies in order to direct readers’ responses. 
However, the novel does not insist upon a particular response, 
but invites or encourages it. Readers have the freedom to 
determine how they will interpret and understand the various 
worldviews Austen’s characters represent.   
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4.1.1 Pride and Prejudice as (Mis)behavior  
In Original Stories, Mrs. Mason describes “some persons of my 
acquaintance, who have suffered the faults, or follies, I wish 
you to avoid” (384), one of whom is the cunning and deceitful 
Lady Sly.  
Last week you [Mary and Caroline] saw Lady Sly, who 
came to pay me a morning visit. Did you ever see such 
a fine carriage, or such beautiful horses? How they 
pawed the ground, and displayed their rich harnesses! 
Her servants wore elegant liveries, and her own 
clothes suited the equipage. Her house is equal to her 
carriage; the rooms are lofty, and hung with silk; 
noble glasses and pictures adorn them: and the 
pleasure-grounds are large and well laid out; […] yet, 
my young friends, this is state not dignity.  
This woman has a little soul, she never attended 
to truth, and obtaining great part of her fortune by 
falsehood, it has blighted all of her enjoyments.… Her 
suspicious temper arises from a knowledge of her own 
heart, and the want of rational employments.… She is 
neglected by her husband, whose only motive for 
marrying her was to clear an incumbered estate. Her 
son, her only child, is undutiful; the poor never have 
cause to bless her; nor does she contribute to the 
happiness of any human being…To kill time, and drive 
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away the pangs of remorse, she goes from one house to 
another, collecting and propagating scandalous tales, 
to bring others on a level with herself. Even those 
who resemble her are afraid of her; she lives alone in 
the world, its good things are poisoned by her vices, 
and neither inspire joy nor gratitude. (385) 
Emphasizing one particular facet of Sophy’s overall character, 
her penchant for deception, Wollstonecraft demonstrates how Lady 
Sly’s “vice” might “poison” both her family and acquaintances. In 
Mrs. Mason’s description of her, we might also recognize the 
“irrational monster” that Wollstonecraft discusses in 
Vindication, who, in, her obsession with superficial attainments 
such as clothes and other finery “neglect[s] all the duties of 
life.” In accordance with Wollstonecraft’s general disdain for 
the uselessness of aristocratic women, she remarks on Lady Sly’s 
“want of rational employments” as a leading cause of her 
“suspicious temper.” The deceptiveness of her character as well 
as her obsession with worldly wealth lead her to cheat her worthy 
cousin out of her inheritance, as she “practiced every mean art 
to prejudice her aunt against her, and succeeded” (Wollstonecraft 
384).  
 Pride and Prejudice deploys a similar representation of 
poor female education in the character of the “other woman;” she 
sometimes “propagates scandalous tales” in regards to the story’s 
heroines, and sometimes altogether “poisons” their hopes of 
happiness. She first appears as the character of Miss Caroline 
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Bingley, sister to Jane Bennet’s newfound love interest. Although 
it is eventually revealed that Mr. Darcy himself convinced Mr. 
Bingley to quit Netherfield and dishonor his anticipated 
engagement to Jane, before Darcy admits to this interference, we 
are introduced to the conniving women that, from the very 
beginning, hope to undermine any connection between the Bennets 
and the residents of Netherfield:  
[The Bingley sisters] were in fact very fine ladies; 
not deficient in good humour when they were pleased, 
nor in the power of being agreeable where they chose 
it; but proud and conceited. They were rather 
handsome, had been educated in one of the first 
private seminaries in town, had a fortune of twenty 
thousand pounds, were in the habit of spending more 
than they ought, and of associating with people of 
rank; and were therefore in every respect entitled to 
think well of themselves, and meanly of others. 
(Austen 11) 
By describing them first as “very fine ladies,” like 
Wollstonecraft, Austen emphasizes the relationship between 
wealth, rank, and a dissipated feminine disposition characterized 
by “pride and conceit.”  
Austen further elaborates Miss Caroline Bingley’s feminine 
“vices” during the Bennet’s stay at Netherfield; in addition to 
her habit of perpetually “thinking well of [herself],” she 
manipulates feminine cunning or “arts” to attract Mr. Darcy’s 
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attention, as she takes up reading “the second volume of his 
[book]” for the purposes of “watching Mr. Darcy’s progress 
through his book” (37) or “walk[ing] about the room” to show off 
her “elegant” figure (38). Miss Bingley’s attempt to display her 
feminine ‘virtues’ for Darcy reveal the nature of her education; 
her desire to show off her “elegant” figure and her ability to 
“walk well” indicate that she has been schooled in various female 
accomplishments that might render her pleasing to Mr. Darcy.  
Exhibiting the jealously and vanity that accompany an education 
based on pleasing men, Miss Bingley fosters prejudice against 
Elizabeth and employs ‘mean art[s]’ to discourage Mr. Darcy’s 
interest in her. At various points, Miss Bingley “abuse[s] her as 
soon as she [is] out of the room. [Elizabeth’s] manners were 
pronounced to be very bad indeed, a mixture of pride and 
impertinence; she had no conversation, no stile, no taste, no 
beauty … Her face is too thin; her complexion has no brilliancy; 
and her features are not at all handsome” (24,175).  Miss 
Bingley’s willingness to resort to cunning and deceit in the 
interests of her selfish desires is also evidenced in her 
manipulation of Jane and Mr. Bingley’s relationship. Although she 
is not the primary reason for Mr. Bingley’s abandonment of Jane, 
she ultimately convinces Jane of his indifference. Indeed, her 
affected politeness in writing Jane to explain their quick 
removal to London only serves to convince Elizabeth of what she 
already suspected, as she suggests that “we are not rich enough, 
or grand enough for them; and she is the more anxious to get Miss 
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Darcy for her brother, from the notion that when there has been 
one intermarriage, she may have less trouble in achieving a 
second” (Austen 81).  
Yet, Miss Bingley’s (mis)behavior resembles Elizabeth’s own 
peculiar faults of “thinking well of” herself, propagating 
“scandalous tales,” and allowing her preconceived notions 
regarding particular people and situations determine her 
judgments—in short, her pride and prejudice. Although Elizabeth, 
as we later discover, accurately represents the character of Miss 
Bingley in her assessment, Jane questions Elizabeth’s hasty 
assumption, suggesting that “they are very pleasing when you 
converse with them … and I am much mistaken if we shall not find 
a very charming neighbor in her” (11). Thinking to herself, 
Elizabeth recognizes Miss Bingley as an “‘insolent girl,’” 
imprudently refusing to consider Miss Bingley’s caveat that she 
should not “give implicit confidence to all [Mr. Wickham’s] 
assertions.”  Harboring “resentment against [Wickham’s] enemies,” 
Elizabeth overlooks the possibility that he could be deceiving 
her, and thus defames Darcy by passing Wickham’s ‘scandalous 
tale’ on to Jane (65, 58).  Elizabeth shares Miss Bingley’s 
capacity for meanness, as she thinks snidely of Miss Bingley’s 
ruined hopes of marrying Mr. Darcy: “This information made 
Elizabeth smile … Vain indeed must be all her attentions, vain 
and useless her affection for his sister and her praise of 
himself, if her were already destined to another” (Austen 57). 
Her initial assessment of Miss De Bourgh is equally unforgiving, 
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as she allows her dislike of Darcy to color her perception: “‘I 
like her appearance,’ … ‘She looks sickly and cross.—Yes she will 
do for him [Darcy] very well. She will make him a proper wife’”  
(106). Thus, Elizabeth’s anger towards Mr. Bingley’s “unfeeling 
sisters” and “overpowering friend” (88) leads her to assume the 
very attitudes and behaviors that she despises in Miss Bingley –
feeling “entitled” as a victim of their “pride and conceit,”  “to 
think well of [herself], and meanly of others” (11).  
Before Elizabeth achieves happiness with Darcy, she must 
turn her sense of victimization and meanness towards the “other 
woman” into a learning experience for herself.  Austen’s “other 
woman” ultimately enables Elizabeth to overcome the temptation to 
assume her faults. This overcoming takes place—not in regards to 
Miss Bingley—but in regards to a more dangerous manifestation of 
Lady Sly, Lady Catherine De Bourgh. Recalling Elizabeth’s initial 
assessment of the Bingley sisters, she describes Lady Catherine 
as “authoritative,” “self-importan[t],” and “gratified by … 
excessive admiration,” with an “air [that] was not conciliating, 
nor was her manner of receiving them, such as to make her 
visitors forget their inferior rank” (Austen 108). Like Miss 
Bingley, Lady Catherine stoops to even “meaner arts” to attempt 
to undermine a marriage between Darcy and Elizabeth, proposing 
that a match between Darcy and her daughter would be preferable, 
as “[Elizabeth] would not wish to quit the sphere, in which [she 
has] been brought up” (232). Lady Catherine’s attempt to “try,” 
Elizabeth, however, actually provides the occasion for Elizabeth 
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to exercise her reason; rather than developing a prejudice 
towards the woman that intends to undermine her (as she does Miss 
Bingley), in her conversation with Lady Catherine, Elizabeth 
“attend[s] strictly to truth,” thus, in Original Stories’ terms, 
enacting feminine “virtue” (Wollstonecraft 384): 
I am not to be intimidated into anything so wholly 
unreasonable. Your ladyship wants Mr. Darcy to marry 
your daughter; but would my giving you the wished-for 
promise, make their marriage at all more probable? … 
Allow me to say, Lady Catherine, that the arguments 
with which you have supported this extraordinary 
application, have been as frivolous as the application 
was ill-judged. You have widely mistaken my character, 
if you think I can be worked on by such persuasions as 
these. (233) 
Assessing Lady Catherine’s “mean arts” by principles of reason, 
making reference to her flawed “arguments” and “judg[ment]” 
rather than her inferior character and behavior, Elizabeth 
resists the temptation of becoming her. Rather than perpetrating 
‘scandalous tales’ about Lady Catherine’s impertinence, she 
recognizes how “the other woman” has played a role in her present 
state of happiness, acknowledging that “Lady Catherine has been 
of infinite use” in bringing Darcy and herself to their “present 
good understanding” of one another’s affections (239, 249). 
Ultimately kinder to Lady Catherine than her own nephew, “by 
Elizabeth’s persuasion, [Darcy] was prevailed on to overlook the 
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offence [of her “abusive” remarks], and seek a reconciliation” 
after which Lady Catherine’s “resentment gave way, either to her 
affection for him, or her curiosity to see how his wife conducted 
herself; and she condescended to wait on them at Pemberley” 
(Austen 254). Elizabeth eventually even speaks well of the 
conniving Miss Bingley, who, although “deeply mortified by 
Darcy’s marriage,” “dropt all her resentment … and paid off every 
arrear of civility to Elizabeth” (253). Like the female-centered 
pedagogy of Original Stories, in which young women learn from 
those “who have suffered” through certain “faults” (384), Pride 
and Prejudice reinforces the importance of “the other woman” in 
the heroine’s development of reason, virtue, and, ultimately, 
happiness.   
Although having more reason to act “mean[ly]” in response 
to Caroline Bingley’s ill use of her, Jane also chooses to adhere 
to principles of virtue in her manner of dealing with “the other 
woman.” However, in her desire to cultivate a friendship with 
Miss Bingley, Jane also demonstrates the dangers of attempting to 
form a relationship with her. Like the debauched everywomen in 
Original Stories, Austen’s “other women” may become acquaintances 
but never friends, given that “it is impossible to form a 
friendship without making truth the basis” (Wollstonecraft 348). 
Refusing to consider Elizabeth’s assessment of her character, 
Jane falls prey to Miss Bingley’s cunning ability to affect 
sincere friendship; Jane finds it easier to believe that Mr. 
Bingley prefers Miss Darcy than to accept the possibility that 
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Miss Bingley has deceived her, stating “Caroline is incapable of 
willfully deceiving anyone; and all that I can hope in this case 
is, that she is deceived herself” (Austen 81).  Although Jane 
insists that their quick removal to London “must be [Mr. 
Bingley’s] own doing,” as Mr. Bingley is “unaffectedly modest,” 
and incapable of acting “on his own judgment” (Austen 242), he 
is, like Jane, easily “duped by” (Austen 100) the other woman, 
and it is Miss Bingley who writes to confirm that they will not 
return. Even when Caroline writes a second letter to report “of 
their all being settled in London for the winter,” and “Miss 
Darcy’s praise occupie[s] the chief of it,” Jane is still 
unwilling, despite Elizabeth’s admonition, to believe that “his 
sisters [have] influence[d] him” (Austen 92). In the belief that 
she can trust Caroline’s word, Jane fails to take the initiative 
to secure Mr. Bingley’s regard, thus allowing “the other woman” 
to successfully undermine their relationship. Pride and Prejudice 
thereby illustrates the power of influence that “the other woman” 
might have over an incredulous young lady, as Miss Bingley—not 
Mr. Bingley—sets the terms for Jane’s courtship.  
However, like Elizabeth, Jane is obliged to confront her 
own faults in Miss Bingley—the “air” of “indifferen[ce]” and lack 
of “sentiment” that led Darcy to doubt her attachment to Bingley 
(130). Indifference is a manifestation of pride, as Elizabeth 
remarks on the Bingley sisters’ “indifference towards Jane when 
not immediately before them” (24), and while visiting London, 
Jane recognizes (in Miss Bingley’s cold “inattention”) that she 
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was “deceived in Miss Bingley’s regard for me” (99), as it “was 
very evident that she had no pleasure in [her visit … and] said 
not a word of wishing to see me again” (99-100). The effect that 
Miss Bingley’s “inattention” has on Jane is enough to convince 
her to “continue the acquaintance no longer” (99), much like the 
effect that Jane’s own air of indifference has on Mr. Bingley.  
Although Jane doesn’t directly confront “the other woman,” she 
takes care to avoid her faults, eschewing scandal and meanness in 
favor of “banish[ing] every painful thought, and think[ing] of 
only what will make me happy, your affection, and the invariable 
kindness of my dear uncle and aunt” (Austen 99). On course to her 
“happy ending,” here we see Jane, despite the “duplicity” of the 
other woman, “com[ing] to terms with herself and go[ing] ahead 
with what she must do now” (Tave 18).  And, hereafter Jane 
relinquishes her earlier “composure of temper and … uniform 
cheerfulness of manner” meant to hide her feelings from 
“discover[y]” (Austen 15)—a species of pride meant to “guard her 
from the suspicions of the impertinent” (15).  When Bingley 
arrives with renewed determination to court Jane, Elizabeth 
observes that “after this day, Jane said no more of her 
indifference” (225), and even Darcy suggests that he was 
“convinced of her affection” (242). Therefore, her relationship 
with “the other woman,” although failed as a friendship, has 
become a learning experience for Jane. And like Elizabeth, Jane 
finally overlooks Miss Bingley’s former “inattention” and 
“duplicity” (Austen 99). In response to Miss Bingley’s letter of 
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“congratulations,” “though feeling no reliance on her, [Jane] 
could not help writing her a much kinder answer than she knew was 
deserved” (250).  
Reflecting the female-centered pedagogy of Original 
Stories, the Bennet sisters’ experiences with Miss Bingley and 
Lady Catherine enable them to amend their own peculiar faults, 
while recognizing the importance of avoiding hers. Pride and 
Prejudice’s didactic approach is not constructed to impose its 
message upon readers, however. Although readers are encouraged to 
question the behavior of Miss Bingley and Lady Catherine because 
they make life difficult for the story’s heroines, these “other 
women” are more than mere didactic tools constructed to reveal 
the effects of poor female education; they are representative of 
a particular worldview—that of the aristocratic or upper-class 
‘snob’—and therefore take on a social significance beyond the 
novelistic context. Undoubtedly, certain of Austen’s late 18th 
century and 19th century readers identified with their plight in 
attempting to ‘save’ their male relatives from unworthy marriages 
to women of lower birth.  Pride and Prejudice also invites 
readers to consider these women—not as rivals to be thwarted—but 
as an enduring part of the heroines’ lives.  Elizabeth and Jane 
recognize “the other woman,” not as a friend or even an enemy, 
but as someone they must graciously accept as part of their 
families or social circles. Like Lady Sly in Original Stories, 
“the other woman” in Pride and Prejudice does not experience 
redemption; there is the possibility of reform (in Miss Bingley’s 
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newfound “civility” and the “[giving] way” of Lady Catherine’s 
“resentment”), but there is neither a full elaboration nor a 
final confirmation of it. Having reconciled begrudgingly, or only 
to “retain the right of visiting at Pemberley” (Austen 253), she 
remains ‘at large’ so that she might serve as the impetus for 
another young lady’s learning experience, or as an ever-present 
reminder to Elizabeth and Jane of the kind of woman they should 
never become. 
4.1.2 Feminist Pedagogy as Sense Vs. Sensibility 
In Sense and Sensibility, the Dashwood sisters undergo a similar 
learning experience, as they are imposed upon by a variety of 
“other women” who threaten to undermine their happiness. The Miss 
Dashwoods  must endure the condescending airs of the “narrow-
minded” Mrs. John Dashwood, who, indulging her own selfishness 
(3-4), ‘talks her husband down’ from the three thousand pounds he 
has determined to give his stepmother and sisters, convincing him 
that “your father had no idea of your giving them money at all” 
(7 ).  Mrs. John Dashwood’s “ungracious behaviour” in 
“install[ing] herself [as] mistress of Norland” (3-4) requires 
that the Dashwoods leave Norland and take up a residence that 
suits their income (8). Not only does she serve to undermine the 
Dashwoods’ financial and domestic stability, but Mrs. John 
Dashwood also functions, like Miss Bingley, to interfere in 
Elinor’s relationship with Edward Ferrars. In the interests of 
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maintaining “her brother’s great expectations,” Mrs. John 
Dashwood informs Mrs. Dashwood of her mother’s “resolution that 
both her sons should marry well, and of the danger attending any 
young woman who attempted to draw him in” (14). Mrs. John 
Dashwood’s conniving attempt to manipulate Edward (who is, like 
Mr. Bingley, easily controlled by the women in his life (13-14)), 
is mirrored by his mother’s equally strong disregard for any 
woman without “a great fortune or high rank” (13). Elinor’s 
relationship to Edward is further complicated by the ‘mean arts’ 
employed by Lucy Steele in confiding her “great secret” to Elinor 
regarding her supposed engagement (86-87). A woman “capable of 
the utmost meanness of wanton ill-nature” (251), Lucy Steele 
recalls Original Stories’ exemplar of poor female education, Lady 
Sly, as she takes advantage of Elinor’s “excellent heart” (3) as 
a means of securing a husband and a fortune.  
This interference on the part of “the other woman” is what 
ultimately allows for the Dashwood sisters to “work,” “suffer,” 
“learn,” and eventually “come to terms with [themselves]” (Tave 
17-18). Unlike the women of Pride and Prejudice, however, these 
representations of poor female education serve to underscore 
Elinor—not as a woman in need of improvement—but as a paradigm of 
feminine virtue, who, by example, must rescue Marianne from 
suffering from the same condition as another of Wollstonecraft’s 
debauched everywomen, Jane Fretful. As Jan Fergus suggests in 
Jane Austen and the Didactic Novel, Sense and Sensibility is 
“unpalatable to those critics” who “feel that Elinor’s ‘sense’ 
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should be exposed as deficient, or as equally in need of 
correction or modification … Such criticism assumes that some 
middle ground is reached between Elinor and Marianne, which 
involves the assumption that Elinor needs correction, usually 
that she is in some way unfeeling at first and learns in the 
course of the action to taste ‘the values of sensibility’” (41). 
However, the female rational moralists often incorporated equally 
virtuous counterparts to offer an alternative to their negative 
exemplars.  As an inheritor of that tradition, Sense and 
Sensibility deploys an exemplar of female rationality and virtue 
as a woman of “Sense,” and therefore her “behaviour” is “from the 
beginning, considerate and right” (Fergus 41). To offer an 
alternative to the “faults, or follies” of Lady Sly, Mrs. Mason 
introduces Mary and Caroline to Mrs. Trueman’s “mode of conduct.” 
In contrast to Lady Sly’s cunning and deceit, Mrs. Trueman 
appears superior to her neighbours, who call her 
Gentlewoman; indeed every gesture shews an 
accomplished and dignified mind, that relies on 
itself, when deprived of the fortune which contributed 
to polish and give it consequence … Her virtues claim 
respect, and the practice of them engrosses her 
thoughts … Not like many women who are eager to set 
off their persons to the best advantage … Mrs. 
Trueman’s conduct is just the reverse; she tries to 
avoid singularity, for she does not wish to disgust 
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the generality; but it is her family, her friends, 
whom she studies to please. (386, 410) 
Original Stories’ paragon of feminine virtue, unlike Lady Sly, 
boasts a “dignified mind” rather than fortune and, because she is 
“good-natured,” she “claim[s] respect” from family, friends, and 
acquaintances. Rather than attempting to indulge her own 
selfishness, Mrs. Trueman “is ever exercising benevolence and 
love” (436). Mrs. Trueman not only exercises these “virtues” 
herself, but works to instill them in her children as well, as 
she “teaches, in the tenderest and most persuasive manner, 
important truths and elegant accomplishments” (386), thus 
“add[ing] to the innocent enjoyments of [her] children, and 
improv[ing] them at the same time” (436). As an ideal woman of 
virtue, Mrs. Trueman obtains “accomplishments,” not for the sake 
of “vanity,” but to “amuse those [she] love[s],” the cultivation 
of which comes second to the “joy resulting from doing good” 
(436). Like Mrs. Trueman, Elinor, as the woman of “sense,” essays 
to avoid “singularity;” she does not seek to arouse pity for her 
own misfortunes, but hopes to “improve” those she loves, as she 
possessed a strength of understanding, and coolness of 
judgment, which qualified her, though only nineteen, 
to be the counselor of her mother, and enabled her to 
frequently counteract, to the advantage of them all, 
that eagerness of mind in Mrs Dashwood which must 
generally have led to imprudence. She had an excellent 
heart;—her disposition was affectionate, and her 
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feelings were strong; but she knew how to govern them: 
it was a knowledge which her mother had yet to learn, 
and which one of her sisters had resolved never to be 
taught. (Austen 3)  
Because Elinor, unlike Elizabeth or Jane in Pride and Prejudice, 
is established early on as possessing all qualities of the 
“rational woman,” she is more significantly tried by “the other 
woman,” as she cannot revert to scandal or meanness in response 
to the cruelty she endures. She must, like Mrs. Trueman, set an 
example of feminine virtue for those around her, especially her 
sister, who “had resolved never to be taught.” In response to Mr. 
John Dashwood’s “ungracious[ness],” she “induced her [mother] 
first to reflect on the propriety of going” (3), and assisted her 
in finding a house that was not “too large for their income” (8). 
Anticipating the condescension of Edward Ferrar’s mother in 
respect to her being “only the daughter of a private gentleman” 
(256),  Elinor puts an end to Marianne’s “conjecture[]” of their 
engagement, or her tendency to imagine that “to wish was to hope, 
and to hope was to expect,” emphasizing instead that “there would 
be many difficulties in his way, if he were to wish to marry a 
woman who had not either a great fortune or high rank” (Austen 
13). When confronted with Lucy’s confidence regarding her 
engagement to Edward, Elinor later explains to Marianne “My 
promise to Lucy, obliged me to be secret. I owed it to her … and 
I owed it to my family and friends, not to create in them a 
solicitude about me, which it could not be in my power to 
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satisfy” (179). Like the benevolent Mrs. Trueman, Elinor 
sacrifices scandal for benevolence, and does so in the interests 
of “spar[ing] [“others”] from knowing how much [she] felt” 
(Austen 179). She even agrees to perform “a most agreeable 
office” on the part of Colonel Brandon, who has made arrangements 
for Edward and Lucy to reside at his parsonage (Austen 197-98).   
 Elinor serves as an example to Marianne, who, although 
“sensible and clever,” was “eager in everything; her sorrows, 
joys, could have no moderation. She was generous, amiable, 
interesting; she was everything but prudent” (3-4). In Some Words 
of Jane Austen, Stuart M. Tave elaborates on the “insensible” 
nature of Marianne’s character, remarking on her “‘coldness’” 
towards others with “difference of taste from herself” suggesting 
that “she gave her affections to a man who was not what she 
thought he was, not a man of sensibility but a man selfish, cold, 
and hardhearted, because she herself was too much like him … For 
all her eager receptivity to nature, to poetry, to music, to 
emotion, for all her responsive ecstasy, Marianne does not know 
what is happening around her” (89-90). Tave recognizes Marianne’s 
selfishness as a critique of the conventional late 18th century 
understanding of sensibility as “a carefully cultivated loss of 
control” (Tave 75).  The type of sensibility that Austen 
critiques—an indulgence of unrestrained feeling that leads to 
“violence” and behavior rivaling that of a “spoiled three-year-
old”  (Tave 80)—reflects Wollstonecraft’s critique of women 
unable to temper passion with reason, represented in Original 
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Stories’ exemplar of poor female education, Jane Fretful. At the 
beginning, we are made aware that Marianne’s passionate 
indulgence is actually encouraged by her mother, as “Elinor saw, 
with concern, the excess of her sister’s sensibility; but by Mrs. 
Dashwood it was valued and cherished. They encouraged each other 
now in the violence of their affliction. The agony of grief which 
overpowered them at first, was voluntarily renewed, was sought 
for, was created again and again” (4).  Representative of the 
problems inherent in an education that fails to emphasize reason 
as a way of restraining passion, Marianne is a version of Jane 
Fretful, whose “weak mother would not allow her to be 
contradicted on any occasion. The child had some tenderness of 
heart; but so accustomed was she to see every thing give way to 
her humour, that she imagined the world was only made for her” 
(381). Jane Fretful’s “continual passions weakened her 
constitution” (381), rendering her susceptible to 
“disappointment,” as “something always disconcerted her; the 
horses went too fast, or too slow; the dinner was ill-dressed, 
or, some of the company contradicted her” (382).  As Tave argues, 
“Marianne judges others’ motives by the immediate effects of 
their actions on herself” (89); similarly, Jane Fretful thinks 
only of how the world affects her, “venting her ill-humour on 
those who depended on her” (381-382). Marianne’s selfishness is 
clearly exemplified in her behavior following Willoughby’s 
departure from Barton. Inconsiderate of the fact that her mother 
and sister were eager to understand the cause of her suffering, 
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Marianne keeps to herself, “and though her family were most 
anxiously attentive to her comfort,” “[s]he avoided the looks of 
all of them” (54-55). Rather than seeking her family’s 
consolation, she courts a “violent oppression of spirits” (55).  
The evening passed off in equal indulgence of feeling. 
She played over every favorite song that she had been 
used to play to Willoughby, every air in which their 
voices had been oftenest joined, and sat the 
instrument gazing on every line of music that he had 
written out for her, till her heart was so heavy that 
no farther sadness could be gained; and this 
nourishment of grief was every day applied. She spent 
whole hours at the piano-forté alternatively singing 
and crying; her voice often totally suspended by her 
tears … Such violence of affliction indeed could not 
be supported forever; it sunk within a few days into a 
calmer melancholy; but these employments, to which she 
daily recurred, her solitary walks and silent 
meditations, still produced occasional effusions or 
sorrow as lively as ever. (55) 
Having no “rational employments” to occupy her mind 
(Wollstonecraft 385), Marianne seems to thrive on 
“disappointment,” nursing her “melancholy” and “sorrow,” seeking 
it out in familiar activities she enjoyed with Willoughby. When 
Elinor suggests that her mother might be “direct” with Marianne, 
and in the interests of “knowing the real state of the affair,” 
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that she “‘ask Marianne at once’ … ‘whether she is or is not 
engaged to Willoughby?,’” Mrs Dashwood refuses, fearing that she 
might “distress” Marianne. Thus, Mrs. Dashwood enables and, by 
her inaction, encourages Marianne’s passionate “indulgence,” as 
“common sense, common care, common prudence, were all sunk in 
Mrs. Dashwood’s romantic delicacy” (56). Marianne’s “continual 
passions” persist as the extent of Willoughby’s deception 
unfolds, and she believes everyone, even Elinor, to be incapable 
of understanding her, and “she can only exclaim how easy it is 
‘for those who have no sorrow of their own to talk of exertion’” 
(Tave 108).  
On the verge, however, of losing herself to this 
indulgence, Elinor rescues her from the fate of those like Jane 
Fretful, whose “peevish temper, preyed on her impaired 
constitution. … and she hastened her end … Her lifeless 
countenance displayed the marks of convulsive anger” 
(Wollstonecraft 382). Like Mrs. Trueman, Elinor eventually 
inspires the capacity for reason in Marianne, not by what she 
says, since Marianne will have “no comforts,” and “no opening for 
consolation” (125), but by becoming an exemplar within her own—
and quite similar—experience of unrequited love. When it became 
necessary for Elinor to “undeceive” Marianne in regards to 
Edward’s engagement to Lucy, as well as the fact that she had 
known it for “four months,”  Marianne is astonished, having 
accused Elinor of “hav[ing] no grief,” and therefore “no idea of 
what [she] suffer[ed]” (125, 177). Elinor reveals the nature of 
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her own “suffer[ing],” in which Edward’s engagement to Lucy “was 
in a manner forced on me by the very person herself, whose prior 
engagement ruined all my prospects, and told me, I thought with 
triumph” (180), and explains her promise to “avoid giving any 
hint of the truth,” as well as her desire to avoid “mak[ing] you 
and my mother most unhappy” (179). Like Mary and Caroline’s 
“praise” of Mrs. Trueman’s “good natured” conduct, upon 
recognizing the “merit” with which Elinor has conducted herself, 
Marianne begins to see reason, exclaiming “How barbarous I have 
been to you!—you, who have been my only comfort, who have borne 
with me in all my misery, who have seemed to be only suffering 
for me!—Is this my gratitude!—Is this the only return I can make 
you?” (Austen 180).  In response to Elinor’s willingness to make 
sacrifices for the sake of her “family and friends,” “no 
reparation could be too much for [Marianne] to make” (Austen 
180). Although, as both Stuart Tave and Jan Fergus observe, 
Marianne does not immediately convert her (again) overly-
emotional self-derision into a change in worldview, Elinor 
provides her with a model to live by, and, following her illness 
and time “to reflect,” Marianne suggests that she “compare[s] 
[her] conduct” “with what it ought to have been; I compare it 
with yours” (236). And, by the end, Elinor’s influence is clear 
in Marianne’s newfound conviction, in which “[t]he future must be 
my proof. I have laid down my plan, and if I am capable of 
adhering to it—my feelings shall be governed and my temper 
improved. They shall no longer worry others, nor torture myself. 
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I shall now live solely for my family. […] As for Willoughby—to 
say that I shall soon or that I shall ever forget him, would be 
idle. His remembrance can be overcome by no change of 
circumstances or opinions. But it shall be regulated, it shall be 
checked by religion, by reason, by constant employment” (Austen 
237-238). Thus, by Elinor’s “example” (237), Marianne establishes 
“religion,” “reason,” and “constant employment” as her present 
(and future) objectives. She brings this objective to fruition by 
marrying a man of “goodness” with a “fond attachment to herself,” 
as Austen elaborates 
Marianne Dashwood was born to an extraordinary fate. 
She was born to discover the falsehood of her own 
opinions, and to counteract, by her conduct, her most 
favourite maxims. She was born to overcome an 
affection formed so late in life as at seventeen, and 
with no sentiment superior to strong esteem and lively 
friendship, voluntarily to give her hand to another!—
and that other, a man who had suffered no less than 
herself under the event of a former attachment, whom, 
two years before, she had considered too old to be 
married …But so it was. Instead of falling a sacrifice 
to an irresistible passion, as once she had fondly 
flattered herself with expecting … in her more calm 
and sober judgment she had determined on,—she found 
herself at nineteen, submitting to new attachments, 
entering on new duties, placed in a new home, a wife, 
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the mistress of a family, and the patroness of a 
village. (259-60) 
However, although Marianne’s marriage serves to exemplify her 
more rational worldview, her “new attachment” is subordinated to 
another in the last lines of the novel—the relationship she 
shares with Elinor: “And among the merits and the happiness of 
Elinor and Marianne, let it not be ranked as the least 
considerable, that though sisters, and living almost within sight 
of each other, they could live without disagreement between 
themselves, or producing coolness between their husbands” (261). 
What is of greatest consequence is the girls’ ability to maintain 
“constant communication” with one another; if Marianne loses her 
more “sober judgment,” Elinor is “within sight” to assist her. 
And, for Elinor, having always considered the happiness of her 
family even before her own—for all her efforts—now has the reward 
of experiencing both.  
Sense and Sensibility’s representation of female-centered 
pedagogy closely resembles the didactic structure of Original 
Stories in its incorporation of an exemplar of feminine virtue 
that must ‘save’ other women from the effects of their bad 
behavior. This construction has, as Jan Fergus argues, rendered  
Sense and Sensibility the “least [appreciated] of all Austen’s 
novels,” since the novel seems “‘extremely rigid’” and Elinor 
“priggish and self-righteous’” (40)—in other words, the novel 
seems too much like conventional didactic novels that feature 
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static exemplary characters.46  Yet, Marianne and Elinor are not 
merely exemplars of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ female education; Marianne 
is, as Andrew Wright suggests (quoted by Fergus above) a 
“loveable” character; she is attractive, silly, and insensible to 
her bad behavior like most ‘little sisters’ are. Unlike Mrs. 
Trueman, Elizabeth exhibits an emotional life that is carefully 
controlled by her own “exertion” (Tave 98), feeling no less than 
Marianne when circumstances warrant such feeling. Hence, Sense 
and Sensibility presents two recognizable worldviews in Elinor 
and Marianne with which readers might identify and struggle—that 
of the ‘older and wiser’ sister and the wayward younger sibling. 
As long as there are sisters, Sense and Sensibility will maintain 
its social significance and, therefore, will remain (for some) a 
pleasurable reading experience.  
Both Pride and Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility reflect 
Wollstonecraft’s female-centered pedagogy, as they incorporate 
representations of poor female education, who, as Austen’s “other 
women,” serve to test the virtues of the Bennet and Dashwood 
sisters. As a result of the “other woman’s” interference, 
Austen’s young heroines must learn through experience, thus 
allowing for the cultivation of reason, and eventually, the 
achievement of their “happy ending.” However, these “happy 
endings” do not belong to the heroine alone; Elizabeth must carry 
                                                 
46 As Jane Spencer argues, Samuel Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa are 
examples of the perfect heroines that pervaded the didactic novel. 
Writers in the reformed heroine tradition sought to undermine these 
static representations of women.   
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on her family obligations both to Miss Bingley and Lady 
Catherine, and Elinor is “within sight” of Marianne, and now 
daughter to Mrs. Ferrars and sister-in-law to Lucy. Like Mrs. 
Mason’s “farewell” to the hitherto “shamefully ignorant” Mary and 
Caroline, which asks that “when you think of your friend, observe 
her precepts; and let the recollection of my affection give 
additional weight to the truths which I have endeavored to 
instill; and, to reward my care, let me hear that you love and 
practise virtue” (Wollstonecraft 449-50), these texts reveal the 
ongoing nature of maintaining feminine virtue, as a young woman 
might ultimately find the “the other woman” in her mother, her 














5.0   19TH CENTURY FEMINIST PEDAGOGY AS ‘SELF MAKING:’ THE 
OTHER WOMAN AS SACRIFICE IN JANE EYRE.   
Like the work of Wollstonecraft and Austen, Charlotte Brontë’s 
Jane Eyre borrows from earlier didactic traditions as a way of 
establishing its feminist project. In her appropriation of 
Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, Brontë constructs a feminist 
pedagogical approach that reimagines everywoman characters who 
help the heroine establish an identity apart from the one imposed 
on her by her Aunt at Gateshead—the “mad cat” and “ugly toad” who 
was considered “less than a servant” by the Reed family (Brontë 
9). In further developing Wollstonecraft’s “Sophy” or Austen’s 
“other woman” as characters in novelistic discourse, Brontë’s 
Jane Eyre more explicitly emphasizes the personal degradation and 
ignominy that women suffer as a result of frivolous educational 
regimens based on feminine ‘accomplishments;’ Jane Eyre imagines 
a variety of plausible outcomes for such a woman, the most 
drastic of which is death. While Wollstonecraft and Austen 
incorporate the other woman ultimately to convey the importance 
of female relationships as part of a female-centered didacticism, 
Charlotte Brontë’s 19th century representation of this 18th 
century feminist topos treats the other woman as an expendable 
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character whose purpose is to teach the heroine that her sense of 
identity and selfhood is the correct one.  
Emerging at a time in which “imperialism, understood as 
England’s social mission, was a crucial part of the cultural 
representation of England to the English” (Spivak 240), Charlotte 
Brontë’s most influential novel Jane Eyre depicts the heroine as 
an adventurer in a “wide” world “go[ing] forth into its expanse, 
to seek real knowledge of life” (Brontë 72). As a quest for 
female individuality, Jane Eyre adapts Bunyan’s moral tale of 
downfall and redemption, a comparatively individual pilgrimage 
that posits the protagonist, Christian (seeking the Celestial 
City, Kingdom of God) against the world (evil). As Heather Glen 
suggests in “‘Dreadful to Me: Jane Eyre and History,” Jane Eyre 
resembles “puritan autobiography or evangelical tract, [in which] 
the social world appears as a place of solitary pilgrimage, and 
the self as radical isolate, pursuing its own separate path to 
its own particular end” (145).47 Whereas Wollstonecraft and Austen 
inscribe their everywoman characters into a female-centered world 
that emphasizes the value of forgiveness and forbearance of 
other’s faults, Jane Eyre appropriates the larger didactic 
framework of Pilgrim’s Progress, thus establishing an 
                                                 
47 Heather Glen reads Jane Eyre in relation to a late 18th century 
Evangelical didactic tradition that includes Hester Chapone’s Letters 
on the Improvement of the Mind (1773) and Hannah Moore’s Cheap 
Repository Tracts, marking the text’s relationship to a “distinctive 
pedagogy which had developed out of the evangelical revival of the 
eighteenth century and which by the nineteenth was enshrined in 
schools” (132). I am reading Jane Eyre as a feminist appropriation of 
the puritan tradition that Glen addresses here.   
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antagonistic relationship between Jane and those who threaten her 
journey towards selfhood. Going the way of Bunyan’s unbelievers 
who attempt to undermine Christian’s quest, the other women in 
Jane Eyre are sacrificed so that the heroine might complete her 
pilgrimage, coming to the penultimate moment in which she 
“penetrate[s] very near a Mighty Spirit” (358). Jane Eyre 
portrays feminine coming of age as an individual and 
introspective process; therefore, the “other woman” becomes the 
heroine’s “antipode” (Brontë 265) and her rival.48  
 While Gilbert and Gubar acknowledge Brontë’s appropriation 
of Bunyan’s “mythic quest plot,” or Jane’s “progress from one 
significantly named place to another,” as well as her use of 
allegorical names and certain “significant redefinitions of 
Bunyan” at the end of the novel (336, 342, 370), they overlook 
Jane Eyre’s appropriation of the text’s didactic strategies in 
favor of emphasizing its “rebellious feminism.”49 They suggest 
                                                 
48 For further commentary on how Jane Eyre represents “feminist 
individualism in the age of imperialism” see Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism” in 
Critical Inquiry 12.1 (Autumn 1985): 243-61.  
49 In their groundbreaking reading of Jane Eyre in “A Dialogue of Self 
and Soul: Plain Jane’s Progress” from The Madwoman in the Attic, Sandra 
M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar suggest that Jane’s story might be 
characterized as a “female Bildungsroman,” in which she “overcomes” the 
“difficulties [of] Everywoman in a patriarchal society” (338-339). In 
light of the influence of postcolonial criticism, many critics have 
problematized Gilbert and Gubar’s reading of Jane Eyre as 
representative of “rebellious feminism,” especially in regards to their 
characterization of Bertha as a psychological extension of Jane, or her 
“dark double.” (See Jenny Sharpe’s Allegories of Empire and Susan 
Meyer’s “‘Indian Ink:’” Colonialism and the Figurative Strategy of Jane 
Eyre” in Imperialism at Home.) I call Gilbert and Gubar’s claim 
regarding Jane Eyre as exhibiting “rebellious feminism” into question 
as well, noting the ways in which Jane’s success as feminist 
individualist necessitates the sacrifice of other women.   
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that Bronte has forgone the “devout substance” of Bunyan’s 
moralizing tale—an argument that does resonate with the moments 
in which Jane expresses her desires to “go where there was life 
and movement” (75) or to “reach the busy world, towns, regions 
full of life I had heard of but never seen” (Brontë 93), and she 
ultimately spurns a man of God in favor of a (once) dissipated 
man of wealth. However, Jane Eyre both alludes to and comments on 
Christian doctrine as an important part of Jane’s journey.50 
Indeed, various moments in the text suggest that Brontë has not 
so much dispensed with the “devout substance” of Pilgrim’s 
Progress as reinterpreted it from a feminist perspective. Jane 
decides to “keep the law given by God” rather than give in to 
Rochester’s pleas that she remain with him as a mistress, takes 
comfort in “His efficiency to save what He has made” when 
confronted with spending the night alone in the wilderness, and 
she “entreat[s] of Heaven” how to respond to St. John’s proposal 
of marriage (270, 276, 357) before she mysteriously hears 
Rochester’s voice calling her. James Diedrick suggests that “in 
the quasi-providential world of Jane Eyre, God seems to intervene 
in Jane’s life repeatedly, whether to aid her in her quest for 
fulfillment…or to protect her moral integrity” (24). Jane Eyre 
integrates these seemingly incongruent discourses of puritan 
morality and feminine individualism, the interplay of which 
                                                 
50  For further elaboration on how Jane Eyre deploys different versions 
Christianity and the Bible, see James Diedrick’s “Jane Eyre and A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman,” Susan VanZanten Gallagher’s “Jane 
Eyre and Christianity,” and Keith A. Jenkins’s “Jane Eyre: Charlotte 
Brontë’s New Bible” in Approaches to Teaching Brontë’s Jane Eyre. 
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functions to redefine the meaning of Christianity from a 19th 
century feminist perspective. Brontë’s redefinition involves 
generating a fiction in which the heroine’s desire and God’s will 
are one and the same, in which other women are (appropriately) 
sacrificed so that Jane—who is “poor, obscure, plain, and 
little”—may live out the feminist dream, becoming “a beauty” in 
Mr. Rochester’s “eyes” (Brontë 216, 220).  
 There has been no attempt to link the marginalized female 
figure of Bertha, often addressed in postcolonial criticism, to 
the other females that are sacrificed in Jane Eyre. Postcolonial 
critics such as Gayatri Spivak have focused on how the process of 
constructing “the feminist individualist heroine of British 
fiction” necessitated the “violence” (243) perpetrated against 
Rochester’s (supposedly) mad Creole wife, but, like feminist 
critics who argue that we might read Jane Eyre as a feminist 
tract despite its exclusion of the “‘native female,’” she 
overlooks Bertha’s relationship to the text’s other marginalized 
female figures. Jane Eyre’s making of the “militant female 
subject” calls for the sacrifice of other women who threaten to 
undermine the heroine’s sense of identity, what Adrienne Rich has 
called her “Jane Eyre-ity.” Jane Eyre’s representation of the 
other woman as “sacrifice” reveals both the possibilities for 
(the feminist individualist) and the limitations of (at the 
expense of another woman’s happiness) of a female-centered 
didacticism.  
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5.1 “A NEW SERVITUDE:” THE VILLAGE SCHOOLMISTRESS AS 
FEMINIST INDIVIDUALIST 
In its deployment of a variety of generic forms and strategies 
(i.e., romance, gothic, bildungsroman), Jane Eyre is 
representative of numerous 18th and 19th century textual 
traditions, and as Gilbert and Gubar have remarked, also 
accessible to readers, as “we tend today to think of Jane Eyre 
as…the archetypal scenario for all those mildly thrilling 
romantic encounters between a scowling Byronic hero (who owns a 
gloomy mansion) and a trembling heroine (who can’t quite figure 
out the mansion’s floor plan)” (337). Despite the fact that 
scenes of women teaching and learning comprise a substantial 
portion of the novel’s action and function to shape the terms of 
its discourse, however, there has been no attempt to read Jane 
Eyre as a text that emphasizes the importance of women as mentors 
and teachers of young girls, or as an appropriation of women’s 
didactic writing from the mid to late 18th century that also 
represents women in this way.51 Jane Eyre has been read as 
                                                 
51 James Diedrick points to a possible relationship between Jane Eyre and 
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. He argues that 
“no attempt has been made…to link…the terms of [Jane Eyre’s] feminism 
in general, to a tradition of feminist discourse that originated fifty-
five years before Jane Eyre appeared, when Wollstonecraft published A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman” (22-23). Diedrick argues that “both 
writers recognize that…society seeks to prevent women from fully 
exercising their reason and developing their virtue” by means of “the 
traditional ‘separation of virtues’ doctrine that assumes different 
mental and moral capacities in men and women” (23, 25). Furthermore, he 
suggests that “in both texts, God empowers women to exercise their own 
moral judgment apart from male expectations” (24). Although I agree 
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representative of the Victorian “governess novel” which emerged 
in the 1830s in response to “the nineteenth-century anxiety 
concerning middle-class female employment in general, and 
governess work in particular,” an anxiety which also led to the 
publication of manuals for governesses and much debate in the 
press. As Cecilia Lecaros suggests in The Victorian Governess 
Novel, this genre incorporated “themes like sudden 
impoverishment, paternal insufficiency, and conflicts with 
nouveaux riches employers” into “plots [that] focused on the 
working conditions and social position of the governess heroine” 
(Lecaros). The “governess novel” evolves, however, from this 18th 
century didactic form that emerged with Sarah Fielding’s The 
Governess; or, The Little Female Academy (1749),52 representing a 
female-centered learning experience overseen by a learned female 
pedagogue or mentor53 in which “portrayals of governesses have a 
clearly didactic purpose and present highly appreciated teachers” 
(Lecaros). While Jane Eyre does adhere to various conventions of 
                                                                                                                                                 
with Diedrick’s linking of Jane Eyre to Wollstonecraft’s feminism, I 
will make more specific connections between the structural features of 
Jane Eyre and Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories.    
52 Like Original Stories, The Governess describes female pupils’ progress 
towards virtue; however, in The Governess, the eldest girl (rather than 
the governess herself) instructs by means of “Fable and Moral” (45) and 
the girls learn from one another through their own “life stories, 
highlighting the various faults that marked their behavior before 
coming to Mrs. Teachum’s school” (Ward 33).  
53 The following texts exemplify how women represented themselves as 
pedagogues in 18th century conduct books and early forms of the 
governess novel. Some, like Fielding’s The Governess, are educational 
novels, others take the form of dialogues or a series of letters: 
Mentoria (Ann Murry 1778), Original Stories from Real Life (Mary 
Wollstonecraft 1788), Anecdotes of Mary; or, The Good Governess (H.S. 
1795), Letters on Subjects of Importance to the Happiness of Young 
Females, Addresses by a Governess to her Pupils (Helena Whitford 1799), 
and “The Good French Governess” (Maria Edgeworth 1801). 
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the governess novel in its representation of orphanhood and 
sudden impoverishment, the text more closely resembles the 
earlier didactic tradition of woman as pedagogue. Unlike the 
culture of the governess novel, Brontë does not represent the 
governess position as one of victimization in order to comment on 
the “working conditions and social position of the governess 
heroine,” but rather emphasizes that becoming a governess (and 
female education in general) enables Jane to achieve feminist 
individuality. By demonstrating the possibilities inherent in 
taking on the role of pedagogue, Jane Eyre functions much like 
18th century texts in which women as teachers/mentors show “how 
women can school themselves toward self-command and psychic self-
sufficiency, and [how] women can help shape the world about them” 
(Myers 201-203).  And, like Brontë’s appropriation of Bunyan’s 
mythic quest plot to represent Jane’s journey towards selfhood, 
certain texts in this 18th century didactic tradition also take on 
the form of bildungsroman, adapting Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress 
as a means of representing young women’s (or girl’s) spiritual 
and/or cognitive development as an educational journey.  
More specifically, however, Jane Eyre reflects the work of 
one writer in this tradition—that of Mary Wollstonecraft. While 
Fielding and others in this didactic tradition focus on teaching 
children to restrain passion or acquire virtue so that they might 
be ‘better behaved,’ Wollstonecraft also explicitly elaborates 
the ways in which poor or insufficient education manifests itself 
in the character and lives of women. Wollstonecraft emphasizes 
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the importance of women taking on the role of pedagogue and 
generates a distinctly feminine didactic discourse that subverts 
masculine conceptions of ‘proper’ accomplishment-based female 
education in favor of reason and virtue. Like Wollstonecraft’s 
didactic texts, Jane Eyre undermines patriarchal approaches to 
women’s education (as represented by Lowood’s overseer, Mr. 
Brocklehurst), depicting the important roles women assume as 
teachers and mentors of young girls in helping them to prepare to 
experience the world, giving them “courage to go forth into its 
expanse” (72). There is no evidence in Brontë’s Roe Head Journal 
or in her correspondence to suggest that she had direct contact 
with Wollstonecraft’s writing. However, with what “may have been 
the most widely read edition” of Vindication published six years 
prior to the release of Jane Eyre in 1847 and Original Stories 
still available in 1820, four years before Brontë began attending 
school (St. Clair 658, 660), it is possible that Brontë came to 
know Wollstonecraft’s work. Given the year she spent at the 
Clergy Daughters’ School at Cowan Bridge and the nature of the 
schoolbooks she had available to her (such as a Prayer Book and a 
monthly magazine featuring religious stories entitled The 
Children’s Friend), it is perhaps even more likely that she read 
Mrs. Sherwood’s 1820 adaptation of Fielding’s The Governess, 
which went through “six editions by 1840” (Ward 234). Sherwood’s 
version, unlike Fielding’s, was overtly religious in nature, as 
Sherwood, a devout evangelical and “active in local Sunday 
schools,” “‘substituted dull, moral tales for Sarah’s fairy-
  158
stories and also inserted the gloomiest quotations from the Bible 
on practically every page’” (Ward 234). Despite Sherwood’s 
evangelical revamping of the text, however, the title, Fielding’s 
representation of woman as pedagogue, and the resemblance of the 
pupils’ educational experience to the spiritual journey in 
Pilgrim’s Progress remain intact. Whether Brontë actually read 
Wollstonecraft or came to know of this didactic tradition through 
Sherwood’s adaptation of The Governess or one of the “versions of 
Fielding’s text [that] continued to appear throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (Ward 36), Jane Eyre and 
Original Stories adopt similar strategies in their appropriations 
of Bunyan’s journey plot, his everyman characters, and in their 
profound emphases on the importance of women as teachers and the 
problems of accomplishment-based female education.  
 In Chapter XVI of Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories 
(1788), a fictional account of two young girls’ progress towards 
the acquisition of reason and virtue, female mentor Mrs. Mason 
tells her two young pupils the story of Anna Lofty or “The 
History of the Village School-mistress.” Similar to (and possibly 
and adaptation of) The Governess’s “Life of Miss Jenny Peace,” 
the story serves to emphasize the importance of women taking on 
mentor/teacher roles as a means of exercising feminine reason and 
virtue, as it reflects the situation of Mrs. Mason herself as 
mentoria to Mary and Caroline. It also reinforces 
Wollstonecraft’s claim in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
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that women should have the opportunity to “attempt to earn their 
own subsistence” (148). 
[Her] amiable parent died when Anna was near eighteen, 
and left her to the care of her father, whose high 
spirit she had imbibed…her aunt treated her as if she 
were a mere dependent on her bounty; and expected her 
to be an humble companion in every sense of the word. 
The visitors took the tone from her ladyship, and 
numberless were the mortifications she had to bear… 
She had her father’s spirit of independence, and 
determined to shake off the galling yoke which she had 
long struggled with, and try to earn her own 
subsistence…She lives indeed alone, and has all day 
only the society of children; yet she enjoys many true 
pleasures; dependence on God is her support, and 
devotion her comfort. Her lively affections are 
therefore changed into a love of virtue and truth:  
and these exalted speculations have given an uncommon 
dignity to her manners; for she seems above the world, 
and its trifling commotions. (Wollstonecraft 426-428) 
 This is not only Anna’s story, but the story of both 
Wollstonecraft and Brontë, who, wishing to “earn her own 
subsistence,” accepts the position of “schoolmistress” or 
governess “to put her in a way of supporting herself, without 
forfeiting her highly valued independence” (Wollstonecraft 428). 
It most strikingly resembles the experience of Jane Eyre, who, 
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after the death of her parents, was “brought up” by her aunt as a 
“parentless infant,” and it was her “place to be humble, and to 
try to make herself agreeable” (Brontë 13, 10), since, “[she] had 
nothing in harmony with Mrs. Reed or her children, or her chosen 
vassalage,” and was therefore considered “less than a servant” 
(Brontë 12, 9). Finally sent away to a girls’ charity school 
called Lowood Institution, Jane is able to forget the “reproach 
of dependence” that had characterized her life with her aunt at 
Gateshead (Brontë 10). Like the schoolmistress, teaching enables 
Jane to take on a new set of responsibilities, and therefore to 
acquire the habits of “duty and order,” as she was afforded “the 
means of an excellent education placed within [her] reach…In time 
[she] rose to be the first girl of the first class; then…was 
invested in the office of teacher; which [she] discharged with 
zeal for two years […]” (Brontë 71).  
Yet, Brontë’s version of this late 18th century tale of a 
schoolmistress finding “many true pleasures” in “patiently 
labor[ing] to improve the children consigned to her management” 
(Wollstonecraft 429) emphasizes the shift away from female 
didacticism as a female-centered experience that will allow one 
to “improve” others and be “above the world, and its trifling 
commotions” (429). Instead, Brontë demonstrates how education 
might allow the heroine to find “true pleasures” in experiencing 
the wide world; while Wollstonecraft’s schoolmistress must remain 
“alone” or only “in the society of children” to exercise “virtue 
and truth,” Brontë shows how “dependence on God,” not as a 
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replacement for, but in alliance with one’s “lively affections,” 
might enable a young woman to remain virtuous when confronted 
with “life amidst its perils.” Jane Eyre’s representation of 
Providence and virtue as allied with Jane’s own will, which I 
will address below, allows for the fulfillment of Jane’s desire 
to seek “life.” Rather than assuaging her “solitary draught” with 
“ejaculation[s] to Heaven,” Jane expresses (and eventually acts 
upon) her eagerness to know life beyond what she has experienced 
as a pupil and teacher at Lowood:  “My world had for some years 
been in Lowood:  my experience had been of its rules and systems; 
now I remembered that the real world was wide, and that a varied 
field of hopes and fears, of sensations and excitements, awaited 
those who had courage to go forth into its expanse” (Brontë 72). 
Education and teaching experience provide Jane with the 
credentials to seek out “a new servitude” (72), leading to her 
encounter Mr. Rochester at Thornfield. More importantly, however, 
it is a ‘self-making’ experience for Jane, as she meets the women 
who influence her change from the “resist[ant]” “rebel slave,” or 
the  “mad cat” “liable to strange penalties” (Brontë 9) to a 
woman eager for “a new servitude” and the opportunity to 
“pleas[]” others—into a woman who can seduce Rochester “with her 
unseduceable independence in a world of self-marketing Célines 
and Blanches” (Gilbert and Gubar 353).  
While Jane Eyre departs from Original Stories’ late 18th 
century representation of female instruction as a necessarily 
self-abnegating experience, both Jane Eyre and Original Stories 
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emphasize the importance of educational regimens that exercise 
women’s reason. In so doing, they attempt to redirect women’s 
education away from accomplishment-based models by incorporating 
exemplars of poor female education as an integral part of the 
protagonists’ journey. In Original Stories, they serve an 
allegorical function in showing Mrs. Mason’s pupils the kind of 
women they don’t want to become. These exemplars of poor female 
education take on an important role in Jane’s bildungsroman, as 
they force Jane to admit and embrace who she is. In conjunction 
with these negative representations, like Original Stories, Jane 
Eyre incorporates exemplars of feminine rationality and virtue 
that represent some type of knowledge or attitude that Jane must 
adopt to succeed in her quest to selfhood. Adrienne Rich, Sandra  
Gilbert and Susan Gubar suggest that Jane encounters various 
women throughout her “pilgrimage” that act as “mothers for Jane” 
(Gilbert and Gubar 346).54 Ultimately, these mothers “give the 
young Jane a sense of her own worth and of ethical choice” (Rich 
474) and, according the Gilbert and Gubar, the ability to 
“compromise” or to come to terms with the fact that “pure liberty 
is impossible” (347). As in the woman as pedagogue tradition, 
however, Jane Eyre represents female mentors—not as maternal 
figures, but as learned female educators or friends—women who 
have eschewed the failings of the conventional mother, who is 
                                                 
54 See Adrienne Rich’s “Jane Eyre: The Temptations of a Motherless Woman” 
in On Lies, Secretes, and Silence. Selected Prose 1966-1978 (1979) and 
Gilbert and Gubar’s “A Dialogue of Self and Soul: Plain Jane’s 
Progress” in The Madwoman in the Attic (1979).  
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often portrayed (either as a result of perpetual absence or 
outright negligence)as the reason for her daughters’ faults.55 By  
characterizing all of Jane’s female influences as maternal 
figures, Rich, Gilbert, and Gubar overlook the ways in which 
these women each represent distinct characteristics that Jane 
adopts later in her journey.  
Yet, these women all serve to impart a specific type of 
knowledge that Jane requires to be successful in her pilgrimage. 
For instance, Rich notes the Reeds’ servant Bessie as “the first 
woman to show Jane affection,” and credits her with “prevent[ing] 
Jane from relapsing into mere hysteria or depression” after her 
“fit” in the Red Room (472). What Rich doesn’t acknowledge, 
however, is what Jane admires about Bessie, beyond her 
(changeable) affection. Although she also “had a capricious and 
hasty temper,” Jane remarks that Bessie “must…have been a girl of 
good natural capacity,” as she “was smart in all she did,” and 
“had a remarkable knack for narrative” (24), which Jane, who much 
enjoys reading as a “transient stimulus” (17) from a “life of 
ceaseless reprimand” (16), “judge[d] from the impressions made on 
me by her nursery tales” (24). It is also Bessie who (indirectly) 
                                                 
55 In “The Polemics of Incomprehension: Mother and Daughter in Pride and 
Prejudice,” Jean Ferguson Carr argues that Austen’s representation of 
Mrs. Bennet as the “‘foolish mother’” rejected by her daughter speaks 
to late 18th/19th century conceptions of the mother figure as “always a 
failure, incapable of satisfying incommensurable demands” (81). Carr 
suggests that “mid-nineteenth century advice books” portray the 
mother/daughter relationship, not “as the province of individuals, but 
as requiring considerable institutional support and guidance” (82). 
Reflecting this larger perspective of the mother as “foolish,” women 
writing in the didactic traditions rarely represent themselves as 
mothers, more commonly taking on the roles of relatives or mentors.    
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convinces Jane that she “should indeed like to go to school,” as 
Jane considers “her details of certain accomplishments attained 
by…young ladies:” “She boasted of beautiful paintings of 
landscapes and flowers by them executed; of songs they could sing 
and pieces they could play, or purses they could net, of French 
books they could translate; till my spirit was moved by emulation 
as I listened” (20). While these accomplishments are not 
ultimately what Jane finds most useful in her education at 
Lowood, as a child, Jane is influenced by Bessie’s representation 
of women’s education as an “accomplishment” worthy of 
“emulation,” allowing her to make the decision that sends her on 
her pilgrimage, to make “an entrance into a new life” (20).  
Bessie’s character takes on the role of Evangelist in 
Pilgrims’ Progress as the one who provides Christian with the 
knowledge of how to begin his journey to the Celestial City. Not 
only does Bessie encourage Jane to consider school through her 
descriptions of “young ladies” and their education, but she also 
exemplifies the type of knowledge Jane will require to help her 
succeed at Lowood—a “natural capacity” for learning, and the 
ability to be “smart” in all she does. Jane observes Bessie’s 
approach to her work as she “move[s] hither than thither” (16), 
making note of how she “had now finished dusting and tidying the 
room, and having washed her hands, she opened a certain little 
drawer, full of splendid shreds of silk and satin, and began 
making a new bonnet for Georgiana’s doll” (17). Despite her 
‘inferior’ position as servant, Bessie reveals to Jane the merit 
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of an “allegiance to duty and order,” which Jane ultimately 
acquires (and exercises) as a student and teacher at Lowood (71). 
Bessie not only carries out her duties, but finds ways to make 
them tolerable, as she “sang” in the “meantime,” reflecting the 
“zeal” with which Jane will eventually engage in her own duties 
(71). Occupying a comparable position (both socially and 
economically) to the one Jane later assumes as a teacher and 
governess, Bessie models the type of knowledge that comes in 
handy for such positions—common sense and the ability to approach 
what would typically be conceived as ‘domestic drudgery’ in a 
positive way. Although by no means “above the world, and its 
trifling commotions,” Bessie also exemplifies an important virtue 
of the village schoolmistress in her willingness to make a living 
as her “own mistress.” Jane later remarks, during a visit from 
Bessie at Lowood, that she “she saw a woman attired like a well-
dressed servant, matronly, yet still very young; very good-
looking, with black hair and eyes, and a lively complexion” (76). 
The reference to Bessie’s attractive appearance functions to 
reinforce the idea that, although socially inferior, her 
attention to duty and order has been rewarded. She’s now married 
with children, and no longer living at Gateshead with the Reeds, 
but in “the lodge” with her husband (77). Like the future Jane, 
Bessie has managed to do quite well for herself acting as “her 
own mistress.” In the “passages of love and adventure” that 
Bessie relates to Jane as a girl of ten, Bessie foresees “from 
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the pages of” Samuel Richardson’s epistolary novel Pamela her own 
as well as Jane’s Virtue Rewarded (7).  
Bakhtin’s theory of novelistic discourse provides a way of 
understanding how Jane Eyre’s representations of seemingly 
didactic figures, themes, and strategies are integrated into a 
novelistic framework that engages and entertains (rather than 
merely instructing) readers. For Bakhtin, “the fundamental 
condition, that which makes a novel a novel, that which is 
responsible for its stylistic uniqueness, is the speaking person 
and his discourse” (“Novel” 332). What makes novelistic discourse 
engaging to readers, as its “images” are “born in… [internally 
persuasive] soil,” (“Novel” 348), is a sense that they can 
complete a dialogue that remains “incomplete and unresolved” 
making it “half” theirs and “half—someone else’s” (Bakhtin 345), 
that they can question or apply new word(s) into “new contexts 
that dialogize it” (“Novel” 346). Unlike the explicitly didactic 
figure of Evangelist, as a an “object of verbal artistic 
representation” in the novel (“Novel” 332), Bessie assumes her 
own ideological life; she does not serve merely to transmit the 
author’s didactic message or to represent his “direct, unmediated 
discourse” (“Dostoevsky” 199), but “observes, as it were, a 
certain distance and perspective” as a “characteristic, typical, 
colorful discourse” (“Dostoevsky” 186). Representing Jane’s first 
mother, a woman that Jane “deemed…a treat” to share company with 
(23), Bessie is a “speaking person” who also “acts” in accordance 
with that speech—who represents “a particular way of viewing the 
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world” (“Novel” 332-334), that of the 19th century dutiful 
servant. While Wollstonecraft’s exemplars of reason-based 
education for women (like Bunyan’s allegorical figures) function 
in terms of the larger didactic purpose of the work and are thus 
limited to it (i.e., to teach readers how a virtuous woman 
behaves), Bessie and the other positive female exemplars in Jane 
Eyre embody specific worldviews and thus “strive[] for a social 
significance” beyond the novelistic context (“Novel” 333). These 
are worldviews that the heroine necessarily and readers may 
“struggle” with, but are not imposed upon to accept by the 
“ultimate semantic authority” of “the direct speech of the 
author” (“Dostoevsky” 187).  However, because the objectification 
of a discourse through character (depending on the extent to 
which there is a “merging of the author’s and the other person’s 
voice”) “is subject…to the stylistic tasks of the author’s 
context” (“Dostoevsky” 198, 187), the author encourages readers 
to accept or reject certain worldviews based on the manner in 
which the narrator and/or other characters (as representations of 
other worldviews) react to them. Thus, readers might accept 
Bessie as the exemplification of a smart and dutiful servant 
because Jane admires her. The invitation to do so is a pleasure 
because it is not extended as the “word of the fathers” (“Novel” 
342), but through the perspective of one without privilege, in 
this case an ill-treated ten year old girl, “poor, obscure, 
plain, and little” (216), a worldview with which many might (at 
least in some respect) identify.  
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During Jane’s experience as a student and teacher at 
Lowood, she encounters two other female figures that play a 
significant role in providing her with valuable knowledge that 
prepares her to face “life amidst its perils.”  For Rich, Miss 
Temple and Helen Burns constitute “a moral and intellectual 
force” that “enables Jane to move forward into a wider realm of 
experience” (474) and for Gilbert and Gubar, they are women Jane 
“admires” but whose virtues she cannot emulate (344). Gilbert and 
Gubar describe “angelic Miss Temple…with her marble pallor” as a 
“shrine of ladylike virtues,” and Helen Burns as “Miss Temple’s 
other disciple” who “burn[s] with spiritual passion”—both 
“equally impossible ideal[s] to Jane” (345). However, Miss Temple 
and Helen are more than just ideals to Jane—they exemplify 
various types of spiritual or intellectual postures and attitudes 
she will have to assume throughout her pilgrimage—endurance, wit, 
and, most importantly, resistance to masculine authority.  
In thinking about Jane Eyre’s exemplary female educators as 
appropriations of Bunyan’s everyman characters, it is useful to 
return to their narrative context in Pilgrim’s Progress. 
Prudence, Piety, and Charity offer Christian lodging to help him 
on his journey, but in the larger didactic structure of the text 
they also represent spiritual attitudes that Christian must 
assume in order to successfully complete his quest. Similarly, 
Miss Temple and Helen Burns are not “lost” (Rich’s term) to Jane 
as she moves on to the “center of her pilgrimage;” their positive 
attributes are assimilated into her character, combining to 
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create the independent woman that has what it takes to engage the 
affections of a man of wealth and rank: intelligence, 
spirituality, and a divine ally.  
5.2  CHRISTIANITY RECONCEIVED: THE (RE)BIRTH OF FEMINIST 
INDIVIDUALIST  
Gilbert and Gubar comment on Miss Temple’s resemblance to the 
depictions of ideal womanhood “invented” by  “that indefatigable 
writer of conduct books for Victorian Girls,” Mrs. Sarah Ellis: 
“[S]he dispenses food to the hungry, visits the sick, encourages 
the worthy, and averts her glance from the unworthy” (344). 
Having thus described her, Gilbert and Gubar read her as taking 
on the role of “fairy godmother to Jane” while harboring 
“repressed” “madness and rage,” she becomes “a beautiful set of 
marble columns designed to balance that bad pillar Mr. 
Brocklehurst” (345). However, unlike Mrs. Ellis’s consummately 
middle class do-gooder, Miss Temple is an educator, and 
overwhelmed by the problems and privations that face the pupils 
at Lowood. She does not possess the luxury of going home from 
such benevolent outings like the “listless” and “useless” women 
Ellis recalls to duty in conduct books such as The Women of 
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England, Their Social Duties, and Domestic Habits (1839).56 As a 
wise, benevolent pedagogue, Miss Temple more closely resembles 
the qualities of the village schoolmistress represented in the 
woman as pedagogue tradition; though loving “virtue and truth” 
and “seem[ing] above the world” and “its trifling commotions,” 
she exhibits an air of independence that gives her the courage to 
become her own mistress. Like the village schoolmistress who 
forgoes the ease of fortune to make her own living, Miss Temple 
is apparently a woman of genteel upbringing, occupying a tenuous 
position as ‘her own mistress’ in patriarchal society. Miss 
Temple doesn’t merely “visit” and “encourage” the downtrodden, 
she suffers with them. Jane describes the two mile walk in the 
“bitter winter wind” from church to Lowood, during which Miss 
Temple could be observed “walking lightly and rapidly along our 
drooping line” “encouraging us, by precept and example, to keep 
up our spirits, and march forward, as she said, ‘like stalwart 
soldiers’” (51). When Typhus afflicts more than half of the 
pupils at Lowood, “Miss Temple’s whole attention was absorbed by 
the patients: she lived in the sick-room, never quitting it 
except to snatch a few hours’ rest at night” (65). Miss Temple’s 
                                                 
56 Although Ellis’s emphasis on fulfilling domestic duty ostensibly 
reflects Wollstonecraft’s educational program, they took very different 
approaches to women’s education. While Wollstonecraft consistently 
remarks on the importance of reason and understanding as an essential 
part of women’s cultivation of virtue, Ellis criticized women’s over-
indulgence of “mental faculties,” which she saw as leading to self-
gratification and “listless indifference” to familial obligations. Most 
importantly, however, the 19th century ideology of republican motherhood 
that Ellis promotes advocated that women maintain their proper roles of 
wife and mother, a standard that Miss Temple clearly defies.   
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‘stalwart’ approach to the hardships and privations of Lowood 
Institution anticipates Jane’s own forbearance of what she first 
perceives as “the ignorance, the poverty, the coarseness” of the 
poor girls she teaches in St. John’s village school at Morton 
(306), as well as her arduous journey from Thornfield to Marsh 
End.   
Miss Temple doesn’t “repress” her anger, or merely 
“balance” the “puritanical dicta” of Brocklehurst, she avoids an 
open display of anger that would undoubtedly result in her 
dismissal as superintendent, tactfully subverting his oppressive 
edicts in a more effective way. This is an important lesson for 
Jane, who has not yet learned to temper her passion, to submit 
when acting will only cause her trouble, like getting her locked 
in the Red Room for “fly[ing] at Master John” (9). In response to 
Mr. Brocklehurst’s demands that she “cut off” certain pupils’ 
hair that was too fashionably arranged and that she “tell all the 
first form to rise up and direct their faces to the wall,” Miss 
Temple “passed her handkerchief over her lips, as if to smooth 
away the involuntary smile that curled them,” and “seemed to 
remonstrate” (54). While Miss Temple responds “quietly” when Mr. 
Brocklehurst addresses her, she defies his authority with a 
disguised smile, signaling that she has no intention of actually 
carrying out his ridiculous demands. When Brocklehurst accuses 
Jane of being “a liar!” in front of the entire student body, Miss 
Temple waits until he departs before asking both Jane and Helen 
to her room to discuss the matter, promising Jane that she will 
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be “allowed to speak” in her “own defense” (58-60). Later, she 
“assembled the whole school” and “pronounced [Jane] completely 
cleared from every imputation” (63). Thus, Miss Temple models for 
Jane the fine art of dealing with unrelenting male authority—to 
seem acquiescent or accommodating in his presence while acting 
otherwise once his judgmental gaze is turned elsewhere. This is a 
skill that Jane adopts in dealing with Rochester’s “fury” at her 
decision that she “will not” be his; rather than further 
provoking him by acting out her intentions in his presence, she 
leaves at dawn “without one sound,” and “she opened the door, 
passed out, and shut it softly” (271-273). Similarly, Jane 
escapes St. John’s inscrutable authority (in the form of a 
marriage proposal) by “mount[ing] to my chamber” and “lock[ing] 
myself in” until morning when “I heard the front-door open, and 
St John pass out;” she departs for Thornfield before his return 
home (359). More importantly, however, Miss Temple’s quiet, yet 
effective resistance to Mr. Brocklehurst’s edicts reveals that it 
is acceptable to undermine masculine authority if it does not 
comport with one’s sense of what is right, an understanding which 
ultimately enables Jane to defy that authority when necessary, 
and also helps her to win Rochester’s love. Among other things, 
Rochester admires Jane’s ability to “master me” while at the same 
time “seem[ing] to submit;” he suggests that “I am influenced—
conquered; and the influence is sweeter than I can express” 
(222). Hence, Miss Temple’s ability to subvert masculine 
authority by means of feigned submission to it easily becomes a 
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means of captivating masculine desire in a man who is (at least 
ostensibly) uninterested in exercising his authority, who likes 
to be “conquered” by a woman who “bends but does not break” 
(222).   
The “all-consuming” spiritual figure of Helen Burns, 
dismissed by Gilbert and Gubar as “submit[ting] to the injustices 
of this life” and “do[ing] no more than bear[ing] her fate” in 
service of religious dogma, actually functions to sanction Miss 
Temple’s resistance to masculine authority (346). As an exemplary 
female figure, Helen enacts a feminine appropriation of the 
tyrannical Calvinism of Brocklehurst, as she explicitly suggests 
(regarding a widely-held belief of Heaven): “No; I cannot believe 
that: I hold another creed; which no one ever taught me and which 
I seldom mention; but in which I delight, and to which I cling” 
(italics mine) (49). This is not to say that Helen dispenses with 
conventional doctrine altogether; when Jane asserts that she 
“must resist those who punish me unjustly,” Helen instructs Jane 
that she must “forget [Mrs. Reed’s] severity, together with the 
passionate emotions it excited:” “Read the New Testament, and 
observe what Christ says, and how he acts; make his word your 
rule, and his conduct your example” (48-49). For the first time 
in Jane Eyre, Helen represents the way in which feminine will and 
God’s will might intersect, providing Jane with a spiritual 
identity to which she might “cling” to when faced with adversity. 
Like Wollstonecraft, Brontë incorporates an omnipotent yet 
benevolent New Testament version of God to emphasize the 
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possibility of a direct relationship to God in the absence of 
male influence, representing God as (in Helen’s terms) “my 
father” and “my friend,” as a “universal Parent” on Whose “power” 
one “might rely implicitly” (69).  Helen explicitly posits this 
feminized version of spirituality in opposition to ‘masculine’ 
conceptions, as she explains to Jane “Mr. Brocklehurst is not a 
god: nor is he even a great and admired man” (58) in response to 
Jane’s grief at his public reproach of her. Helen presents a 
feminized version of Christianity that redefines the oppressive 
‘hell and brimstone’ doctrine Mr. Brocklehurst represents, and 
thus a version of female virtue that allows for the fulfillment 
of feminine will sanctioned by her “universal Parent.” 
 Helen’s close relationship to Miss Temple actualizes 
Wollstonecraft’s conception of reason as necessarily tied to (and 
sometimes synonymous with) a relationship to God based on one’s 
own understanding rather than rote repetition of catechism,57 
exemplified in the village schoolmistress’s “dependence on God” 
as “her support.” And the interaction between these two 
characters results in the “rous[ing]” of Helen’s “powers within 
her” which Jane regards with “wonder:” 
They conversed of things I had never heard of: of 
nations and times past; of countries far away: of 
secrets of nature discovered or guessed at: they spoke 
                                                 
57 Wollstonecraft elaborates this argument to varying degrees in A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Original Stories, and The Preface 
to The Female Reader.  
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of books: how many they had read! What stores of 
knowledge they possessed! Then they seemed so familiar 
with French names and French authors: but my amazement 
reached its climax when Miss Temple asked Helen if she 
sometimes snatched a moment to recall the Latin her 
father had taught her, and taking a book from a shelf, 
bade her read and construe a page of ‘Virgil’; and 
Helen obeyed, my organ of Veneration expanding at 
every sounding line. (62) 
This marriage of Miss Temple’s intellect and “refined propriety” 
of “language” and Helen’s spiritual intensity produces a method 
of converse that reflects the woman that Jane will become—smart 
and interesting, with a capacity to traverse subjects generally 
engaged only by men, such as history and ancient language and 
literature. Miss Temple might be read as a church where outcasts 
such as Helen might come to worship, as an affirmation of the 
“meaning” “movement” and “radiance” of the feminized spirituality 
with which Helen burns. Jane’s recognition of this experience as 
bordering on the divine, as she “was struck with wonder,” 
“amazement,” and “Veneration” parallels representations of 
Christian rebirth and regeneration through Christ. Here, in the 
presence of a newly conceived God and her Church, is where Jane 
Eyre—the mad cat and ill-used victim of Gateshead—is reborn as 
feminist individualist. Advised by Helen to trust God as her 
“friend” and use Christ’s “conduct” as her “example,” Jane no 
longer experiences the passionate rage she so often exhibited at 
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Gateshead—it has now been tempered by reason, and later she 
recalls that, by Miss Temple’s example, “better regulated 
feelings had become the inmates of my mind” (71). Having access 
to a form of Christianity that authorizes the female as subject, 
Jane might venture into the “wide” world with faith in His 
Providential guidance and care. 
Not only does Jane’s “amazement” at Miss Temple and Helen’s 
mode of converse along with her exoneration from Brocklehurst’s 
accusation incite her to a more pronounced interest in academic 
achievement, but it also sets her on the path to becoming 
Rochester’s “good and intelligent woman”(264)—a paradigm of 
reason and independence that is the “antipode” of Bertha Mason. 
Rochester emphasizes with great clarity that he admires Jane’s 
panache for conversation, her “eloquent tongue” that can address 
subjects ranging from painting to ancient myths to the Bible, or, 
as he later relates “when addressed you lifted a keen, a daring, 
and a glowing eye to your interlocutor’s face: there was 
penetration and power in each glance you gave; when plied by 
close questions, you found ready and round answers” (222, 267). 
Reflecting the “power” and adeptness with which Helen converses 
with Miss Temple, Jane’s intelligence, combined with her ability 
to defy masculine expectation, make her the kind of woman that 
Rochester might regard as “my equal” and “my likeness” (217). 
Rochester also admires the fact that she is a woman of 
“character” to whom he can be “ever tender and true”—a woman who 
is not defined by “flatness, triviality…imbecility, coarseness, 
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and ill-temper,” but has, like Helen Burns, a “soul made of fire” 
(222).  
As discursive representations of two socially significant 
19th century figures—the undervalued schoolteacher and the 
pathetic orphan, Miss Temple and Helen Burns function as 
identifiable characters in novelistic discourse, not as didactic 
tools. Yet Jane learns from them, and therefore invites readers 
to as well. Like the inevitable separation of Christian from his 
saintly guides, Miss Temple’s departure from Lowood spurs Jane 
onward into the next phase of her journey, since “with her was 
gone every settled feeling, every association that had made 
Lowood in some degree a home to me” (71). Like Mrs. Mason’s 
pupils in Original Stories, Jane must show the women who taught 
her to exercise feminine virtue that she can “observe [their] 
precepts” despite the circumstances that await her 
(Wollstonecraft 450). Armed with the capacity for intelligent 
conversation and a Providential ally, Jane is ready to face “life 





5.3  BLANCHE AND BERTHA AS ‘THE BAD GIRLS:’ BAD TEMPER AND 
MADNESS AS  (MIS)BEHAVIOR IN JANE EYRE 
Like Original Stories, Jane Eyre establishes negative female 
exemplars meant to represent the system of female education 
elaborated by writers such as Rousseau and Dr. John Gregory, 
which recognizes women as having different mental and spiritual 
faculties than men and therefore different educational regimens. 
In Jane Eyre, these exemplars simultaneously challenge and 
reinforce the value of what Jane has learned from Miss Temple and 
Helen Burns. They test her willingness to adhere to feminist 
principles of reason and spirituality, threatening to keep her 
from the path of God’s will. Providentially for Jane, in the 
words of Helen Burns, “the sovereign hand that created your 
frame, and put life into it, has provided you with other 
resources than your feeble self” (59).   
More profoundly than other female didactic writers of the 
18th century, Mary Wollstonecraft elaborated the problems inherent 
in current methods of women’s education. Based on the assertion 
that women, as the weaker sex, should cultivate different virtues 
than men, Rousseau’s regimen was devised essentially to make them 
“pleasing,” exercising neither mental nor moral capacities. For 
Wollstonecraft, women educated according to this system were 
puerile, vain, competitive, and incapable of thinking beyond the 
petty demands of dressing and adorning themselves. Dr. John 
Gregory’s A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters (1774) translated 
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Rousseau’s educational philosophy regarding women into practice, 
encouraging young women to hide their intellect and devote their 
time obtaining ‘feminine appropriate’ accomplishments in the 
interests of attracting a suitable husband. Legacy was frequently 
reprinted during the romantic period, with a new edition as late 
as 1839, remaining “available through much of the nineteenth 
century [and] still advertised c. 1860” (St. Clair 275, 604). 
However, having worked as a governess, Brontë need not have read 
Rousseau or Gregory to know the effects of this type of 
education, which emphasized “cunning, softness of temper, outward 
obedience, and a scrupulous attention to a puerile kind of 
propriety” (Wollstonecraft, Vindication 19). She writes the 
following to a friend regarding her experience as a governess to 
the wealthy Sidgwick family:  
I soon found that the constant demand on my stock of 
animal spirits reduced them to the lowest state of 
exhaustion—at times I felt and I suppose seemed 
depressed—to my astonishment I was taken to task on 
the subject by Mrs. Sidgwick with a sternness of 
manner & a harshness of language scarcely 
credible...Mrs. Sidgwick is generally considered an 
agreeable woman...but O Ellen does this compensate for 
the absence of every fine feeling of every gentle—and 
delicate sentiment?...I have never had five minutes 
conversation with her since I came—except while she 
was scolding me.” (Dunn 434) 
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Brontë’s description of Mrs. Sidgwick resonates with 
Wollstonecraft’s various representations of Sophy in Original 
Stories, emphasizing the selfish and even tyrannical nature of 
women who have been taught only a “smattering of accomplishments” 
for the purposes of pleasing men. Like Original Stories, Jane 
Eyre demonstrates what happens when ‘bad girls’ grow up, and how 
their ‘naughty’ childish attitudes and behaviors translate into 
self-destructive or even dangerous ones in adulthood. As a child 
at Gateshead, Jane is consumed by questions surrounding ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ behavior, as she wonders why the Reed children seem to 
‘get away with’ problematic behaviors such as selfishness, 
“spoiled temper” and even cruelty to animals while she “strove to 
fulfil every duty; and…was termed naughty and tiresome, sullen 
and sneaking, from morning to noon, and from noon to night” (12). 
The bad behavior of the Reed children manifests itself in their 
characters in adulthood; the dissolute John Reed gambles away the 
family fortune and eventually commits suicide, and Eliza and 
Georgiana represent the extremes of “judgment” and “feeling:” 
Eliza is “intolerably acrid” and Georgiana is vain and given to 
bouts of self-indulgent emotion (202). Jane Eyre invites readers 
to see representations of poor female education as ‘negative’ 
examples by demonstrating the consequences of those behaviors;  
like the Reed children, these exemplars hinder Jane’s progress by 
testing her—making her journey more difficult. However, 
functioning as the alternatives to Jane’s capacity for reason and 
spiritual fortitude, these negative exemplars ultimately allow 
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her to achieve the feminist individualist dream by making the 
“poor, obscure, plain, and little” seem ideal. 
Jane Eyre offers a varied and complex portrait of poor 
female education that manifests itself in a wide range of 
characters such as her Aunt Reed (who closely resembles Mrs. 
Sidgwick), her stepsisters Eliza and Georgiana, her pupil at 
Gateshead, Adèle, and the “exquisite” Miss Rosamond Oliver who 
visits her at the village school. However, Jane learns the most 
from the two women that threaten to keep her from fulfilling 
God’s providential design for her life—marriage to Mr. Rochester. 
Just as Jane is beginning to believe that Rochester might 
“approve” her (133), she finds that he has gone on a “journey” to 
visit Mr. Eshton, where “quite a party” is “assembled,” including 
the “the queen” of beauty Blanche Ingram (134-135). Thus, Jane’s 
first encounter with Blanche Ingram is through the description of 
Mrs. Fairfax: 
Yes, I saw her…Tall, fine bust, sloping shoulders, 
long, graceful neck; olive complexion, dark and clear; 
noble features; eyes rather like Mr. Rochester’s, 
large and black, and as brilliant as her jewels. And 
then she had such a fine head of hair, raven-black, 
and so becomingly arranged; a crown of thick plaits 
behind, and in front the longest, the glossiest curls 
I ever saw. (135) 
Not only is Blanche beautiful according to contemporary 
standards, with features comparable to the “noble” and “graceful” 
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stature of a “Grecian” goddess, but, as Mrs. Fairfax relates, she 
is also “admired” “for her accomplishments,” which, Jane later 
learns, consist of conversing on “botany,” playing the piano, 
singing, and speaking French (135, 147). The image of Miss Ingram 
undermines the possibility of a relationship between Jane and Mr. 
Rochester, and Jane chastises herself for her naiveté and 
attempts to recall herself to “common sense” by sketching out 
their portraits. She relates how she will generate the 
“impressions I wished to stamp indelibly on my heart:”  
Listen, then, Jane Eyre, to your sentence: to-morrow, 
place the glass before you, and draw in chalk your own 
picture, faithfully; without softening one 
defect…write under it, ‘Portrait of a Governess, 
disconnected, poor, and plain.’ Afterwards, take a 
piece of smooth ivory—you have one prepared in your 
drawing-box: take your palette…delineate carefully the 
loveliest face you can imagine…call it ‘Blanche, an 
accomplished lady of rank.’ (137) 
Jane’s comparison of her “plain” features to the beauty of 
Blanche Ingram establishes the two women as rivals for 
Rochester’s affection, and also gestures towards Jane Eyre’s 
larger commentary on the differences between women educated by 
exemplary, virtuous women, and those educated to please men. As 
Jane learns, although seemingly ‘perfect’ in every way, 
underneath the ivory surface of the Grecian Goddess lies a 
selfish and undeniably bad temper. Jane observes that Miss 
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Ingram’s approach to conversation with Mrs. Dent “was decidedly 
not good natured” (147) and, when Mr. Eshton asks if Jane might 
take part in the game of charades, Blanche rudely asserts that 
“she looks too stupid for any game of that sort” (155). Not only 
is she ill-natured towards other women, but even shows “spiteful 
antipathy” (158) towards little Adèle, remarking to Rochester 
that “You should have sent her to school” (150), later calling 
her a “tiresome monkey” (161) when she incorrectly suggests that 
Rochester has returned from Millcote. While Rochester is away, 
Blanche exposes her lack of consideration for others, as well as 
the limits of her intellectual endeavors, as she “repel[s], by 
supercilious taciturnity, some efforts of Mrs. Dent and Mrs. 
Eshton to draw her in to conversation…[and] flung herself in 
haughty listlessness on a sofa, and prepared to beguile, by the 
spell of fiction, the tedious hours of [his] absence” (161). She 
takes an attitude with her mother, who suggests she “cannot 
possibly” allow the fortune teller in: “Indeed, mamma, but you 
can—and will…I must have my will” (164). When the footman doesn’t 
usher the fortune teller in quickly enough, she exclaims “Cease 
that chatter, blockhead! and do my bidding” (164).  
In her unrelenting insistence that she have her own way, 
Blanche resembles Wollstonecraft’s Jane Fretful, who was “so 
accustomed…to see everything give way to her humour, that she 
imagined the world was only made for her…she was very unhappy, 
but did not try to conquer her temper” (381). Like Wollstonecraft 
in Original Stories, Brontë demonstrates how Blanche’s bad temper 
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has resulted from poor education, much in the same way that 
Jane’s develops from the fact that she was not “contradicted on 
any occasion” (381). Blanche’s discussion of her educational 
experience simultaneously reveals the extent of her ill-nature 
(she knows Jane is in the room, sitting by the window) as well as 
the behavior from which it developed:   
I have just one word to say of the whole tribe [of 
governesses]; they are a nuisance. Not that I ever 
suffered much from them; I took care to turn the 
tables. What tricks Theodore and I used to play on our 
Miss Wilsons, and Mrs. Greys, and Madame 
Juoberts!...The best fun was with Madame Joubert. Miss 
Wilson was a poor and sickly thing, lachrymose and 
low-spirited: not worth the trouble of vanquishing, in 
short; and Mrs. Grey was coarse and insensible: no 
blow took effect on her. But poor Madame Joubert! I 
see her yet in her raging passions, when we had driven 
her to extremities—spilt our tea, crumbled our bread 
and butter, tossed our books up to the ceiling, and 
played a charivari with the ruler and desk, the fender 
and fire-irons. (151) 
Miss Ingram’s pleasurable reflection on the “tricks” she and her 
brother used to play on their incompetent governesses not only 
reflects poorly on her character, but also indicates that Miss 
Ingram did not have the benefit of a Miss Temple to emulate. One 
governess was “poor and sickly,” the other “coarse and 
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insensible,” and, worst of all, Madame Joubert went into “raging 
passions” when confronted with childish impudence. Her bad 
behavior unchecked and reinforced by poor example, Miss Ingram 
has grown into a woman who, although beautiful and refined, is 
“coarse and insensible,” demanding to have her “passions” 
indulged at her whim, and ultimately one that Rochester finds 
“not worth the trouble of vanquishing.” Although Blanche has 
acquired little from her governesses, she exemplifies Rousseau’s 
ideal type of education for women, as she has “has only been 
taught to please,” using the art of cunning in order to secure 
Rochester as a husband (Vindication 27). Jane observes Blanche’s 
posture, having “seated herself with proud grace at the piano…She 
appeared to be on her high-horse to-night; both her words and her 
air seemed intended to excite not only the admiration, but the 
amazement of her auditors” (153): 
‘Oh, I am so sick of the young men of the present 
day!’ exclaimed she, rattling away the instrument. 
‘Poor puny things not fit to stir a step beyond papa’s 
park gates: nor to even go so far without mamma’s 
permission and guardianship! Creatures so absorbed in 
care about their pretty faces and their white hands, 
and their small feet; as if a man had anything to do 
with beauty! As if loveliness were not the special 
prerogative of woman—her legitimate appanage and 
heritage! I grant an ugly woman is a blot on the fair 
face of creation; but as to the gentlemen, let them be 
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solicitous to possess only strength and valor: let 
their motto be—Hunt, shoot, and fight; the rest is not 
worth a fillip.’ (153) 
By suggesting that beauty is “the special prerogative of woman” 
and that men should “possess only strength and valor,” Blanche 
recalls Rousseau’s idea that women are “naturally weak” and “must 
have the skill to incline us to do every thing which her sex will 
not enable her to do herself” (349-350), such as hunting, 
shooting, and fighting. In so doing, she emphasizes her 
femininity and advertises her need for a man to ‘protect’ her. 
More importantly, however, she exercises cunning by emasculating 
men who indulge in their appearance in an attempt to flatter Mr. 
Rochester, who, as Jane indicates, is “athletic,” but not 
handsome.  
Yet, like Wollstonecraft’s various representations of 
Rousseau’s Sophy in Original Stories, Blanche Ingram is thwarted 
in her efforts to obtain happiness (in the form of a marriage 
proposal) through cunning and bad temper. As Jane relates, “Miss 
Ingram was a mark beneath jealousy: she was too inferior to 
excite the feeling” (158), since she did not exhibit any of 
Jane’s own qualities of intellect or spirituality. Like a true 
rival, Jane lists her “defects,” suggesting that “her mind was 
poor, her heart barren by nature…She was not good; she was not 
original…she did not know the sensations of sympathy and pity; 
tenderness and truth were not in her…Other eyes besides mine 
watched these manifestations of character—watched them closely, 
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keenly, shrewdly” (158). Never taught to develop her reason, 
Blanche does not have anything “original” to say, but merely 
“repeat[s] sounding phrases from books” to appear interesting. 
Unable to restrain her passion, she fails to exercise “goodness” 
or “sympathy and pity,” since she cannot see past her own wants 
and desires to take another’s feelings into consideration. So 
self-absorbed that she treats a child with “coldness and 
acrimony,” Blanche Ingram exhibits none of the qualities of Miss 
Temple and Helen Burns; she exercises neither reason nor 
Christian goodness. Jane’s recognition of Blanche’s faults 
functions to reinforce the importance of what she has learned 
from her female exemplars at Lowood, and Rochester’s seeming 
affirmation of her assessment reveals that educations designed to 
please men inevitably fail when those men are looking for “a good 
and intelligent woman” (264): “I felt he had not given her his 
love, and that her qualifications were ill adapted to win from 
him that treasure…she could not charm him” (159). Despite her 
“meretricious arts and calculated manoeuvres,” Jane suggests that 
Blanche’s “pride and self-complacency repelled further and 
further what she wished to allure” (159). Rochester’s “clear 
consciousness of his fair one’s defects” and his “obvious absence 
of passion in his sentiments towards her” (158) allows Jane to 
feel good about who she is, as she remarks “when she failed, I 
saw how she might have succeeded. Arrows that continually glanced 
off Mr. Rochester’s breast…might, I knew, if shot by a surer 
hand...have called love into his stern eye” (159). Thus, by 
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failing to win Rochester’s love, Blanche functions to reinforce 
the importance of reason-based education for women, since she 
cannot “charm” Rochester with all of the accomplishments she has 
mastered. Blanche’s inability to “fascinat[e] Mr. Rochester” also 
affirms Jane’s sense of identity as a woman of faith and 
intellect, as she has the power to “charm” him without the aid of 
either rank or beauty.   
Jane’s “scorn” for Rochester’s “project of marrying for 
interest and connexions” to a woman “inferior to you…with whom 
you have no sympathy” finally incites Jane to verbalize and 
affirm her own identity: “Do you think because I am poor, 
obscure, plain, and little, I am soulless and heartless? You 
think wrong!—I have as much soul as you,—and full as much heart! 
And if God had gifted me with some beauty and much wealth, I 
should have made it as hard for you to leave me, as it is now for 
me to leave you….it is my spirit that addresses your spirit; just 
as if both had passed through the grave, and we stood at God’s 
feet, equal, —as we are!” (216). This moment of self-assertion 
and self-affirmation is followed by Rochester’s proposal, which 
he later attributes to her acknowledgment of her status as his 
equal, suggesting that “it was you who made me the offer” (224). 
Having experienced a complete recognition of who she is—a woman 
whose “spirit” renders her equal even to a man of rank like Mr. 
Rochester—‘bad-tempered’ Blanche, she finds, is no longer a 
candidate for Rochester’s affections. Rochester explains that 
“she…deserted me: the idea of my insolvency cooled, or rather 
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extinguished, her flame in a moment” (224). Although Jane makes 
some inquiry into why Rochester took “such pains to make me 
believe you wished to marry Miss Ingram,” and as to whether “Miss 
Ingram will…suffer from your dishonest coquetry,” she quickly 
disregards the fact that Rochester insensitively used Miss Ingram 
to rouse her jealousy. Reassured by Rochester’s insistence that 
“there is not another being in the world has the same pure love 
for me as yourself,” Jane seems to accept Blanche’s bad behavior 
as license to overlook how Rochester has treated this bad-
tempered woman, failing to consider the import of his bad 
behavior, though—as a woman of sympathy—she appropriately calls 
it “a burning shame” and “a scandalous disgrace” (224). While 
Jane could have used Rochester’s ill-treatment of Blanche as an 
opportunity to question his earlier moments of deception, 
Rochester’s suggestion that Blanche’s “pride” required “humbling” 
excuses his “dishonest coquetry.” Thus, Blanche’s bad behavior 
serves to camouflage Rochester’s complicity in this “feigned 
courtship,” allowing Jane to have what she desires—to continue to 
love him “very much” despite his “eccentric” “principles” (224). 
Having served her purpose in allowing Jane to affirm her own 
identity, Blanche is written out of the story; she is dehumanized 
as “inferior,” unlovable—an object of Rochester’s “sneer[s]” and 
(indirectly) Jane’s “scorn” (216)  
Blanche’s inability to ‘please’ Rochester with her feminine 
“allure,” “manufacture[d] airs,” and flattery serves as a useful 
counter-example to Jane as she engages in courtship with 
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Rochester. Jane Eyre reveals that the cause of poor female 
education lies in the confused and debauched patriarchal psyche, 
which, exemplified in Rochester, unconsciously objectifies women 
as “dolls” to be “dressed,” encouraging them to be submissive and 
pleasing despite his desire for a woman of strong mind and 
fortitude. No sooner has Jane agreed to marry Rochester than he 
begins to treat her like a Blanche Ingram, flattering her 
“beauty,” uttering ‘sweet nothings’ in regards to her “brow,” her 
“fine wrists,” and “fairy-like fingers,” with which he wishes to 
adorn with “jewels,” “bracelets,” and “rings” (220-221). He 
suggests that “I will attire my Jane in satin and lace, and she 
shall have roses in her hair; and I will cover the head I love 
best with a priceless veil” (221). Although Rochester has just 
professed his admiration for “the soul made of fire, and the 
character that bends but does not break,” dismissing “women who 
please me only by their faces” and exhibit “flatness, triviality, 
…coarseness, and ill-temper,” he demonstrates that he only knows 
how to treat Jane as if she were a Blanche Ingram, threatening, 
in turn, her sense of self.  
Jane reminds Rochester that she has no intention of playing 
the role of his “beauty” or “angel” suggesting that “I will be 
myself…you must neither expect nor exact anything celestial of 
me—for you will not get it, any more than I shall get it of you: 
which I do not at all anticipate” (221). Knowing what happens to 
women who attempt to charm Rochester “by their faces” (222), Jane 
reminds him of the “diamonds” and “cashmeres” he gave a French 
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“opera-dancer” who seduced him with feigned “ardour” (120), much 
in the way that Blanche Ingram tried to flatter him by 
downplaying the importance of masculine beauty. Determined not to 
become ‘that woman,’ Jane essays to retain her own identity, 
asserting that she “will not be your English Céline Varens. I 
shall continue to act as Adèle’s governess; by that I shall earn 
my board and lodging, and thirty pounds a year besides. I’ll 
furnish my own wardrobe out of that money” (230). Throughout 
their engagement, Jane avoids “sink[ing] into a bathos of 
sentiment,” opting instead to “thwart” and “afflict” him, as she 
is aware that “a lamb-like submission and turtle-dove 
sensibility, while fostering his despotism more, would have 
pleased his judgment, satisfied his common-sense, and even suited 
his taste, less (233-234). By refusing to become a Blanche 
Ingram, Jane simultaneously re-asserts her selfhood as a woman of 
“character” with a “soul made of fire” and ensures that she will 
retain Rochester’s affections. Had she given in with “lamb-like 
submission,” to please Rochester, she would have transformed into 
exactly what he despises in women. Recognizing that the 
patriarchal psyche is incapable of understanding how to exact 
from women that which will “suit his taste,” Jane must adapt 
herself to this flaw—making sure that she maintains her own 
identity despite Rochester’s insistence that she submit to his 
desires. Thus, Blanche Ingram serves as a valuable exemplar for 
Jane, alerting her to the dangers of being too eager to please 
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and submit to Rochester, though, as Jane suggests, she “would 
rather have pleased than teased him” (234).  
 The representation of Jane’s educational “antipode” as 
expendable sanctions a feminism that seeks to eradicate—not the  
root cause of poor female education exemplified in Rochester—but 
the women who suffer from licentious and self-destructive 
principles. As she is representative of an unpopular worldview 
(the ‘upper-class snob’) and Jane’s rival for Rochester’s 
affections, Jane Eyre invites readers to dismiss Blanche as 
quickly as Jane and Rochester dismiss her. Jane Eyre’s 
representation of Blanche Ingram as a woman who might be 
“scorned” and “sneered” at in the interests of Jane’s happiness 
gestures towards the troubling effects of feminist individualism, 
as it necessitates the sacrifice of other women so that the 
heroine might have her will. Unlike Wollstonecraft’s negative 
exemplars and Austen’s “other women,” Brontë’s ‘bad girl’ is 
neither pitied nor given the opportunity to reconcile with those 
she offends.  
The problematic nature of this feminist perspective is more 
fully realized with the introduction of Rochester’s ‘mad’ wife 
Bertha, as it is revealed that Providence regards these women as 
expendable as well, conveniently disposing of Jane’s rival so 
that she and Rochester might experience happiness in marriage 
(385). Rich, Gilbert and Gubar imagine Bertha as an extension of 
Jane’s character; for Rich, Bertha is Jane’s “alter ego” that 
“her instinct for self-preservation…must save her from becoming”  
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(475-476), and for Gilbert and Gubar, Bertha functions as Jane’s 
“dark double” who, “manifests” herself in response to Jane’s 
repressed “anger” (360-361).  However, like Blanche, Bertha might 
also be read as Jane’s “antipode” (Rich 474-475) and an exemplar 
of the problems inherent in educating women to please men. Her 
representation as a “savage,” animalistic being (242) resonates 
with a 19th century infatuation the exotic native “other,” and 
Rochester’s description of her prior to her supposed turn to 
madness speaks to suspicions regarding Creole women’s mixed 
racial ancestry and propensity for emotional excess.58 Culturally 
and racially defined by 19th century imperial ideology as one who 
is unable to exercise reason, Bertha exemplifies the most extreme 
effects of poor female education.  Rochester emphasizes that it 
is not “because [Bertha] is mad I hate her” (257), instead 
explaining how he “repressed the deep antipathy [he] felt” for 
the fact that “her cast of mind [was] common, low, narrow, and 
singularly incapable of being led to anything higher…whatever 
topic I started immediately received from her a turn at once 
coarse and trite, perverse and imbecile…no servant would bear the 
continued outbreaks of her violent and unreasonable temper, or 
the vexations of her absurd, contradictory, and exacting orders” 
                                                 
58 In Wide Sargasso Sea (1966), Jean Rhys’s rewrite of Jane Eyre, her 
representation of Antoinette comments on and critiques the widely-held 
belief that Creole women were given to uncontrollable emotional 
outbursts and sexual excessiveness. Although there is much debate in 
postcolonial criticism regarding Bertha’s race (in WSS she is a White 
Creole), Rochester’s character in WSS reveals the general suspicion 
surrounding the racial purity of Creoles claiming to be of English or 
European descent.  
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(261). The daughter of a wealthy “West India planter,” Bertha 
seems to have experienced the same type of education as Blanche, 
as “she flattered [Rochester], and lavishly displayed for my 
pleasure her charms and accomplishments” (260). Described as 
having once been “a fine woman, in the style of Blanche Ingram” 
(260), Bertha also recalls Blanche’s “poor” mind and lack of 
originality in conversation as well as her “coarseness” and bad 
temper, demonstrating an inability to control her passion with 
reason. Rochester’s recognition of her “pigmy intellect” and 
“giant propensities” as evolving into the “excesses [that] 
developed the germs of insanity” recalls Original Stories’ 
representation of the effects of passion unrestrained by reason, 
consisting of extreme forms of bad behavior, such as incessant 
wailing and even physical violence. For Wollstonecraft, Fielding, 
and other “rational moralists” writing for children in the 18th 
century (Ward 33), reason was the only way to overcome passion, 
which could easily “take[] root in the infant mind” 
(Wollstonecraft, Original 359). Fits of passion led to behavior 
such as the following, exemplified in Original Stories’ Jane 
Fretful:  
When she was an infant, if she fell down, her nurse 
made her beat the floor…and when she was angry would 
kick the chairs and tables, or any senseless piece of 
furniture…For some time she…really felt something like 
an affection for [“a pretty little dog”]: but one day 
it happened to snatch a cake she was going to eat…she 
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flew into a violent passion, and threw a stool at the 
poor creature…it received so severe a blow…the poor 
wretch languished two days, suffering the most 
excruciating torture. (381) 
Fielding’s representation of Sukey Jennett shows how such 
behavior may result in violence against other human beings as 
well:  
I had a little Play-fellow, in a Child of one of my 
Papa’s Servants, who was to be intirely under my 
Command. This Girl I used to abuse and beat, whenever 
I was out of Humour; and when I had abused her, if she 
dared to grumble, or make the least Complaint, I 
thought it the greatest Impudence in the World; and, 
instead of mending my Behaviour to her, I grew very 
angry that she should dare to dispute my Power. (88) 
The descriptions of Jane Fretful and Sukey Jennett reveal that 
effects of poor education could easily be confused with (or 
recognized as) madness, as these (mis)behaviors resemble Bertha’s 
“curses,” her “wolfish cries,” and her demonic “gambols” as well 
as her attempts to inflict bodily harm on both Richard Mason and 
Rochester (251, 262). Recalling the tyrannical behavior that 
Wollstonecraft ascribes to women lacking reason in Vindication, 
Bertha resembles an “irrational monster” that in “practicing or 
fostering vice” ultimately becomes a “capricious tyrant” (45). 
Rochester’s accusation that Bertha was “intemperate and unchaste” 
also reflects Wollstonecraft’s understanding of poor female 
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education as leading to licentious behavior, since women only 
taught to please would necessarily try to please other men when 
“her charms” no longer “have much effect on her husbands heart” 
(27).  
The idea of Bertha as exemplary of poor female education is 
reinforced by Rochester’s stereotypical representation of the 
racial/cultural “other” as incapable of rational thought; he 
suggests that, in searching for a woman like Jane, he was looking 
“for the antipodes of the Creole” in “a good and intelligent 
woman” (264-265). Like Blanche, Bertha serves to affirm Jane’s 
identity as a woman of reason and spirituality—one who is “a 
contrast to the fury I left at Thornfield” (264). Thus, Bertha’s 
dehumanization as a madwoman and a “beast” is a necessary 
prerequisite to the realization of Jane’s feminist dream, since 
it was Bertha’s “pigmy intellect” and “excesses” that led 
Rochester to seek her opposite. Her “mental defects,” like 
Blanche’s pride and bad-temper, also serve to overshadow 
Rochester’s complicity in marrying a woman out of lust, that he 
“never loved” and “never esteemed,” inciting Jane to “pity” him 
and excuse his “mental defects,” his inability to restrain his 
passion and act according to reason (261). In the same moment 
that Jane excuses his faults, however, Rochester—as a self-
destructive purveyor of patriarchal power—unwittingly attempts to 
seduce her into the same sort of relationship that undermined his 
happiness with Bertha. Like Blanche, Bertha serves as an example 
to Jane—one that prevents her from submitting to another of 
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Rochester’s desires that threatens to jeopardize her sense of 
identity as well as his love for her.  
By insisting that Jane unlawfully “be Mrs. Rochester—both 
virtually and nominally” and, in essence, become his “mistress,” 
Rochester asks Jane to become exactly what he despised in Bertha—
“intemperate and unchaste” (261). Listening to his tales of 
mistresses that failed to retain his affections, all of which 
shared one or more of Bertha’s defects—“violen[ce],” 
mindless[ness],” “not one whit to my taste” (266), Jane 
acknowledges to herself: “if I were so far to forget myself and 
all the teaching that had ever been instilled to me…to become the 
successor of these poor girls, he would one day regard me with 
the same feeling which now in his mind desecrated [his former 
mistress’s] memory” (266). The “teaching” to which Jane refers is 
what she learned from Miss Temple and Helen Burns—to resist 
masculine demands when they don’t comport with the principles of 
feminine virtue and rationality. Despite Rochester’s insistence 
that she acquiesce to his desires, Jane acknowledges that by 
doing so, she would become just like Bertha. In response to his 
convincing suggestion that “you have neither relatives nor 
acquaintances whom you need fear to offend by living with me” 
(270), Jane asserts: 
I care for myself. The more solitary, the more 
friendless, the more unsustained I am, the more I will 
respect myself. I will keep the law given by God; 
sanctioned by man. I will hold to the principles 
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received by me when I was sane, and not mad—as I am 
now…They have a worth—so I have always believed; and 
if I cannot believe it now, it is because I am insane—
quite insane: with my veins running fire, and my heart 
beating faster than I can count its throbs. 
Preconceived opinions, foregone determinations, are 
all I have at this hour to stand by” (271).  
Reinforcing the idea of madness as passion unrestrained by 
reason, Jane suggests that Rochester’s emotional harangue has 
taken its toll on her ability to exercise her judgment, inciting 
in her the same “mental defects” that plague his debauched wife 
(262). Aware that by submitting to him, she risks defying “the 
law given by God” and therefore her identity, Jane insists that 
she will adhere to her “principles” and “foregone determinations” 
adamantly stating “there I plant my foot” (271). Once again, in 
an effort to gratify his desire, Rochester blindly and self-
destructively attempts to transform the woman he loves into one 
he will ultimately despise. Knowing that giving in to 
unrestrained passion will make her “insane” like the madwoman in 
the third story—through Bertha’s example—Jane avoids her fate.  
  Like Blanche, Bertha is conveniently ‘written out’ of the 
story once the other achievements of Jane’s pilgrimage have come 
to fruition (i.e., her discovery of her cousins at Moor House, 
her acquisition of an inheritance). Jane’s moment of concern for 
Bertha (her reference to her as “that unfortunate lady” who 
“cannot help being mad”) quickly subsides as Rochester’s story of 
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Bertha’s “pigmy intellect” and “giant propensities” unfolds.  
Acting as Jane’s spiritual ally and “friend,” Providence seems to 
reinforce the easy dismissal of “that unfortunate lady.” An 
“entreat[y]” to “Heaven” prompts Jane’s supernatural experience 
in which she hears Rochester calling her, signaling Bertha’s 
death and Rochester’s freedom to marry (357-358), the same night 
in which she overcomes St. John’s authority, “penetrat[ing] very 
near a Mighty Spirit” (358). Jane Eyre’s discursive 
representation of Bertha allows for and anticipates her 
sacrifice, as, like most 19th century representations of the 
native “other,” she is completely denied speech (she “snatches” 
and “growls”) and therefore a worldview with which readers might 
identify or sympathize. With one inferior woman scorned and the 
other dead, Jane Eyre can complete her pilgrimage, becoming the 
wife of Mr. Rochester—bereft of a hand, his sight, and, thanks to 









5.4  THE OTHER WOMAN AS SACRIFICE: IS FEMINISM “A GOOD 
THING FOR WOMEN?” 
In “The Madwoman and her Languages,” Nina Baym writes  
The creature [Bertha Mason] is wholly hateful, 
and no wonder: She has stolen Jane’s man. Jane’s rage 
against Rochester, one might say, is deflected to what 
a feminist might well see as an innocent victim. The 
woman rather than the man becomes her adversary; that 
woman’s death is necessary for Jane’s liberation and 
Rochester’s blinding. How then, do Gilbert and Gubar 
“read” a woman’s death as a good thing for women? It 
seems to me that they have been so far convinced by 
Brontë’s rhetoric as not to see Bertha as a woman.   
Baym’s questioning of Gilbert and Gubar’s overlooking of Bertha’s 
death signals a problem in Jane Eyre’s construction of feminist 
ideology as well as the feminist ideology we adhere to today. 
Rather than using the examples of Blanche and Bertha to call 
Rochester’s manipulation of women into question, Jane allows them 
to suffer and absorb the effects of his confused patriarchal 
psyche, avoiding those effects herself in an effort to maintain 
his affection. Instead of acknowledging men like Rochester as 
perpetuating the type of education that devalues and degrades 
women, Jane rebukes the women themselves as products of that 
education, seeing them as objects of licentiousness and 
mindlessness that seduce and lead Rochester astray.  
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Reading Jane’s only encounter with Bertha Mason—the night 
she enters her room and “her lurid visage flamed over mine”—there 
is a brief moment in which the text seems to allow for another 
possibility for Jane’s future. Jane relates the story of that 
frightful “vision:” “…presently she took my veil from its place; 
she held it up, gazed at it long, and then she threw it over her 
own head, and turned to the mirror…it removed my veil from its 
gaunt head, rent it into two parts, and flinging both on the 
floor, trampled on them” (242). On the other two occasions that 
Bertha escapes from the attic, she lashes out violently at 
Rochester and Richard Mason, but she “retreated” from Jane’s room 
without harming her. Perhaps Bertha hopes to warn Jane to avoid 
marriage to Rochester, signaled by her tearing of the veil, and 
then “glar[ing] upon me.”  Had Jane Eyre presented Bertha’s 
perspective at this point, allowed her to speak, perhaps Jane 
would have discovered truths about Rochester that could not be 
overshadowed by the (mis)behaviors of even the most ill-tempered 
woman. This is not how the story ends in Jane Eyre, of course, 
and as a “pattern for countless others” (Gilbert and Gubar 338), 
Jane Eyre marks the break away from late 18th century feminism as 
a female-centered ideology and posits woman as individualist—in 
alliance with “her man”—in opposition to all other women. And, as 
critics, we are tempted to accept this inscription of the ‘bad 
girl,’ allowing this form of feminist individualist “rhetoric” to 
obscure the possibility of seeing ‘that woman’ as ourselves 
before we learned—through their example—that it is more conducive 
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to our happiness to act otherwise.  Until we are able to 
understand women’s poor education as a product of patriarchal 
oppression rather than an opportunity for rivalry, we will 
continue to read the ‘bad girl’s’ death as “a good thing for 
women.”   
While teaching a course that paired postcolonial and 
canonical British texts, I asked my students if we might still 
read Jane Eyre as a feminist text despite its representation of 
Bertha as a ‘disposable’ female figure. At this point, we had 
read Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea, a rewrite of Jane Eyre that 
describes Bertha’s life prior to her inscription into the 
“cardboard house” of Jane Eyre (107), calling Rochester’s 
representation of her history and her supposed ‘madness’ into 
question. Jane Eyre’s feminist individualist rhetoric is so 
convincing, however, that most students responded in the 
affirmative, suggesting that Bertha, recognized as ‘mad’ and 
locked away, could serve no other purpose than to allow Jane to 
achieve her feminist goals. I was struck by this response, as it 
signaled the extent to which feminism as an individualist 
enterprise has come to be understood as an acceptable way to 
achieve success as a woman in our society. In conducting research 
for my course, I found that most of the essays in MLA’s 
Approaches to Teaching Brontë’s Jane Eyre reinforce the 
representation of Jane Eyre as a “feminist” text. By teaching the 
text in this way, we perpetuate Jane Eyre’s representation of 
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feminism as a self-serving worldview, thus sanctioning the 
dehumanization of other women in the interests of feminist goals.  
We might, however, challenge Jane Eyre’s representation of 
feminism by teaching the text alongside the work of 
Wollstonecraft and Austen, demonstrating how these writers have 
interpreted and appropriated earlier texts and traditions 
differently, and how their representations of female-centered 
pedagogies simultaneously reflect and call Jane Eyre’s feminist 
approach into question. By reading feminism as a process of 
appropriation of earlier texts rather than a set of “attitudes” 
about women, we can address the limitations and possibilities 
allowed by different versions of feminism while simultaneously 
reminding students that these versions are always—-to greater and 
lesser degrees—-grounded in the masculine discourses from which 
they are derived. In this way, feminism might be recognized as a 
practice rather than a way of characterizing oneself—a practice 
that requires a consistent effort on the part of women to 
carefully revise and appropriate authoritative masculine 
discourses as a means of rethinking and reestablishing the Rights 
of Woman in today’s society. 
The need for such a practice became apparent to me the 
first time I taught Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman in a freshman composition course with a women’s 
studies focus. To offer historical context and to encourage 
students to see Wollstonecraft’s text as a response to the 
perspectives of other 18th century authorities on the subject of 
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women’s education, I had students first read excerpts from 
Gregory’s A Father’s Legacy to his Daughters. Anticipating that 
the very smart group of young women who had taken my course would 
be eager to challenge Gregory’s claims that women’s education 
should consist of learning how to please a man in the interests 
of catching a husband, I was surprised to find that reactions to 
the text were overwhelmingly favorable. Students described him as 
“caring,” “concerned,” and, generally speaking, simply “wanting 
the best for his daughters.” Reflecting on where I had faltered 
in my expectations, I realized that the didactic strategies 
Legacy deploys are very similar to the approach of modern-day 
magazines and self-help books in which misogynist ideology is 
often camouflaged as caring or well-meaning advice on women’s 
issues ranging from appearance to relationships to home 
decorating.  
This experience led me to consider the possibilities 
Wollstonecraft’s approach might open up for the women’s studies 
classroom. Wollstonecraft appropriates Gregory’s advice into the 
context of her argument for The Rights of Woman, describing it as 
a “system of slavery” and providing examples of what happens to 
women who fail to cultivate their understanding in the interests 
of pleasing men. How might Wollstonecraft’s work be introduced as 
a way of exemplifying to students how they might appropriate and 
revise masculine authoritative discourses they encounter in their 
everyday lives? Might Wollstonecraft’s treatment of Gregory model 
how to identify masculine authoritative discourse—even that which 
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seems “well meaning?” Could Wollstonecraft’s feminist approach 
open up different ways of talking about modern or postmodern 
women writers that may seem alienating or pose particular 
difficulties for students? While Wollstonecraft’s late 18th 
century feminist agenda may not necessarily comport with 
postmodern standards of womanhood in its emphasis on women as 
necessarily taking on the role of wives and mothers, her feminist 
approach offers a way of understanding feminism—not as an 
attitude or position—but as a constant struggle to revise 
existing discourses on the role of women in society and an 
opportunity to (re)imagine the rights of woman in our own terms. 
By studying Wollstonecraft’s approach, we might encourage 
students to appropriate and revise current notions of feminism 
that are all too often understood as abstract postmodern 
concepts—to recognize feminism as a practice that can become 
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